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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a study of how racial prejudices 
and stereotypes influenced Britain's utilization of Black 
military personnel from 1660 to 1997, with an emphasis on 
the twentieth century. In addition to the economic, 
strategic, and local causes of British imperialism, the idea 
of European, or "White," racial supremacy and Black 
inferiority helped to justify the empire to the government 
that ruled it, the bureaucrats who administered it, and the 
subjects, Black and White, who financed its exploration, 
military conquest, and economic exploitation. Throughout 
the empire, British authorities utilized Black colonial 
forces to augment the crown's military power and, logically, 
the same stereotypes and prejudices against Black peoples in 
general informed Britain's policies regarding Black military 
personnel in particular. 
I. The Role of Black Colonial Troops 
In India, Africa and the West Indies, British 
authorities found that "native" troops proved cost effective 
because they could better survive their own climate than 
foreign-born and generally higher paid White troops. In 
1920, the War Office listed the three purposes for which 
colonial forces existed: 
(i) For the protection of the area administered 
by local Government maintaining the Force, or 
certain vital portions of it, from external 
aggression. 
(ii) For the support of the Civil Power in the 
maintenance of law and order, including, in 
many cases, the protection of the White 
population from possible violence at the hands 
of the natives. 
(iii) Assistance in the defence of the Empire as 
a whole in time of war by providing units, 
either existing or produced by expansion.1 
In addition to assisting Britain to control many lands 
and peoples, Black colonial troops significantly augmented 
British military strength in the major conflicts of the 
twentieth century. In the First World War, the empire 
raised the following numbers of troops (Table 1): 
1 P.R.O. C.O. 537/621. "Local Defence Forces: 
Military Considerations regarding their Composition and 
Organization," 6 November 1920. 
2 
3 
Table 1. Manpower Contributions to the Imperial War Effort. 
White Empire 
Black Empire 
United Kingdom 
Dominions 
White Totals 
5,704,416 
1,306,512 
7,010,928 
Dead 
662,083 
137,639 
759,722 
India 1,440,437 47,746 
Colonies 134,837 3,649 
Black Totals 1,575,274 51,395 
Imperial Totals 8,586,202 811,117 
Source: Figures from Statistics of the Military Effort of 
the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920 (London: 
His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1922), 756. 
In the Second World War, the United Kingdom's armed 
forces grew to 4.6 million soldiers, sailors, and airmen and 
those of the Dominions 1.5 million. Meanwhile, India raised 
2.5 million soldiers, probably the largest volunteer army in 
history. 2 The "Colonial Empire" proper, which included the 
African and West Indian colonies, contributed another half 
million soldiers (Table 2): 
2 F.W. Perry, The Commonwealth armies: Manpower and 
orginisation in two world wars (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1988), 117. 
Table 2. Colonial Forces in the Second World War. 
Strengths as of : 
East Africa 
West Africa 
Mediterranean 
Middle East 
Far East 
Fiji and Western Pacific 
Caribbean and Bermuda 
Mauritius and Seychelles 
St. Helena 
Falklands Islands 
1 September 
1939 
11,119 
8,412 
1,441 
1,742 
15,227 
681 
4,162 
263 
0 
255 
---·····-·----· ............ __________________ _ 
1 May 
1945 
227,864 
145,862 
17,732 
27,052 
26,228 
11,912 
9,921 
4,943 
266 
194 
Colonial Empire Totals 43,302 471,974 
Source: P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice] CAB. 21/1689. E.E. 
Sabben-Clare, "The Colonial Military Forces in the Second 
World War," 1947. 
4 
A glance at the preceding figures reveals the numerical 
extent of Black involvement in Britain's military efforts, 
but the nature of that service reflected prevailing British 
attitudes concerning race. To summarize, in the Great War, 
Britain's Indian troops fought in Egypt and Mesopotamia 
against the Turks, in Salonika against the Bulgarians, but 
only briefly in France against the Germans. African 
colonial troops fought in the Cameroons and Tanganyika 
against German colonial troops, but not in Europe. In the 
Second World War, several Indian infantry divisions, with 
large British components, fought throughout the Middle East 
and Mediterranean theaters as well as in Burma against the 
5 
Japanese. Meanwhile, African combat troops fought in 
Ethiopia against the Italians and in Burma against the 
Japanese but were excluded from the European theater. In 
both world wars, a majority of the Indian, African and other 
colonial soldiers deployed outside their home colonies 
served as military laborers, or pioneers, behind the battle 
lines in the Middle East and South East Asia. In addition 
to serving in separate colonial military forces, individual 
Blacks have formed a small and usually unwelcome proportion 
of the British Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force. It is 
contended here that the British Empire's non-European 
manpower served in secondary or limited roles primarily as a 
consequence of British sentiment concerning race. 
II. Terms 
The term "race" has varied in its meaning, from a 
single ethnic group, e.g., "the Irish race," to the peoples 
inhabiting an entire continent, that is, "the African race." 
The complex evolution of British scientific thought on race 
will not be retraced in detail here; "race" will refer to 
skin color and its cultural attributes within the context of 
common British perceptions. In British eyes, the many 
peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean certainly 
differed physically and culturally from each other, but they 
shared one crucial link: they were not "White," and, thus, 
6 
lacked the primary qualification needed for political 
autonomy. The all-encompassing term "Black" will identify 
non-White British citizens, subjects, and protected persons 
of Asian, African and Afro-Caribbean descent. This usage 
follows a trend among scholars and British community groups 
to denote a social category within the British historical 
experience 3 , and largely supplants the negative and 
cumbersome device, "Non-European," as well as the tedious 
and repetitive listing of the various ethnic groups 
comprising the population of the British Empire. 
"European" and "White" will be used interchangeably 
because, in colonial settings, the recognition of variation 
in European nationalities gave way to the dichotomy between 
White and Black. "European" and "White" were used more 
often than "British" or "Briton" by British military and 
civilian officials to identify a person from the United 
Kingdom. The term "colonial troops" will refer to those 
military forces raised in Britain's overseas possessions and 
3See, for example, Laura Tabili "We Ask for British 
Justice: Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial 
Britain (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994) and David 
Killingray, "All the King's men?" Blacks in the British Army 
in the First World War, 1914-1918," in Ranier Lotz and Ian 
Pegg, eds., Under the Imperial Carpet: Essays in Black 
History (Crawley: Rabbit Press, 1986); See also, 
Wellingborough District Racial Equality Council, "National 
Curriculum History: Possible Black History Themes," a 
recent pamphlet prepared for school teachers. 
7 
administered by local colonial authorities, including 
India. 4 "Regular," "imperial," and "the forces" will denote 
the permanent full-time armed forces (the British army, 
Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force) maintained by the United 
Kingdom for service at home and in any part of the empire. 
"Volunteer corps" or "the volunteers" will refer to a type 
of colonial military force which was often unregulated and 
consisted of amateur part-time soldiers. 
III. Historiography 
Published works on the military experience of Black 
British subjects are numerous, but the most useful tend to 
fall within a few general categories, including memoirs, 
regimental histories, monographs, and polemics. The large 
number of published personal accounts provides much useful 
information on British attitudes toward Black troops and the 
inner workings of regimental life. 5 Unit histories mainly 
4 For the sake of this dissertation, the Indian army 
will be considered one of Britain's Black colonial forces, 
although technically, India constituted an administratively 
separate entity within the imperial framework. The India 
Off ice ruled India while the Colonial Off ice ruled most of 
the rest of Britain's colonial empire. 
5This sort of material is vast in the case of White 
British officers. For accounts by White officers in the 
African colonial forces, see W.D. Downes, With the Nigerians 
in East Africa, (London: John Murray, 1919) and Gerald 
Hanley, Monsoon Victory (London: Transworld Publishers, 
1958). For an excellent account by an officer in the Indian 
army, see John Master, Bugles and a Tiger (New York: Viking 
Press, 1956. Unfortunately, published accounts by Black 
service personnel are relatively few. Among these are E.M. 
8 
focus on administrative matters and narratives of glorified 
events in the particular unit's past. However, because 
their authors are usually current or former members of the 
regiment, 6 they often prove as useful as personal accounts. 
There are numerous scholarly studies of the military 
institutions and war-time experiences of various individual 
colonial possessions. 7 
Noble, Jamaica Airman: A Black Airman in Britain, 1943 and 
After (London: New Beacon Books, 1984) and Elvey Watson, The 
Carib regiment of World War II (New York: Vantage Press, 
1964). 
6R.A.R. Bent, Ten Thousand Men of Africa: The Story 
of the Bechuanaland Pioneers and Gunners, 1941-1946 (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1952); Brian Gray, Basuto Soldiers in Hitler's 
War (Maseru: Basutoland Government, 1953); A. Haywood and 
F.A.S. Clarke, The History of the Royal West AfricanFrontier 
Force (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1964); H. Moyse Bartlett, 
The King's African Rifles (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1956); 
E.H. Rhodes-Wood, A War History of the Royal Pioneer Corps 
1939-1945 (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1960). For general 
accounts of the Indian Army, see Byron Farwell, Armies of 
the Raj, From the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence: 1858-
1947 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989); Philip Mason, A Matter 
OIIIonour (New York: Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1974); S.L. 
Menezes, Fidelity and Honour (New Delhi: Viking Press, 
1993), and Charles Chenevix Trench, The Indian Army and the 
King's Enemies 1900-1947 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988). 
For a scholarly study on administrative matters, see T.A. 
Heathcote, The military in British India: The development 
of British land forces in South Asia, 1600-1947 (New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1995. For an intriguing social 
history, see David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj: The 
Indian Army, 1860-1940 (London: The MacMillan Press, 1994). 
7 Peter B. Clarke, West Africans at War, 1914-18, 
1939-45: Colonial Propaganda and its Cultural Aftermath 
(London: Ethnographicca, 1986); G.O. Olusanya, The Second 
World War and Politics in Nigeria 1939-1953 (Lagos: 
University of Lagos Press, 1973); O.J.E. Shiroya, Kenya and 
World War II: African Soldiers in the European War (Nairobi: 
9 
IV. Contribution to Field 
The subject of Black people's participation in British 
war efforts has received some attention. In a chapter of 
his 1979 dissertation on minority groups and military 
service around the world, Warren Lee Young took a 
comprehensive approach to the topic in his analysis of the 
political consequences of Black service in the British armed 
forces. 8 In the 1980s, David Killingray published two 
groundbreaking survey articles on Blacks in the British 
army. 9 Also, there are several provocative works on the 
military participation and exploitation of Black people 
which provide valuable information. 10 What has been lacking 
Kenya Literature Bureau, 1985); N.J. Westcott, "The Impact 
of the Second World War on Tanganyika, 1939-1949." (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Cambridge, 1982). 
8See chapter four of "Minority Groups and Military 
Service: Case Studies in World Perspective," Ph.D. diss., 
(University of Cambridge, 1979). 
9Killingray, "All the King's Men," and "Race 
Rank in the British army in the twentieth century." 
and Racial Studies 10, 3 (July 1987): 276-90. 
and 
Ethnic 
10The Caribbean at War: British West Indians in 
World War II. (London: The North Kensington Archive, 1992.); 
Marika Sherwood, Many Struggles: West Indian Workers and 
Service Personnel in Britain (1939-45) (London: Karia Press, 
1984); and Ben Bousquet and Colin Douglas, West Indian Women 
at War (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991); and J. Lee Ready, 
Forgotten Allies: The Military Contribution of the 
Colonies, Exiled Governments, and Lesser Powers to the 
Allied Victory in World War II. 2 Vols. (London: McFarland & 
Company, Inc., 1985). 
is a reverse approach to the politics of Black military 
service, a study tracing the impact of British conceptions 
of race on the utilization of Black service personnel. 
10 
In addition to practical, if not insurmountable, 
impediments such as deficiencies in shipping and supplies, 
the "racial mindset" of the British military and political 
establishments limited the use of Black colonial troops. 
Inculcated over many generations, racial stereotypes and 
prejudices against Black people informed British military 
policies but arguments in favor of utilizing Black colonial 
manpower challenged entrenched military prejudices. Hoping 
to strengthen the bonds of empire, the politically sensitive 
Colonial Office lobbied the services, especially the army, 
to provide opportunities for subject peoples to be 
"associated more closely" with British war efforts. In 
general, the military establishment's attitudes fluctuated 
between indifference to colonial politics and outright 
bigotry against Black people. This study of race's 
influence on military policy will complement an enormous 
body of historical literature dealing with the military 
experience of the British empire and commonwealth as well as 
colonialism and race relations. 
V. Summary 
In the balance of this chapter, I provide a background 
11 
sketch of the historical relationship of Britain and its 
Black subjects and colonial troops. Chapters two through 
four concern Black colonial troops, i.e., the military 
forces raised in the colonies and usually maintained by 
colonial governments for local service, from about 1850 
through the present. The second chapter, "Racial Supremacy 
and Military Policy," traces how concerns about "White 
prestige" tempered British trust in Black colonial troops. 
Valuable as Black colonial troops might have been, British 
reliance upon them to maintain European rule actually 
threatened that rule. Chapter three, "The Perceived Utility 
of Black Colonial Troops," examines the practical arguments 
offered by contemporaries to limit the usefulness of Black 
troops in the imperial order of battle, including a chronic 
lack of White officers, low British estimates of the 
fighting abilities of colonial troops and the fear that 
Blacks could not withstand the European climate. All of 
these "pragmatic" factors directly related to British 
perceptions of "race." Chapter four focuses on the West 
Indian contribution to the imperial orders of battle, 
especially in the Second World War. Black West Indians, 
culturally and genetically among the most "British" of 
Britain's non-European subjects, ironically endured the 
widespread disdain of British military authorities precisely 
because they were supposedly "too" White in manners and 
blood. 
12 
Chapters five through seven address the service of 
Black individuals in the United Kingdom-based armed forces 
because, while the policies affecting the conditions of 
service of colonial troops differed considerably from those 
of the United Kingdom forces, the stereotypes affecting the 
former have frequently impeded the service of the latter. 
Chapter Five discusses the considerable role played by 
Britain's Black soldiers and sailors during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The Georgian-era armed forces 
highly prized the service of Blacks, but usually as ornately 
attired musicians or laborers. In contrast, the Victorian 
era witnessed a general hardening of racial attitudes 
throughout British society, which the army and navy 
expressed via the imposition of color bars to Black 
enlistment and commissioning. In chapter six, the policies 
of the British government during and after the First World 
War are analyzed, in part to test how the intensification 
and lessening of colonial political pressures could alter 
the military policies of the metropolis. Many Black Britons 
and colonial subjects succeeded in enlisting in the forces 
throughout the war and the War Off ice suspended the color 
bar in 1918. The inter-war years saw the forces reinstate 
13 
their color bars although they were challenged by 
individuals, student organizations and politicians, but the 
military establishment clung on to this. In Chapter seven, 
the color bar's second suspension in 1939 and its 
consequences are traced. In the Second World War, Britain 
conscripted and accepted at least ten thousand Black British 
and colonial volunteers. Many Black personnel received 
commissions and decorations for their efforts but others 
suffered from discriminatory policies. Chapter eight will 
recount how service professionals, especially within the 
army and navy, strove to return to pre-war restrictions. 
Overruling the services, the Cabinet decided that, for the 
good of imperial and commonwealth relations, the color bar 
could not be renewed. Nevertheless, the forces have never 
been completely reconciled to being multi-racial in 
composition. 
VI. Britain and Black People 
While Britain's relationship with Black people dates 
back many centuries, the historical experience of Black 
people in Britain has received considerable scholarly 
attention only recently. 11 Around A.D. 200, long before the 
11Peter Fryer, Staying Power (London: Pluto Press, 
1984); Gretchen Gerzina, Black London: Life before 
Emancipation (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1995); Jagdish S. Gundara and Ian Duffield, eds., Essays on 
the History of Blacks in Britain (Aldershot: Avebury, 1992); 
14 
British conquered vast tracts of African lands and peoples 
in the nineteenth-century, the Romans had sent a unit of 
African soldiers to Britain. They received their discharges 
and settled there, thereby contributing to the 
"Romanization" of the country. In the Middle Ages, Africans 
captured by Vikings frequently participated in their 
masters' raids on the British isles, particularly Ireland. 
By the late fifteenth century, African entertainers became 
common features of English and Scottish royal courts. 12 
The Black presence in Britain has been continuous since 
the mid-1500s when John Hawkins brought a group of three 
hundred African slaves to Britain. During England's 
conflicts with Spain in the late sixteenth century, many 
Africans were captured from the enemy and brought to 
Britain. Enough Africans lived in Britain by 1596 to alarm 
the crown about the Black threat to the purity of English 
blood. In 1596, despite the fact that she herself had added 
an African entertainer and page to her court, Queen 
David Killingray, ed., Africans in Britain (London: Frank 
Cass, 1994); Folarin Shyllon, Black People in Britain, 1555-
1833 (London: Oxford University Press, 1977); Rozina 
Visram, Ayahs, Lascars and Princes: Indians in Britain, 
1700-1947 (London: Pluto Press, 1986); James Walvin, Black 
Ivory: A History of British Slavery (Washington, D.C.: 
Howard University Press, 1994) . 
12Paul Edwards, "The Early African Presence in the 
British Isles," in Gundara and Duffield, 9-29. 
15 
Elizabeth I called for the expulsion of Africans from 
England, thus issuing the first known racially 
discriminatory law in British history. 
Nevertheless, the ownership of African servants became 
fashionable in England among the wealthy and powerful, and 
within the monarchy itself. Elizabeth's successor, James I, 
had Black minstrels, and his wife, Black servants. In the 
1650s, the conquest of Spanish Jamaica facilitated the 
acquisition of African slaves. Britain's Black population 
grew to such an extent that, in 1731, the City of London 
banned Blacks from apprenticeships in trades. 13 
Alarm at the Black presence aside, Georgian society 
flirted with various clothing and decorating styles related 
to Black people and their cultures. 14 For example, the 
employment or ownership of Indian servants became widespread 
largely because of "nabobs" who returned to Britain after 
acquiring fortunes in the service of the East India Company. 
Once home, they often attempted to recreate the 
luxuriousness of their Indian existences by constructing 
Indian-style houses and importing Indian servants to staff 
them. 15 Other "Black"-inspired customs among Britons 
13Gerzina, 4; Shyllon, 93, 84-5. 
14V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1969), 19-22. 
15Visram, 11-13. 
16 
included the imitation of Africans for social gatherings and 
entertainment. Also, African images became features in the 
crests of prominent families, whether or not they had 
actually been involved with slavery. 16 
The institution of slavery continued in the British 
Isles well after the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. 
In the celebrated Somerset Case of 1772, a British chief 
justice, Lord Mansfield, had ruled that an escaped slave 
could not be forced to leave Britain by a master. This 
decision did not, in itself, end slavery in the British 
isles, but a Scottish court in 1778 decreed that slavery was 
illegal in Scotland. In England itself, slavery remained 
legal for a further six decades. 17 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, Blacks continued to arrive in Britain, typically 
as seamen or increasingly as students. 18 Numerically, 
merchant sailors formed the largest group of Black 
16Gerzina, 5-6. 
17Shyllon, 24-8. 
180n African students, see Ray Jenkins, "Gold 
Coasters Overseas, 1880-1919," Immigrants and Minorities 4 
(November 1985): 5-52; Hakim Adi, "West African Students 
in Britain, 1900-60," and John D. Hargreaves, "African 
Students in Britain: The Case of Aberdeen University," in 
David Killingray, ed., Africans in Britain (Ilford, Essex: 
Frank Cass, 1994), 129-44. 
17 
individuals who settled in Britain. Indian sailors, 
"lascars," crewed many of the vessels travelling between 
India and Britain while Africans and West Indians joined the 
crews of ships carrying transatlantic trade. Between 
voyages, Black seamen congregated in the major ports of 
Britain, especially Liverpool and Cardiff and many married 
local women. Until the large-scale immigration of the post-
1945 period, the visible Black population numbered between 
ten to twenty thousand. As individual Blacks settled in 
Britain, they and their usually mixed-descent progeny 
intermarried with the general population and eventually 
disappeared as a visibly distinct presence. However, the 
arrival of individual Blacks continually renewed Britain's 
Black population. 
VII. Racial images 
An important focus of the historical scholarship on 
Black people in the British empire has been the issue of 
"race" or "race relations." 19 In addition to encountering 
19For examples, see Christine Bolt, Victorian 
Attitudes to Race (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971); 
Philip D. Curtin, The Image of Africa (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1964); Allen J. Greenberger, The British 
Image of India (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); 
Ronald Hyam, Empire and Sexuality: The British Experience 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Winthrop D. 
Jordan, The White Man's Burden (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974); Douglas Lorimer, Colour, Class and the 
Victorians (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1978); 
and J.A. Mangan, ed., The Imperial Curriculum: Racial images 
and education in the British colonial experience (London: 
Black individuals in Britain, British people observed 
thousands of Africans in African and American settings via 
trade, war and slavery. The physical and cultural 
differences between the themselves and Africans profoundly 
affected the perspectives of many Britons. 20 In historian 
Winthrop D. Jordan's words, 
From the first, Englishmen tended to set Africans 
over against themselves, to stress what they 
conceived to be radically contrasting qualities of 
color, religion, and style of life, as well as 
animality and a peculiarly potent sexuality. 21 
18 
By the eighteenth-century, British racial theorists accepted 
that African physical attributes were connected to the 
"African way of life."22 Thus, in the English world view, 
"White and Black connoted purity and filthiness, virginity 
and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness, 
beneficence and evil, God and the Devil." 23 
The association of racial characteristics with behavior 
coincided with a demand for cheap labor in the New World. 
Economic interests induced pro-slavery propagandists to 
justify African slavery on the grounds that Africans were 
Routledge, 1993) . 
20Gerzina, 5. 
21 Jordan, 25. 
22Curtin, 30. 
23Jordan, 6. 
inherently inferior to Whites and destined for servitude. 
These sorts of writers propagated the view that Africans 
were lazy, sexually aggressive, stupid, and incapable of 
improvement. 
19 
Ironically, the racial prejudice developing among the 
British in the Georgian era did not translate into 
segregation or physical danger for Black people in Britain. 
Historian Douglas Lorimer suggests that, in Georgian 
Britain, Black peoples, including African slaves, suffered 
little discrimination or bigotry when it came to inter-
racial marriage or to social relations with Whites as a 
whole. Indeed, Lorimer claims that "no clear pattern of 
institutionalized or socially sanctioned discrimination was 
in evidence." Instead, Britons of the period reserved their 
violent xenophobia for Roman Catholics. 24 
In the late nineteenth century, however, British racism 
developed into a widely-held antipathy for Black people. 
Metropolitan attitudes towards Blacks had changed during the 
Victorian era because of transitions in British social 
structures. According to Lorimer, as the middle-class 
expanded and became more highly class-conscious, Blacks, 
including educated "gentlemen," in Britain became equated 
with the inferior social status of the working class and 
24 Lorimer, 28-31. 
20 
impoverished Whites. Middle-class Victorians disdained 
Blacks and lower class Whites in British cities "equally." 
To summarize, according to Lorimer, "mid-Victorian attitudes 
to race rested upon assumptions about differences of class 
rather than upon a perception of the unique physical 
attributes of racial groups." 25 
Late Victorian racial thought rejected previous 
philanthropic sentimentality concerning Africans and Asians. 
Informed by Social Darwinism and other new sciences, British 
scholars argued forcefully for the biological inability of 
non-Europeans to improve. Concurrently, philanthropic 
opinion had been disillusioned by the apparent failure of 
Caribbean and Indian peoples to improve their societies 
along English lines after extensive reforms. Instead of 
adopting English ways, the subject peoples retained their 
previous norms and, on occasion, violently rejected colonial 
control. 26 From the British perspective, this demonstrated 
inherent flaws in Black peoples as well as any other group 
that failed to adhere to British, particularly, southeastern 
English standards. 
In the Victorian worldview, physical attributes and 
cultural achievements divided the races of the world into a 
25 Ibid., 92-107. 
26Wa1 vi n, 3 3 o-2 . 
21 
hierarchy with Anglo-Saxons and other Germanic peoples at 
the top. Although the British regarded all Black peoples as 
"children," Asians were ranked higher than Africans in 
cultural achievement. In particular, the British placed in 
the front rank of non-Europeans the "Aryan" peoples of 
northern India because they most closely resembled the 
British conception of physical beauty. 27 In comparison, 
Britons commonly believed that Africans had physical but not 
mental strength and tended toward a greater degree of 
"savageness"[sic] . 28 African peoples, according to this 
line of thought, possessed no history, sophisticated 
political institutions, or ambition to exploit their 
continent. The contempt felt for Africans could often take 
incredible forms as when, in 1873, the Times discussed a 
suggestion to settle "industrious" Chinese in Africa in 
order to displace the native Africans. The organ claimed 
that, though it acknowledged the African's inferiority to 
the Chinaman "as a specimen of humanity," it was not certain 
whether or not the world was "prepared for the substitution 
of one race for the other after the fashion proposed." 29 
Historian and journalist Peter Fryer has usefully 
divided late Victorian racism into eight forms of 
27Bolt, 186-7. 
28 Ibid., 208-10. 
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expression. As "phrenology," racism informed British rulers 
that, because of physical characteristics, such as the shape 
of their skulls, Black people lacked "force of character." 
As "teleology," racism provided the British with the idea 
that the destiny of Blacks was to labor for Whites. 
Anthropological racism held that Black people had more in 
common with apes than with Europeans. Social Darwinism told 
Britons that the inherent inferiority of Blacks condemned 
them to eventual extinction. In the form of Anglo-Saxon 
nationalism, racism reflected a belief in a divinely 
ordained mission for Britain to conquer and rule others. 
Racism also took the form of trusteeship, or the view that 
Britain had the moral obligation to educate and guide Black 
peoples, usually for an indefinite period of time. Finally, 
popular racism, expressed through popular entertainment and 
jingoistic newspapers, persuaded the British public that 
British rule benefited colonial peoples. All of these 
variations of racism served a common political purpose in 
that they justified British colonial rule over Black 
peoples. 30 
29Times (London), 5 June 1873. 
30Peter Fryer, Black People in the British Empire 
(London: Pluto, 1988), 66-67. 
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VIII. Racial Conflict in the Twentieth Century 
Victorian racial paradigms remained firmly entrenched 
in the British mindset well into the twentieth century. 
Nevertheless, the Black population of Britain grew because 
of the service of colonial Blacks in the armed forces and 
merchant marine. After the First World War, thousands 
remained in British ports rather than return to their home 
colonies. However, the poor economic conditions and job 
prospects for all returning veterans, Black and White, 
created social stresses throughout Britain. These tensions 
exploded in 1919 with anti-Black riots in several cities 
including Liverpool and Cardiff. Often, the local civil 
authorities proved unable or unwilling to prevent the 
violence. The 1919 riots marked the onset of a turbulent 
phase in the experience of Black people in Britain. 
Between 1920 and the Second World War, racism mainly 
took the form of discrimination. For example, in a pre-war 
survey of individuals, families, and guest houses providing 
housing for students, about 40 percent "expressed specific 
unwillingness to take a coloured guest." 31 Since the Second 
World War, hundreds of thousands of Black people have 
settled in Britain to escape the poverty or violence of 
31K.L. Little, "A Note on Colour Prejudice amongst 
the English 'Middle Class,'" Man (September-October 1943): 
105. 
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their previous homes. Eventually, the Black presence grew 
to approximately 5 percent of the British population and 
concentrated mainly in the larger cities. Paralleling 
trends in the United States, racial strife became a 
prominent feature of British national life. 
CHAPTER II 
RACIAL SUPREMACY AND MILITARY POLICY 
Virtually wherever the British established a presence 
in an area inhabited by Black peoples, especially tropical 
regions, they raised Black troops. The main regions 
"requiring" the employment of Black colonial units included 
India, Africa and the West Indies. Inevitably, "racial" 
considerations became limiting factors in Britain's 
utilization of Black colonial soldiers. First, British 
reliance upon Black troops to police the empire raised 
questions as to just which Black ethnic groups should be 
tapped for military service. Out of this dilemma arose one 
of the central racial myths affecting the utilization of 
colonial soldiers, the "martial races" theory, which held 
that only certain ethnic groups in Africa and Asia provided 
good soldiers. Secondly, the British never completely 
trusted the Black troops they did select for recruitment. 
The authorities realized that Black troops could and did 
occasionally mutiny and, within a given colonial possession, 
White military forces of some kind were always deemed 
necessary just in case the loyalty and discipline of Black 
soldiers wavered. Therefore, the extensive use of Black 
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colonial troops actually reinforced the necessity of 
maintaining White units throughout the empire. Because 
regular army regiments and sailors were scarce, the 
participation of European colonial subjects in military 
units, particularly amateur volunteer corps, became a 
necessary support for colonial rule. Logically, the British 
could only extend the privilege of serving in volunteer 
units to those peoples thought to be loyal and loyalty 
became enmeshed in racial politics. A third racial 
consideration was that the employment of Black troops 
potentially challenged the "great bluff" of colonial rule, 
"White Supremacy." After all, colonial troops might have 
been called upon to kill European enemies or, worse still, 
travel to Europe where they would have close contact with 
White civilians, especially women, of all levels of society. 
Colonial interests feared that Black familiarity with 
Whites, in the form of mortal or amorous embrace, would 
lessen European prestige in the eyes of Black servicemen. 
Also, the diverse nature of the British Empire and 
commonwealth caused troops of various nationalities to serve 
alongside each other but the possibility of racial friction 
between soldiers from different backgrounds threatened the 
internal harmony of the empire and complicated Britain's war 
efforts. 
I. Colonial Forces, Race and "Martial Races," 1857-1947 
A. Asia 
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The first colonial military force to be considered in 
this chapter, the Indian army, was by far the largest 
maintained by Britain. The body of literature, scholarly 
and otherwise, relating to the Indian army is vast because 
of the force's size and long length of service within the 
imperial order of battle. From 1600 to 1857, the East India 
Company functioned as the main agent for Britain in India. 
For the first century of its presence in India, the company 
focused its energies on securing trade, and its military 
forces remained small until the mid-eighteenth century, when 
the struggles between Britain and France made India a hotly 
contested prize. The Battle of Plessey in 1757 decided the 
rivalry in favor of the company, which received the right to 
tax, or plunder, much of Bengal. The company then possessed 
its own economic resources with which to expand its 
authority and assume a direct political role in India. By 
1857, the company had either eliminated or neutralized most 
of its political opponents in the subcontinent. Its 
military forces were organized into armies based in Bombay, 
Madras, and Bengal and consisted of native Indian and a 
small portion of European mercenary units. Regular British 
army regiments supplemented company forces, but Indian 
troops always significantly outnumbered White soldiers by 
several times. 
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In its imperial role, the Indian army functioned as a 
reserve and "fire-brigade" for British interests in the 
entire part of the globe considered by Britain to be the 
"East." For example, under company control, Indian troops 
campaigned in the Dutch East Indies in the early 1800s. 
Later, under direct crown control, the Indian army fought in 
Abyssinia in 1867, garrisoned Malta in 1878, and, toward the 
close of the century, provided contingents for service in 
East Africa and China. 
Just before the First World War, the Indian forces 
fielded 241,934 soldiers. 1 The army of the "King-Emperor" 
in 1914 looked much different from the East India Company's 
forces in the years before the Indian Mutiny of 1857. In 
that year, much of the company's largest military force, the 
Bengal army, mutinied against its British officers. The 
soldiers, a high proportion of whom were high caste Hindus, 
had been suborned by fears that Christianity would be forced 
upon them. After the mutiny's suppression, the British 
government assumed direct rule of India. Over the next half 
century, the new administration transformed the composition 
of the military by drastically reducing the recruitment of 
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darker-skinned southerners, including high-caste Bengali 
Hindus, while increasing that of "martial races," i.e., 
Moslems, Sikhs and Gurkhas of the north and northwest. The 
"martial races" theory held that some ethnic groups and 
castes possessed characteristics such as simplicity, 
fidelity, courage and a warrior tradition which others, such 
as the previously favored Bengali Brahmins, apparently 
lacked. 2 
British military authorities attributed to each of the 
"martial races" certain unique qualities. For example, 
according to a government handbook on Sikh soldiers, the 
Sikh's "natural profession" was that of a soldier: "offer 
him but good pay, and there is no service, however difficult 
or dangerous, for which he will not gladly come forward." 3 
Freddie Guest, who served as an officer with a typical mixed 
cavalry regiment, rated the main types of cavalry trooper 
within his unit. He ranked Hindu Rajputs as the "first and 
highest type of fighting soldier amongst the Hindus" while 
"the Punjabi is probably the best type of fighting 
Mahommedan in India." 4 Following the dictum of "divide and 
2 See Pradeep Barua, "Inventing race: The British and 
India's martial races," Historian 58, 1, (Autumn 1995): 107-
117. 
3A.H. Bingley, Sikhs (Simla: Government Central 
Printing Office, 1899), 93. 
4Freddie Guest, Indian Cavalryman (London: Jarrolds, 
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rule," or, in this case, "counterpoise," most Indian army 
battalions, excluding the trusted Gurkhas, contained "mixed-
class" companies and platoons drawn from different ethnic or 
religious groups. 5 In 1920, a high-ranking Indian army 
officer optimistically noted that, "the different races have 
their own characteristics; by mixing them you get a 
combination of elan, stubbornness, and endurance." 6 More 
realistically, by means of "counterpoise," the authorities 
in India intended to forestall any united dissent among 
members of any particular battalion. Unfortunately, this 
pitting of ethnic groups against one another resulted in 
difficulties in the provision of supplies and replacements 
during long periods of combat. 
B. Africa 
In the early 1800s, Britain's military presence in 
Africa remained limited, and usually consisted of small 
penal formations or allied African levies. For example, 
Britain established the Royal African Corps in 1800 to 
garrison Goree, just off the West Coast of Africa. Soon, 
1959) I 88. 
~ark Houston Jacobsen, "The Modernization of the 
Indian Army, 1925-1939," (Ph.D. diss., University of 
California at Irvine, 1979), 211. 
6James Willcocks, With the Indians in France 
(London: Constable and Company, 1920), 58. 
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the regiment began to recruit Africans because European 
soldiers, mostly military criminals, could not survive the 
diseases associated with the climate; after 1817, it 
recruited only Africans. 7 Until the late 1800s, White 
British officers raised temporary levies of soldiers from 
African allies to supplement their regular forces. These 
units received few, if any, modern arms and little western 
military training but fought in most, if not all, campaigns 
against the Ashanti in West Africa as well as in the 
numerous campaigns in southern Africa against the so-called 
"Kaffirs" and Zulus. 
British expansion in western and eastern Africa 
necessitated the establishment of numerous small regular 
units including the Sierra Leone Frontier Force, the Royal 
Niger Haussas, Gold Coast Haussas, and the Uganda Rifles. 
Local colonial authorities controlled most of the African 
colonial units but the War Office maintained a few of its 
own for specifically "imperial" duties such as the 
garrisoning of Mauritius and the naval base at Freetown. By 
the early 1900s, British authorities had replaced these 
smaller formations with larger military units: the West 
African Frontier Force (W.A.F.F.; later "R[oyal]. W.A.F.F.") 
7J.J. Crooks, "The Royal African Corps, 1800-1821," 
United Services Magazine 15 (1917): 213-221. 
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in West Africa and the King's African Rifles (K.A.R.) in 
East Africa, each of which contained several regiments or 
battalions. Following the Indian example, the British 
applied the martial races theory to their growing African 
military forces. To fill the ranks of the West African 
battalions, for example, British recruiters preferred Muslim 
and "pagan" northerners over coastal, more sophisticated 
peoples such as the Ashanti and Sierra Leone creoles. 8 
C. Limitations of the "Martial Races" Theory 
The "martial races" theory had no genuine scientific 
merits, but it met British military requirements. In India, 
for instance, the British felt that high-caste Hindu 
Bengalis, a favored group before the 1857 Mutiny, could no 
longer be trusted. British recruiters then looked to 
Gurkhas and lighter-skinned Muslims and Sikhs of the north 
and the northwest. These peoples appeared to possess the 
hardiness, fidelity, and "simplicity" found lacking in their 
southern counterparts. Thus, the "martial races" theory 
reflected immediate political and military necessity. In 
the long-term, adherence to the paradigm actually created 
problems for colonial authorities. 
8 S.C. Ukpabi, "Recruiting for the British Colonial 
Forces in West Africa in the Nineteenth Century," Odu 10 
(July 1974): 79-96 and J. Bayo Adekson, "Ethnicity and army 
recruitment in colonial plural societies," Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 2 (April 1979): 153-8. 
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By its nature, the "martial races" theory limited the 
pool of potential Black colonial troops available to 
Britain. In particular, manpower availability became a 
serious question during the world wars because the military 
establishments in both Asia and Africa initially sought to 
recruit exclusively from minority martial races and not from 
the general populations. In practice, the "martial races" 
theory strained the traditional manpower sources of the 
empire while others remained untouched. 9 In the case of 
Malaya, adherence to the "martial races" theory contributed 
to the British defeat at Singapore in 1942 because it had 
prevented the British rulers from forming regular military 
units from Malays. Throughout the Victorian era, Malays had 
been judged as "effeminate," inherently incapable to resist 
conquest, and far from the physical model of White 
manliness. During the early twentieth century, influential 
Malays pressed for a permanent military unit until the 
British relented in 1933 and created the one-battalion Malay 
Regiment. 10 Unfortunately, the regiment remained an 
9 In addition to regimental histories, see Aubrey 
O'Brien, "The Inexpansiveness of the Indian army," United 
Service Magazine ns 54 (February 1917): 376-82; and Rita 
Headrick, "African Soldiers in World War II," Armed Forces 
and Society 4 (May 1978): 504-7. 
10See Nadzam Haran, "The Malay Regiment, 1933-1955: 
Political and Social Study of a Colonial Military 
Establishment in Malaya," Ph.D. diss. (University of Essex, 
1987), 64-106; and M.C. Sheppard, "The Malay Soldier." 
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"experiment" and the British formed a second battalion of 
the regiment only in December 1941, too late to 
significantly affect the outcome of the Malayan Campaign. 11 
Another problem of the "martial races" paradigm was 
that, in addition to shunning "effeminate" Black peoples, it 
discounted the literate, mostly urban recruits required for 
the efficient functioning of modern armies. The rustic 
"martial" peoples of the hinterlands of the empire provided 
Britain with brave and capable soldiers for colonial 
policing, but, for modern attritional warfare, colonial 
infantry and cavalry required the support of massive numbers 
of technologically sophisticated soldiers who would serve in 
skilled occupations such as lorry drivers, mechanics, 
electricians, wireless operators, and artillery gunners. 
Unfortunately for British traditionalists, most educated 
subjects could be found only among "non-martial" groups, 
specifically those with a significant degree of 
Westernization. The British generally held low opinions of 
western-educated Africans and Asians on the one hand and 
mixed-descent Eurasians and Black West Indians on the other. 
In the age of Social Darwinism, these types seemed to be 
Straits Times Annual, (1939): 31. 
11Donald H. Webber, Letter to Wife, 1945 (?), Webber 
Collection, Imperial War Museum, London. 
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"artificial" constructs and weak imitators of European 
culture. In British eyes, mixed-race and "mixed-culture" 
individuals possessed too much of a non-European background, 
even if that of a "martial race," to be redeemed by the 
supposed superior attributes of White civilization. 12 
The case of the Eurasian community in India epitomized 
a persistent difficulty facing British colonial rule, the 
conflict between existing racial paradigms and military 
security. India's Eurasians formed one the most prominent 
groups of "westernized" Black peoples in the empire whom the 
British denied a regular military role. Eurasians, 
descendants of inter-marriage and liaisons between 
Europeans, often soldiers, and Indian women, usually 
identified themselves with the local European community. In 
turn, Whites of Britain's middle and upper-classes in India 
usually disdained the association. Hoping to benefit 
economically and socially, Eurasians desired greater 
opportunities for service in the British military, but their 
possession of "Asiatic" blood made their martial qualities 
suspect. 13 Even White proponents of greater Eurasian 
12Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly 
Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the late 
nineteenth century (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1995) and William Moore, "Recruiting the Anglo-Indian Army," 
Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review 2 (1891): 48. 
13 F. Loraine Petre, "The Inefficiency of India's 
Volunteers: An Indictment and a Remedy," Empire Review 5 
36 
military participation acknowledged biologically-determined 
weaknesses in Eurasians. For example, the Anglo-Indian 
Allen's Indian Mail, argued that Eurasians "may, as a rule, 
be better at driving quills than wielding swords or rifles," 
but, "if hereditary instincts count for anything, some of 
them must possess a martial spirit and a taste for active 
pursuits. " 14 Throughout the history of the Indian empire, 
Britain denied the Eurasian community a regular military 
function, but they, and other "non-martial" peoples did find 
a role in a peculiar sort of military unit, the amateur 
part-time "volunteer corps." 
II. Trust and Local Colonial Forces 
At times, Britain's dependency upon Black troops 
jeopardized the internal security of the empire. Around the 
globe, few colonial governments expected that they could 
rely exclusively on locally raised Black troops to maintain 
internal security. In the Caribbean area, several mutinies 
by Black troops in the early 1800s had convinced British 
authorities to maintain European troops there in order to 
guard against insurrection. Similarly, after the 1857 
(May 1903): 385. 
14Quoted in the Times (London), 12 August 1873, p. 
6. See, also, Moore, 47-8. See also, Arthur N. Gordon, 
"Local regiments for India," Empire Review 27 (March 1914): 
112-3. 
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Indian Mutiny, thousands of British troops remained to 
garrison India, even during world war emergencies. In 
addition to defending India from external assault, the 
British garrison watched Indian soldiers. Whenever 
possible, the authorities maintained a proportion of one 
White soldier for every two Indian soldiers. They usually 
assigned one British battalion with two or three Indian ones 
to a brigade, a pattern strictly adhered to until late in 
the Second World War. 
Since regular army units were often unavailable in 
sufficient numbers, White colonial subjects looked to 
"volunteer corps" for their self-preservation. Briefly, the 
Victorian volunteer movement had originated in Britain with 
the formation of self-supporting, normally unpaid, part-
time, and loosely regulated military units in 1859. 
Enrollment in a volunteer corps conferred military prestige 
on members without the social stigma attached to service in 
the regular army and militia. 15 
15 In Britain, large numbers of volunteer units 
formed during the invasion scares of the late eighteenth-
and early nineteenth centuries. After the Napoleonic wars, 
the public's interest in military matters remained dormant 
until the Crimean War, 1854-56. Then, the physical and 
spiritual well-being of servicemen became objects of much 
concern for reform, and elements of British society 
expressed a desire for a closer association with the army 
and navy. They received their chance at military glory in 
1859, during a war scare with France. Tens of thousands of 
eager middle class patriots spontaneously formed themselves 
into amateur "volunteer" regiments. Thus, they avoided 
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The growing enthusiasm for the military in Victorian 
Britain paralleled similar trends throughout the empire. 
However, "race," rather than social class, tended to be the 
main criterion for membership in a particular colonial 
volunteer unit. The three main purposes of a typical White 
volunteer unit, such the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps, 
included 1) defending the colony from external threats 2) 
assisting the civil authorities in maintaining law and 
order, and 3) training potential officers for other military 
forces. 16 Of course, other, if not all, British military 
forces shared the same general responsibilities. However, 
the second reason cited is of particular interest here 
because, in places where Black populations outnumbered 
Europeans, "assisting the civil authorities in maintaining 
law and order" meant safe-guarding European lives. As the 
Navy and Army Illustrated put it, a European man in India 
"always has hanging over his head the possibility of 
suddenly being called upon, not only to defend his own life, 
serving in the regular army and militia under aristocratic 
officers and alongside members of the lower socio-economic 
orders. See Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social 
and Political History, 1859-1908 (Hamden, CT: Archon, 1975); 
and S.P. MacKenzie, The Home Guard (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
16G.L.L. Lushington, "Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps, 
1900-1949," TMs, Imperial War Museum, London. 
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but that also of all those dependent upon him." 17 The 
Taranaki Rifle Corps in New Zealand claimed the distinction 
of being the first "British" volunteer unit to see combat, 
in 1859 against the Maoris. 18 The White settlers of 
southern Africa could easily dispute that claim because they 
had frequently formed themselves into volunteer units to 
fight various African foes since the beginning of European 
colonization. 19 Even in nominally independent China, the 
British community formed the Shanghai Volunteer Corps in 
1853 in order to protect itself from the "natives."20 
Volunteering may have seemed, from the European 
perspective, necessary for the security of White civilians 
and the maintenance of British influence, but it was not an 
exclusively White phenomenon. Non-European subjects 
17
"The Volunteer Army in India--I," The Navy and 
Army Illustrated 14 (12 July 1902): 419. 
18W.J. Penn, The Taranaki Rifle Volunteers (New 
Plymouth, New Zealand, 1909. 
19F.K. Mitchell, "Sansom's Horse." Military History 
Journal 2, 6 (December 1973): 213-215. See, "My Volunteer 
Troop in Kafirland," Bentley's Miscellany 29 (1851): 355-
360, for a humorous account of a mounted volunteer unit's 
misfortune. 
20H.P.E. Pereira, "Shanghai Volunteer Corps," 
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 33 
(1955): 139; A. McK. Annand, "The Tientsin Volunteer Corps 
in the Boxer Rising, 1900," Journal of the Society for Army 
Historical Research 36 (December 1958): 179-81; "A Report 
on the Tientsin Volunteer Corps in 1900," Journal of the 
Society for Army Historical Research 39 (June 1961): 66-70. 
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throughout the empire formed or enrolled in volunteer units 
in order to share in the prestige of military service and 
demonstrate loyalty, identity, and equality. White 
reactions to Black volunteering depended upon local 
political and military conditions. In Victoria, British 
Columbia, the local Black population raised the Victoria 
Pioneer Rifle Corps in 1860, but White hostility caused it 
to be disbanded four years later. 21 In West Africa, where 
the European population was sparse until the twentieth 
century, volunteering began in 1863 when a small group of 
African volunteers accompanied a British military expedition 
against the Ashantis. In 1872, African subjects established 
the Gold Coast Rifles and the corps, which included African 
officers, received permission to become permanent in 1892. 
It had an initial authorized strength of one hundred, 
although it grew to a strength of four hundred within two 
years. 22 In the Far East, Europeans and Eurasians had 
21 S.W. Jackson, "The Victoria Pioneer Rifle Corps," 
Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 39 
(March 1961): 41-3. 
22Gold Coast Rifle Volunteers," The Volunteer 
Service Magazine 31 (December 1894): 313-318. After 1900, 
the sparse and scattered European population in the Gold 
Coast formed small volunteer units of their own, including 
the Railway Volunteers and Mines Volunteers, but the 
government did not generally regard them as combat-worthy 
because of their lack of training. Killingray, "The 
Military in the Gold Coast," Ph.D. diss. (Cambridge 
University, 1980), 63-64. 
41 
formed the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps in 1854 in 
response to riots among the Chinese population. 
Indifference by Whites led to its dissolution in 1887, but, 
in 1900, Europeans formed a new corps, followed soon by 
separate Chinese, Eurasian and Malay units. Until 1915, 
Malayan volunteer corps remained exclusively European, 
although local sultans and maharajahs financially supported 
them. Ironically, these Asian sponsors acted as honorary 
colonels of units in which they could not ordinarily 
enroll. 23 
Though British authorities in India denied Eurasians an 
opportunity for regular military service, the government 
allowed them to enroll in volunteer corps. The first 
"Indian" volunteer units had been formed in the eighteenth 
century by British merchants and bureaucrats. The much more 
extensive volunteer movement of the nineteenth century 
received its impetus from the 1857 Mutiny during which 
Europeans as well as Eurasians quickly established rifle and 
cavalry units throughout India. By 1900, the infantry 
component of the Indian volunteers had become a largely 
Eurasian body, with Europeans concentrating in the elite and 
23 T.M. Winsley, A History of the Singapore Volunteer 
Corps, 1854-1937 (Singapore, 1937), 12-13; G.H. Kelling, 
"Untitled History of the Military forces of Malaya," n.d., 
TMs., Imperial War Museum, London. 
42 
expensive cavalry units. 24 Despite the practical usefulness 
of Eurasian volunteers, many Whites criticized the high 
proportion of them within the volunteers. For example, 
Major General Edwin Collen, Military Member of the Vice-
Roy's Council, asserted in 1903 that "the volunteer force is 
intended, and rightly intended, to be a force composed of 
men of our own racial characteristics and creed ... " 25 In 
regard to volunteering, however, Britain's precarious 
position in India negated anti-Eurasian sentiment. 
By allowing Eurasian volunteers, the Indian government 
encouraged these mixed-descent subjects to look to Britain 
for identity and social position. On the other hand, the 
British denied Indian subjects, in particular, westernized 
professionals, the right to establish or enroll in volunteer 
corps out of fear of arming and training potential rebels. 
Indian participation in volunteering became a charged 
political issue in 1885 during a war scare with Russia. 
Indians, especially members of the western-educated urban 
classes, demanded that they be allowed to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the empire by sharing equally in its defense. 
24A.A. Mains, "The Auxiliary Force (India)," Journal 
of the Society for Army Historical Research 61, 247 (1983): 
162-3; Madhvi Yasin, "The Volunteer Movement," The 
Quarterly Review of Historical Studies 24,4 (1985): 29-36. 
25Edwin Collen, "The Volunteer Forces of India," 
Empire Review 5 (April 1903): 225. 
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The opponents of Indian volunteers cited the "effeminacy" 
and disloyalty of the western educated urban Indians (called 
"Babus" by the British) who wished to enroll. Ultimately, 
the government decided against the inclusion of Indians in 
the "Indian" volunteers. 26 
In the First World War, White colonial volunteer units 
mainly served as officer pools for regular colonial forces, 
while Black volunteers assisted local civil authorities in 
upholding British rule. In Britain itself, enthusiasm for 
military service had all but disappeared in the decade 
following the Great War. In contrast, the White populations 
in the colonies continued to be "militarized," though out of 
perceived necessity rather than glamour. White colonial 
subjects remained a key element of the effective external 
defense and internal security of overseas possessions. With 
the possible exception of the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence 
Corps Artillery, which contained both European and non-
European members in the 1930s, 27 membership in local 
colonial forces normally depended upon one's descent. The 
War Office advised colonial governments to maintain: 
26 See Sinha, 69-95. 
27 P.R.O. W.O. 32/4153. Minute by Raining, 28 May 
1937. 
(i) A small 'Active' Force, composed of one or 
more of the following types of unit: 
(a) Native units with White officers on a 
regular basis. 
(b) Non-regular native units. 
(c) Non-regular White units. 
(ii) A White 'Reserve' Force including all male 
Europeans not serving in the 'Active' Force 
and divided into two sections: 
A. Composed of young men who with their 
qualifications are registered, and 
who, where possible, receive annual 
training 
B. Including the remaining men of 
military age, and forming a 
'National Guard' for use in 
great emergencies. 28 
44 
Colonial responses varied but usually conformed generally to 
these stipulations. In the mid-1920s, the Gold Coast 
replaced its autonomous African and European volunteer units 
with a tightly regulated Local Defence Force (L.D.F.) for 
Europeans and an African Territorial Force with an 
exclusively White officer corps. 29 Going a step further, 
the government of Kenya required White settlers to enroll in 
the part-time Kenya Defence Force. 30 
28 P.R.O. C.O. 537/621. "Local Defence Forces: 
Military Considerations regarding their Composition and 
Organization," 6 November 1920. 
29Killingray, "The Military in the Gold Coast," 63-
4 . 
30Peter Ernest Walters, Interview, n.d., transcript, 
Department of Sound Records, Imperial War Museum, London. 
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Not only did the racial nature of colonialism compel 
Whites to serve in local forces, racial politics also made 
it imperative that they serve at the front during imperial 
war efforts. In 1943, Black Mauritians mutinied in 
Madagascar, in part because no all-White Mauritian unit had 
been sent overseas. 31 Similarly, after the decision to send 
a West Indian contingent to fight Nazi Germany had been 
made, the military and political leaders in Bermuda judged 
it politically essential to send a separate detachment of 
White Bermudians, otherwise, officials on the spot feared, 
the whole White population will lose prestige with the 
coloured people after the war." 32 
The experience of colonial local defense forces 
reflected the political and racial complexities of defending 
the British empire. Because of "race," certain ethnic 
groups were regarded and treated very differently from 
others in regard to imperial defense. The British felt that 
some Black peoples could not be relied upon to provide 
effective soldiers. In contrast, all male White subjects in 
the colonies incurred a duty to serve, largely in order to 
31P.R.O. CAB. 21/1689. "The Contribution of 
Colonial Forces during the Second World War," 1947, 18. 
32 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Extract from Letter from 
Brigadier H.D. Maconochie-O[fficer] .C[ommanding]. T[roo]PS, 
Bermuda to Lt. Col. C.P. Dawnay, n.d. 
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keep the Black populations about them subjugated. 
III. Questions of White Prestige 
A. Black Soldiers in European Conflicts 
At the height of the British empire, political, meaning 
"racial," considerations inhibited Britain's willingness to 
rely on Black troops in conflicts between White powers and 
as guardians of British colonial rule. But this had not 
always been the case. During the American Revolution, the 
Napoleonic Wars, and the War of 1812, Britain frequently 
employed Black troops against the White troops of France, 
Spain, and the United States in the Americas. From 1817 to 
1819, Black West Indian troops garrisoned Gibraltar. 33 
Consistent with a deepening British antipathy toward 
Black peoples in the late nineteenth century, concern grew 
as to whether or not non-Europeans should be used to fight 
European foes at all. In 1878, British prime minister 
Benjamin Disraeli brought Indian troops to Malta as a 
demonstration of British strength and resolve in the face of 
a Russian threat. Many found this a dangerous precedent, 
such as the Spectator, which bluntly stated the risks for 
33Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier: The military 
Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas. (New: York: 
Garland, 1993) is a comprehensive introduction to this 
topic. See also, Letter to the Editor by G.E. Boyle, The 
Times, 8 May 1878, for information on West Indian troops in 
Gibraltar. 
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"White prestige" if Indian troops were successfully employed 
against European enemies: "they would have learned the only 
lesson we do not want to impart,--that Sepoys can defeat 
White troops in the open field." 34 Doubts about utilizing 
non-European soldiers to kill White enemies with non-
European soldiers increased in the years leading up to the 
Boer War. 
British subjects around the globe viewed the conflict 
in South Africa as a crusade for the empire and British 
ideals. The White communities in India, Ceylon, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada sent thousands of soldiers to South 
Africa. Likewise, Black subjects wished to serve, but 
imperial, colonial and Boer authorities considered the open 
military employment of Africans and Asians against Whites in 
South Africa to be an atrocity and a direct threat to White 
rule. To no avail, "every officer and man" of the Jamaica 
Militia reportedly stepped forward for active service in 
South Africa. 35 The New Zealand government declined 
hundreds of Maori offers of service, 36 and even the Queen's 
own desire for the deployment of her beloved Indian cavalry 
34 Quoted in they Madras Mail, 29 March 1878. 
35
"The Jamaica Militia," The Navy and Army 
Illustrated 4 (28 October 1899): 146. 
36James Cowan, The Maoris in the Great War 
(Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Limited, 1926), 7. 
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to the war zone could not be fulfilled because the British 
government formally relegated non-Europeans in this "White 
Man's war" to support roles such as wagon drivers and 
stretcher bearers. 37 
In reality, the prohibition against Black involvement 
broke down immediately because of military necessity. For 
example, when besieged by Boers during the first months of 
the war, British-held towns called upon Africans and mixed-
race "coloureds" to help in their defense. Both sides 
attached African scouts to their forces and on the British 
side, many of the sweeps of Boer civilians off the land were 
conducted with the assistance of African personnel. Also, 
in the course of the conflict, Boers frequently raided into 
the territories of their traditional African enemies, 
including the Zulus. Rather than intensifying the conflict 
by openly acknowledging or endorsing Black participation, 
each side in the conflict adhered to the charade that it 
waged a "White Man's war.n Occasionally, however, one side 
would publicly accuse the other of engaging in the 
uncivilized practice of utilizing Blacks as soldiers against 
the other. 38 
37 See Cabinet discussions for February 1900, in 
P.R.O. CAB. 41/25/30-2. 
38 See Hulme T. Siwundhla, "White Ideologies and non-
European participation in the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902," 
Journal of Black Studies 15 (December 1984): 223-234 and 
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The war in South Africa highlighted Britain's military 
weaknesses around the globe, but most British government 
opinion still held that wars between European peoples should 
be as "civilized" as possible, meaning that Black 
participation ought to be limited to secondary roles. In 
1901, Lieutenant-Colonel Altham prepared a paper for the War 
Off ice on the organization of colonial troops for imperial 
service. He noted that the war in South Africa had been "a 
valuable illustration of the necessity for organizing the 
defence of the Empire against far graver contingencies." 
However, Altham continued, the burden of fighting a European 
enemy would still "be borne by the White subjects of the 
King." The value of Black colonial troops was recognized, 
but only in regard to their local defense roles. 39 Along 
with Altham, most Britons would probably have agreed with 
the Spectator's explanation that, "our coloured auxiliaries 
are invaluable, but our sovereignty is built, like that of 
the Roman, on the White legionary." 40 
The prevailing wisdom that the use of Black troops in 
Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War 1899-
1902 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
39P.R.O. W.O. 32/8303. "The Organization of Colonial 
Troops for Imperial Service," December 1901. 
40
"0ur Black Troops," The Spectator, 23 March 1901, 
415. 
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"White Men's" wars constituted a violation of civilized 
warfare was illustrated in 1909, when the War Office 
rejected the idea of using ad hoc "native levies" in its 
African territories until an enemy did so. 41 Curiously, the 
prohibition was extended to some of Britain's well-
disciplined Black colonial troops. According to the army's 
1914 regulations governing the conduct of war, "troops 
formed of coloured individuals belonging to savage tribes 
and barbarous races should not be employed in a war between 
civilized States." The War Office specifically exempted the 
Indian army, France's African colonial forces, and the 
United States' Negro regiments, 42 but not Britain's own West 
Indian and African colonial units. France and the U.S. were 
potential allies and Britain probably did not wish to 
antagonize them with any unilateral declarations about the 
utilization of their own Black soldiers. In the case of 
Britain's own Indian empire, the War Office had recently 
begun considering Indian army divisions, with their high 
proportion of regular British soldiers, as potential 
reinforcements in the event of a European war. Out of 
41P.R.O. C.O. 537/394. Extract from the Minutes of 
the 102nd Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 29 
June 1909. 
42War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1914), 242. 
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necessity, British policy shifted enough to include certain 
Black soldiers in its strategic planning. 
B. Black Soldiers and White Settings 
"Vinculum," an Edwardian proponent of the use of Black 
troops, asserted that the martial instincts and loyalty of 
war-like peoples such as the North American Indians, Zulus, 
and Maori, could be nourished in a multi-racial imperial 
army. 43 Vinculum's hopes might have had a chance to have 
been realized in the course of the First World War, in which 
Britain welcomed the participation of hundreds of thousands 
of White troops from throughout the empire. 44 As in the 
case of the Boer War, Black colonial subjects offered 
themselves for military service. 45 Most British and 
colonial officials feared the consequences of removing 
colonial troops from their normal duties in order to serve 
alongside White troops in Europe. However, the huge 
43
"Vinculum," "Imperial Recruiting-Grounds," 
MacMillan's Magazine, ns. 1, (1906): 821-2. 
44Ceylon sent a contingent of several hundred, many 
of whom subsequently received commissions in British 
regiments. British Malaya contributed one thousand and 
Fiji, 680. See P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/3. "Note on Combatant 
and non-Combatant Contingents despatched from certain 
dependencies during the War, 1914-1918." 
45 For example, the Sierra Leone Weekly News proposed 
that its colony form a new regiment to be called "The King's 
Own Creole Boys." E.D.A. Turay and A. Abraham, The Sierra 
Leone Army: A Century of History (London: MacMillan 
Publishers, 1987), 39. 
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manpower demands of the Great War moved the British 
government to reconsider its stance in two ways. First, the 
British called upon their only immediately available 
reserve, the Indian army, to provide an expeditionary force 
for France within months of the war's outbreak. Secondly, 
as the war continued into 1915 and 1916, Britain needed to 
bring Black military laborers by the tens of thousands to 
France. 
Britain's Black troops received heartfelt welcomes in 
France and Britain, 46 but their presence raised serious 
concerns for colonial and military officials. In colonial 
possessions, British civil and military personnel expected 
that "natives" should be treated as and behave as clear 
subordinates. Except at points of exploitative or 
administrative contact, Europeans in the colonies had 
attempted to maintain distance from Black subjects. If, 
however, "non-colonial" Whites of various classes in Europe 
would be willing to associate with Black soldiers, then 
European prestige would be undermined. Black soldiers would 
see Whites performing menial tasks or engaging in scandalous 
46Tabili, 15-29. For example, the patrons of an 
exclusive London restaurant treated a wounded and limping 
Sikh soldier to "See the Conquering Hero Comes" and a 
standing ovation. Saint Nihal Singh, "India's Blood-
Sacrifice," Nash's and Pall Mall Magazine 55 (June 1915): 
492. 
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activities, a far different reality from the pristine and 
aloof image of Whites that colonial authorities wished to 
display as part of the "theater" of colonial rule. 
Inter-racial sexual contact particularly worried 
British colonial authorities. 47 Politically, the British 
felt that inter-racial sex lessened the respect or awe for 
themselves that they had hoped to instill in Black subjects. 
Thus, inter-racial sex had become a profound demonstration 
of equality and colonial authorities wished to avoid it. 
The British made some attempts to keep Black soldiers away 
from White women during the First World War, by imposing 
curfews and segregating medical care, but the effectiveness 
of such measures is difficult to gauge. Historian Jeffrey 
Greenhut argues that the attempts at sexual segregation 
undermined the morale and, ultimately, the military 
effectiveness of the Indian Corps which fought in France for 
the first year of the war. 48 Another historian, Laura 
47 See, for example, Norman Etherington, "Natal's 
Black Rape Scare of the 1870s," Journal of Southern African 
Studies 15 (October 1988): 36-53; and John Pape, "Black and 
White: The 'Perils of Sex' in Colonial Zimbabwe," Journal 
of Southern African Studies 16 (December 1990): 699-720. 
48 Jeffrey Greenhut, "Race, Sex, and War: The Impact 
of Race and Sex on Morale and Health Services for the Indian 
Corps on the Western Front, 1914," Military Affairs 45, 2 
(April 1981): 71-74; and Gregory Martin, "The Influence of 
Racial Attitudes on British Policy Towards India during the 
First World War," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 14, 2 (1986): 92-97. 
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Tabili, suggests that, in the course of the war, British 
authorities actually relaxed colonial sexual taboos 
concerning Black soldiers' access to European women, 
especially prostitutes, as an implicit reward for loyal 
service. 49 An alternate explanation for the occurrence of 
inter-racial romance may be that the strict enforcement of a 
sexual color bar in Europe was impractical. 
In either case, British racial prejudices and sexual 
anxieties unequivocally reasserted themselves in the decades 
following the end of the First World War. From 1919, the 
French government stationed several thousand African troops 
in the Rhineland and E.D. Morel, an outspoken English 
radical, referred to France's policy as a "horror" and 
campaigned extensively for the Black troops' withdrawal. He 
sensationalized tales of mass rape and other violent crimes 
supposedly committed by African troops against German 
civilians. Morel's crusade persuaded the Women's 
International League for Peace (W.I.L.P.) to adopt the 
following resolution: 
That in the interest of good feeling between all 
the races of the world and the security of all 
women, this meeting calls upon the League of 
Nations to prohibit the importation into Europe 
for warlike purposes, of troops belonging to 
primitive peoples, and their use anywhere, except 
for purposes of police and defence in the country 
49Tabili, 24. 
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of their origin. 50 
Despite Morel's efforts, the British government refrained 
from interfering in what it considered to be a French 
matter, but when it came to the possibility of Britain's own 
African soldiers having sexual relations with White women in 
Britain, government policy closely resembled the W.I.L.P.'s 
position. For example, when authorities made arrangements 
to send West African soldiers to London for the coronation 
in 1937, their commanding general advised the Colonial 
Office that they be kept away from White prostitutes because 
"the accounts of the deterioration in behaviour on the 
return here of those Africans who have done so are 
deplorable ... " 51 On another occasion, at the beginning of 
the Second World War, British officials in Nigeria briefly 
entertained the idea of attaching African women to any 
African contingent sent to Europe. Otherwise, they feared, 
the soldiers "would obviously consort with White prostitutes 
with the most undesirable effects upon them ... " 52 
5
°Keith L. Nelson, "The 'Black Horror on the Rhine': 
Race as a Factor Post-World War I Diplomacy," Journal of 
Modern History 42, 4 (1970): 606-627. 
51 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1470/1. G.J. Giffard to Cole, 20 
January 1937. 
52 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/12. Orde Brown to S.S.C., 13 
January 1940 and 14 January 1940. Since it would be 
impractical to allow all of the soldiers to bring a wife. 
Orde-Browne proposed that authorities recruit single women, 
perhaps 20 to 25 percent of ration strength, as "cooks" 
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While anxieties over inter-racial sex still existed 
throughout the Second World War, British authorities did 
little directly, if anything, to prevent it. Many Black 
colonial servicemen in Britain dated and married Whites with 
no official prohibitions of any kind. 53 A military censor 
reported that Black West Indian soldiers in Italy 
"boastfully and luridly" described their sexual relations 
with local women in letters home. 54 Unfortunately, in the 
course of fostering Anglo-Italian relations, many of them 
lost rank and pay because they had contracted venereal 
diseases. According to a Black member of the unit, had the 
regiment remained where it was, it "would have been wiped 
out without a shot being fired." 55 Though they punished the 
contraction of sexually-transmitted diseases because it 
inhibited military efficiency, the authorities tolerated 
inter-racial sexual relationships 
(i.e., prostitutes) to the unit. The Governor of Nigeria 
himself rejected Orde-Browne's suggestion for recruiting 
"cooks" because it would create "serious resentment 
locally," especially among Christian missionaries. Governor 
of Nigeria to Colonial Secretary, 18 January 1940. 
53See Noble, 42. See also, Rene Webb, Interview, 
n.d., transcript, Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial 
War Museum, London; Watson, 62-3. 
54 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Extract from Middle East 
Military Censorship Summary No. 106, period 27 December 1944 
to 9 January 1945. 
55Watson, 67. 
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C. Black and White Soldiers 
The world wars brought military personnel from various 
regions of the empire into contact with one another and 
British authorities worried about the political 
repercussions of this contact. White troops had 
demonstrated a great deal of contempt, even violence, toward 
Black peoples in colonial settings. As feared, when Black 
and White soldiers served alongside each other, friction and 
violence frequently resulted. According to a White soldier 
in East Africa during the First World War, fights broke out 
between White, Indian and African soldiers when members of 
one group transgressed into the camp facilities of 
another. 56 In a particularly brutal incident, several 
hundred White patients assaulted fifty maimed Black West 
Indians in a Liverpool military hospital in 1918. 57 
Colonial officials feared that such bad treatment at the 
hands of White soldiers would cause dissatisfaction among 
Black colonial troops, which would, in turn, be transferred 
to the colonies as resentment against White colonial 
society. 
Apart from outright White bigotry, the most significant 
56Robert W. Ball, "Reminiscences, Humour and Tales 
from the German East African Campaign, 1914-1919," TMs., 
1920, 58-9, Imperial War Museum, London. 
57 Fryer, Staying Power, 297. 
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source of tension revolved around differences in pay and 
family allowances. On the eve of the Second World War, each 
colonial force had a pay scale based upon local conditions 
and types of currency. Normally, authorities paid colonial 
troops at approximately one-half to three-fourths of British 
rates. Only forces from the West Indies (including Bermuda) 
received pay comparable to British troops. In addition to 
differences in normal pay, colonial soldiers' families 
received allowances at two-thirds of British rates. 58 
In order to prevent inter-racial antagonism caused by 
hatred or jealousy, military authorities segregated soldiers 
of different races as much as possible. For instance, 
during the preparation for the coronation of King George VI, 
initial plans to quarter Black colonial troops with White 
dominion troops had to be changed for fear of inciting 
racial violence between contingents. 59 When contact became 
unavoidable, British authorities urged their soldiers to 
exhibit a combination of formality and respect toward 
colonial servicemen. A 1940 booklet urged White soldiers 
headed to India to avoid being "altogether too free" with 
Indian servants, otherwise, they would become insolent. 
58 P.R.O. CAB. 21/1689. "The Colonial Military Forces 
in the Second World War," 1947. 
59See P.R.O. C.O. 323/1378/6. Ceremonial-Coronation. 
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Conversely, it advised British soldiers not to label all 
Indian soldiers together as potential mutineers; instead, 
"Tommies" were encouraged to maintain good relations with 
their Indian comrades. 60 An anonymous but apparently semi-
official pamphlet, Service Overseas, encouraged White troops 
bound for Africa to adopt a "colonial" attitude: "In all 
contact with the natives, let your first thought be the 
preservation of your dignity" and the maintenance of 
distance from Africans. 61 
The British government's aim of preventing racial 
conflict conflicted with its enthusiasm for the military 
involvement of the Union of South Africa. Especially during 
the Second World War, overseas South African participation 
raised concerns about possible violence between Union 
personnel on the one side and Black troops and civilians on 
the other. For example, before the Ethiopian Campaign of 
1941, the British hesitated about bringing White South 
African troops to East Africa. Strategic necessity 
prevailed and, ironically, General Sir Alan Cunningham, 
600ur Indian Empire: A Short Review and some hints 
for the use of soldiers proceeding to India (New Dehli: 
Government of India, 1940), 65, 52-3. 
61Advisory pamphlet quoted in "Advice to Britons 
bound for West Africa: Some dangerous nonsense which should 
be amended," West Africa (January 1943): 21. See Shiroya, 
97-99. 
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military commander in East Africa, reported that he was 
"intensely surprised to find [South Africans] even playing 
football with the K.A.R. and R.W.A.F.F. battalions." 62 It 
would appear that shared hardship and distance from the 
Union facilitated White and Black camaraderie in the 
Ethiopian campaign. 
The Union itself remained a delicate political problem 
because it served as a transit base for troops en route 
around the Cape, and the guest troops included West Africans 
and Indians. Early in the war, after some Royal Indian Air 
Force officers were asked to leave a Cape Town restaurant, 63 
the British decided that no further Indian personnel would 
be sent to the Union. 64 In case this stipulation proved 
impossible to enforce, Indian servicemen waiting in the 
Union would be subject, for matters of discipline, to the 
local British representatives and not to South African 
military authority. 65 Meanwhile, tens of thousands of West 
62P.R.O. C.O. 820/48/23. Cunningham to Moyne, 16 
July 1941. Cunningham qualified his observation with the 
following: "Though I have to admit with the air of 'Don't 
tell them in the Union." 
63P.R.O. W.O. 32/9362. India Office to Dominions 
Office, 17 May 1941. 
64 P.R.O. W.O. 32/9362. Dominions Office to Acting 
United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Union of South 
Africa, 7 May 1941. 
65P.R.O. W.O. 32/9362. India Office to Dominions 
Office, 17 May 1941. 
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Africans passed through the Union on their way to Ethiopia 
and Burma. The country's prosperity may have impressed 
them, but the strict segregation proved somewhat 
disillusioning. Barred from certain areas of South African 
towns, R.W.A.F.F. soldiers were also prohibited from 
carrying arms and had to be accompanied by officers or 
British N.C.O.s when sightseeing. 66 The South African 
government obviously did not want its Black population 
thinking that Africans anywhere could carry arms like White 
soldiers or confidently walk about without close White 
supervision. 
Issues of race influenced the military roles given 
Black colonial troops in an empire justified by and 
structured according to a racial hierarchy. First, "race" 
determined who served: martial races provided Britain with 
generally reliable imperial guardians, but for major wars, 
the adherence to the paradigm restricted the numbers and 
qualities of military recruits. Westernized and mixed 
descent "non-martial" peoples, though enthusiastic to serve, 
usually found their opportunities for military service 
66A.C. Boreham, "Saga of a Suffolk Soldier," n.d., 
TMs., 163, Imperial War Museum, London; and Adrienne M. 
Israel, "Measuring the War Experience: Ghanaian Soldiers in 
World War II," Journal of Modern African Studies 25, 1, 
(1987): 164-6. 
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limited to secondary roles. Secondly, where Black colonial 
servicemen served was affected by the fears of colonial 
authorities that "native" troops would be negatively 
influenced by contact with White troops and civilians in 
Europe. Britain preferred to keep Black soldiers as 
"unfamiliar" with European society as possible, but military 
necessity often over-rode these concerns. Thirdly, the 
ethnic diversity of the empire complicated Black military 
participation because the fear always existed that Black and 
White soldiers would come into conflict. 
CHAPTER III 
THE PERCEIVED UTILITY OF BLACK COLONIAL TROOPS 
Several ostensibly "practical" factors, including a 
lack of officers, a relatively low level of military 
effectiveness and the fear of the possible effects of a cold 
climate on Black soldiers, limited the usefulness of Black 
colonial troops as part of the British Empire's order of 
battle. All of these seemingly pragmatic considerations 
directly related to British perceptions of race. First, 
until decolonization, the government required that colonial 
troops be officered exclusively by Whites. It was generally 
believed that the effectiveness of Black colonial soldiers 
depended mostly on their White officers. The lack of 
officers possessing what British authorities held to be the 
necessary racial background, education, and character 
prevented a greater utilization of colonial troops during 
world war efforts. 1 Secondly, no matter how well officered 
1 P.R.O. CAB 23/1. For the First World War, see 
"Note on the Availability Resources of Man-power, both White 
and coloured in the Overseas Dominions and Dependencies of 
the empire," Minutes of the 41st meeting of the War 
Cabinet, 23 January 1917; and Perry, 92-3. For similar 
concerns during the Second World War, see P.R.O. C.O. 
323/1672/4. Minute by Lee, 21 December 1939; and Perry, 111. 
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and effective Black troops might have been, they, with the 
possible exception of the Gurkha regiments of the Indian 
army, were not considered to be the equal of European 
soldiers in fighting abilities. British sources cited 
racial and cultural attributes for these differences and 
such beliefs often proved to be self-fulfilling prophesies. 
A third frequently cited restriction on the use of Black 
troops, either as combatants or military laborers, was the 
"Myth of the Black Man's Grave." In a reverse of the "White 
man's grave," which was the fear, based on long experience, 
that European troops suffered appalling rates of sickness 
and mortality in tropical regions, British authorities 
assumed that Black troops were naturally and extremely 
vulnerable to colder climates. The fact that the British 
accepted these "practical" considerations limited the manner 
in which they could utilize colonial troops. 
I. LACK OF OFFICERS 
A. White over Black 
For British observers, the 1857 mutiny of Indian troops 
of the Bengal army drove home the lesson that the loyalty of 
Black troops to the British crown depended upon how well 
their White officers knew their soldiers. In trying to 
establish the actual spark or first step of the revolt, 
British military sources almost universally cited the 
65 
breakdown in the relationship between White officers and the 
sepoys, who had been disaffected by rumors that they were 
going to be forced to accept Christianity. In the decades 
leading up to the Indian Mutiny, European officers of the 
East India Company's army (who themselves were despised by 
the class-conscious royal army establishment) tended to be 
disdainful of their soldiers. Although a pre-Mutiny guide 
for Indian army officers praised the native soldier for his 
fidelity, courage and lack of criminality, 2 indifferent 
company officers commonly referred to their soldiers 
disparagingly as "natives" and "those horrible Black nigger 
sepoys," terms which had certainly gone out of fashion 
decades later when, under crown rule, the Indian army became 
an extremely desirable posting for British officers. 3 
Immediately preceding 1857, military voices warned of 
the deteriorating relationship between European officers and 
their Indian troops. Albert Hervey, an officer with the 
40th Madras infantry, condemned the racial prejudice which 
he often encountered among colleagues and warned against 
officers being ignorant of their soldiers' feelings: "the 
2John Mccosh, Advice to Officers in India (London: 
Wm. H. Allen & Co., 1856), 124-5. 
3 Trench, 15; Albert Hervey, Ten Years in India 
(London: W. Shoberl, 1850), I., 88; Amiya Barat, Bengal 
Native Infantry: Its Organisation and Discipline, 1792-1852 
(Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), 114-6. 
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poor soldier will be maltreated until his meek and humble 
spirit becomes roused, his pride hurt, and the consequences 
are attended with fearful results." 4 
The "fearful" events of 1857 demonstrated to most 
British observers that thoroughly dedicated officers were 
needed for the Indian army. Direct crown rule in India 
dramatically raised the prestige of a Indian military career 
and by the end of the century, the Indian army drew its 
British officers from among the top graduates of the Royal 
Military Academy at Sandhurst. Normally remaining with 
their Indian regiments for their entire military careers, 
these "Indian" officers considered themselves indispensable 
to the efficiency of their Indian troops, whom they referred 
to as "jawans" ("youngsters" or "young warriors"), no matter 
what their actual age. 5 In 1878, a British officer 
expressed the typical opinion that, "the native fighting 
4Hervey, I., 89, 278. See also, "Jack Sepoy," 
Bentley's Miscellany 32 (1852), 77; John Jacob, Tracts on 
the Native Army of India (London: Smith, Elder & Col., 
1858). Jacob, an officer in the Bombay army, wrote a number 
of pamphlets in the years leading up to the Mutiny, in which 
he warned about the deteriorating condition of the officer-
sepoy relationship. 
5E. Candler, The Sepoy (London: John Murray, 1919), 
x. Later, even Indian officers testified to the deep 
paternalistic affection felt by British officers toward 
their men. For example, see D.K. Palit, "Indianisation: A 
personal experience," Inda-British Review 16 (1989), 60; 
Evans, 104. 
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material is inferior to the British. All men require 
leading, but the Indian needs it more than the Anglo-
Saxon ... " 6 The official historians of the Indian Corps in 
France during the First World War noted that Indians 
demonstrated a degree of dependence on European officers 
"greater than ... in any army in the world." Consequently, 
they concluded that British officers, no matter their age, 
developed the "habit and frame of mind of a father, and 
sometimes ... even more the habit and frame of mind of a 
mother." 7 
The purportedly "unique" relationship between British 
officers and Indian other ranks has been a central theme in 
discussions about the effectiveness of the Indian army. For 
example, Charles Chenevix Trench, historian and former 
Indian army officer, wrote that, 
What made the Indian Army tick was the sepoy's 
pride in his profession and in his regiment, and 
complete, unquestioning trust between officer and 
man. But there was a reverse to this coin: it was 
a personal relationship between the sepoy and the 
officers whom he knew. If too many of these 
officers were killed, and replaced by strangers 
who might not speak his language or know his name, 
then the Indian soldier might be utterly lost. 8 
6A.S. Bolton, Letter to the Editor, The Times, Apr. 
19, 1878, 9; See also, Dermot M. Killingley, Farewell the 
plumed troops: a memoir of the Indian Cavalry, 1919-1945 
(Newcastle upon Tyne, Grevatt and Grevatt, 1990), 55. 
7 J.W.B. Merewether and F. Smith, The Indian Corps in 
France (London: 1919), 481. 
8 Trench, 15-16. 
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Philip Mason, another historian and former Indian army 
officer, emphasized the Indian soldier's cultural background 
in his explanation of the bond between officers and men: 
[The Indian soldier] took it for granted that in 
any society there were great differences in social 
level; some men were leaders by birth, others were 
destined to be led. He felt neither envy nor 
discontent when he saw the mess dining-room ... On 
the contrary, he was proud that his sahibs should 
be rich and should have expensive rifles and polo-
. 9 ponies ... 
After having studied the performance of the Indian Corps in 
France during the First World War, historian Jeffrey 
Greenhut concluded that traditional British views of the 
dependence of Indian troops on European officers were 
essentially true. He stated that the soldier-officer 
relationship was far more personal than in the British army, 
and Indian soldiers expected British officers to be many 
things besides simply a manager. 1° Conversely, David Omissi 
questions the idea of Indian dependence on and devotion to 
British officers by citing numerous censored letters written 
by Indian soldiers who served in France during the First 
World War. Omissi argues that the letter-writers rarely 
mentioned their officers and, thus, were indifferent to 
9Mason, 390-1. 
10Jeffrey Greenhut, "Sahib and Sepoy," Military 
Affairs 48 (January 1984): 15-18. 
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them. 11 It is doubtful whether this line of reasoning does 
more than suggest indifference among the literate minority 
of Indian soldiers, and, unfortunately, Omissi does not 
differentiate between the "peace-time" Indian army and its 
expanded war-time incarnation which suffered from heavy 
casualties. Whether or not Omissi correctly interprets the 
mail of the Indian Corps in France, his theory would 
probably not apply to the "peacetime" Indian army, in which 
officers and men developed relationships over years rather 
than days or hours. 
European officers themselves expected to function 
differently in their Indian postings than they would in a 
British regiment. Sir William Slim, famed Indian army 
general of the Second World War, found that, in contrast to 
British troops, Indian troops responded immediately and 
intensely to emotional and spiritual appeals. 12 To be 
effective leaders, and thereby prevent another Mutiny, 
British officers believed that they had to take an active 
paternal interest in their soldiers' cultural and religious 
practices, especially the complex concept of "izzat" or 
honor. On leave, they traveled in their soldiers' home 
110missi, 103-106. 
12William Slim, Defeat into Victory (Dehra Dun: 
Natraj Publishers, 1981), 188. 
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districts and visited pensioners of their regiment. In 
return for this personal concern, soldiers often initiated 
deserving officers into their particular ethnic group or 
caste. 13 
In Africa, officers for colonial troops volunteered for 
the duty and, after serving for a term of several years, 
normally returned to their British regiments. Service in 
Africa offered junior officers better opportunities for 
higher pay, adventure, and active command responsibilities 
than they could receive at home. A World War II brochure, 
intended as an introduction to Nigerian soldiers for 
European personnel, summarized the unique difficulties 
ahead: 
You may like the African or you may not, but if 
you feel that he really is an impossible 
individual remember these things: (i) He probably 
cannot understand what you say and nobody is at 
their best under these circumstances. (ii) He may 
never have left his village until he joined the 
army and he probably finds everything very strange 
and frightening. (iii) If he is 'educated', his 
father almost certainly was not, and what you have 
acquired in many generations is being forced on 
him in one . 14 
Newly posted British officers and N.C.O.s found themselves 
in a foreign place among peoples who presumably viewed the 
13Masters, 119; Guest, 90. 
14 Tribes in the Nigerian Military Forces: Their 
Customs and Markings (Lagos: Government Printing Office, 
1943)' 5. 
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world very differently from western Europeans. 
British sources expected that, in order to transcend 
the wide cultural gulf, African troops required better 
officers than British soldiers. According to Francis 
Lugard, African troops needed the sort of European leaders 
who would empathize with and be proud of their soldiers. 15 
A 1942 booklet implored new officers to remember that, "by 
European standards [African soldiers] are children, and that 
you are their 'father and mother' for the moment. " 16 
Similar to the usage of "jawan" in the Indian army, British 
officers in the African colonial forces often referred to 
their soldiers with such terms as "my Africans," "our 
Africans," and "the Africans." 17 Officers found that 
African troops responded positively to a familiar approach 
without the "stern reserve" supposedly characteristic of 
15Francis Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical 
Africa, (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood and Sons, 1922), 577-8. 
For other examples, see P.R.O. C.O. 96/379. "Report of 
Mutiny of the West African Regiment." 5 May 1901; J.F. 
Whitacre Allen, "An African Army: Some Possibilities," 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 63 (1918): 
658; Haywood and Clarke, 451; and Moyse-Bartlett, 572. 
16
"The African Soldier in the Nigeria Regt.," 1942. 
See also, J.A. Kent, "Funga Safari" I, n.d., TMs, Imperial 
War Museum, London, 6-9. 
17Hanley, 253; Charles Carfrae, "Nigerians at War," 
Blackwood's Magazine, (September 1946): 184; and Israel, 
159. 
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British units. 18 Army psychiatrist Captain N. Dembovitz 
reported that Africans responded positively to "flattery of 
the most naive sort," but warned that they resented verbal 
abuse, never forgiving Europeans who denigrated their skin-
color or the legitimacy of their births. 19 The apparent 
"dependency" of African soldiers on White officers revealed 
itself especially in combat situations. In European eyes, 
Africans needed to know and trust their officers personally 
and tended to panic in battle when led by officers with whom 
they had not time to develop a personal rapport. 20 British 
officers commonly felt that African troops developed a 
mystical attachment to them. For example, P.B. Poore 
discovered during the Burma campaign, 1944-45, that his 
soldiers considered him lucky because he had a "good and 
powerful 'Ju Ju.'" Even if he blundered, his soldiers 
expected that his "ju ju" would retrieve a dangerous 
18W. Lloyd-Jones, K.A.R. (London: Arrowsmith, 1926), 
142-3. 
19N. Dembovi tz, "Psychiatry amongst West African 
troops," Journal of the Royal Army Medical Corps 84 (1945) 
72. 
20Allen, 658; Patrick Leslie Edwards, Interview, 
Transcript, n.d., Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial 
War Museum, 7; R. C. Glanville, Interview, Transcript, 
n.d., Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial War Museum, 
London, 74; Haywood and Clarke, 451; and Moyse-Bartlett, 
572. 
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situation. 21 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries White officers depended upon the assistance of 
several types of "native officer" (N.O.) who did not hold 
commissions equal to that of European officers. Their 
powers of command were limited to non-European troops and 
the most senior of them was subordinated to the lowliest 
young British officer fresh out of Sandhurst. Indian N.O.s, 
termed "Viceroy Commissioned Officers (V.C.O.s)" rose from 
the ranks according to seniority and, thus, had much 
experience, if little formal education. In addition to 
their command responsibilities as platoon commanders, they 
helped European officers learn Indian customs and languages. 
In the massive world war expansions of the Indian army, 
V.C.O.s became more crucial as intermediaries because fresh 
officers from Britain did not attain fluency in Urdu, the 
main language of the Indian army, before being posted to 
Indian units. 22 Despite the proven value of V.C.O.s, 
British military authorities doubted the ability of Indians 
to function effectively as regular, or King's Commissioned 
Officers (K.C.O.s). General Willcocks, the commander of the 
21 P.B. Poore, "The First Kaladan Campaign," n.d., 
TMs, Imperial War Museum, 69-70. 
22J. B. Harrison, "A Temporary Officer in a Temporary 
Battalion," Indo-British Review 16 (1989): 103-4. 
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Indian Corps in France in the Great War, considered Indians 
"well fitted" to replace fallen European officers 
temporarily but he did not believe that they could 
permanently do so as commissioned officers, their obstacles 
being training and temperment. 23 
In Africa by the 1890s, there existed potential 
conflicts between N.O.s and the British non-commissioned 
officers (N.C.O.s) who appeared in increasing numbers to 
help administer African battalions. If N.O.s attempted to 
assert authority over White sergeants, it was feared, all 
concerned, including political leaders, would be 
embarrassed. By 1900, British authorities in West Africa 
had decided to end N.O.s. altogether. 24 In East Africa, the 
K.A.R. finally terminated its N.O. ranks in 1931. 25 W. 
Lloyd-Jones, a pro-African K.A.R. officer, acidly remarked 
that nothing had irritated European settlers "so much as to 
see a 'jumped-up nigger,' so it may easily be imagined that 
the uniform of an African officer of the K.A.R. is to them 
anathema." 26 Still needing collaborators, the British 
23Willcocks, 6. 
24Killingray, "The Military in the Gold Coast," 173-
6. 
25Moyse-Bartlett, 465. 
26Lloyd-Jones, 104. 
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relied upon African N.C.O.s who, by regulation, always fell 
under the authority of White N.C.O.s. A.N.C.O.s became 
essential for the effectiveness of newly assigned British 
officers who required at least two months to develop into 
efficient leaders of colonial troops. 27 
In the Victorian era, Britain excluded non-Europeans 
from officer commissions in its colonial forces, but this 
may not have always been the case. Immediately after the 
American Revolution, the British appointed Stephen Bluche, a 
prominent Black Loyalist residing in Nova Scotia, as a 
Lieutenant Colonel (probably an honorary or provincial 
title) in command of the Loyalist "Black Guides and 
Pioneers." 28 British commanders in the West Indies during 
the Napoleonic Wars had occasionally incorporated captured 
enemy Black troops, including a few of their Black officers, 
into their own service. 29 Early in its existence, the 
27Lt. Col. w. P. B. Arkwright, "With the Nigerians in 
the East African Campaign," Journal of the Royal Scots 
Fusiliers 18, 1 (January 1951): 37. 
28Graham Russell Hodges, ed., The Black Loyalist 
Directory (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), xxiii; In a 
letter to the author dated March 13, 1996, Hodges stated 
that Bluche, "like other Black military figures fighting for 
the English in the Revolution, received informal titles out 
of respect rather than actual rank." 
29Peter M. Voelz, Slave and Soldier: The Military 
Impact of Blacks in the Colonial Americas, (New York: 
Garland Publishing, 1993), 153. 
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Sierra Leone militia contained Black officers who commanded 
White as well as Black personnel. 30 Until the 1860s, 
Canadian militia regiments, including predominately White 
units, often appointed or elected Black officers. 31 
Individual Blacks thus served as officers in part-time 
colonial forces, being accepted more or less as "equals" by 
Whites with whom they served, but they could not yet obtain 
regular commissions. 
In the 1820s, suggestions circulated that Black 
officers be commissioned for African colonial service in 
order to spare the lives of European officers. 32 Sir Neill 
Campbell, Governor-in-Chief of the Cape Coast, proposed that 
such officers could be found "among the sons of the European 
merchants who have been educated in England and for whom 
there is no employment after the death of their fathers. 
They would not require much pay, no half-pay, no 
pension ... " 33 Other colonial officials questioned the 
wisdom of appointing Black officers. For example, from 
30James St. G. Walker, The Black Loyalists, (New 
York: Africana Publishing Co., 1976), 192. 
31Winks, 150-153. 
32Voelz, 44, 154-5, 250. 
33Campbell to Bathhurst, 12 November 1826, in G.E. 
Metcalfe, ed., Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana 
History, 1807-1957 (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1964), 
105-107. 
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Barbados, Governor Warde related the "strong jealousy" of 
his colony's White population toward such advancement of 
"free coloured people." 34 Racial anxiety notwithstanding, 
William Smellie, a Black West Indian, received a commission 
in the Royal African Colonial Corps in 1827. 35 Meanwhile, a 
debate followed in the War Office as to the value of Black 
officers. The Duke of Wellington, professional head of the 
British army, disliked the idea of utilizing groups of Black 
officers but he conceded that there might be Black 
individuals who were fit to be commissioned. 36 In any 
event, the brief flirtation with appointing Blacks to 
colonial military commands apparently ended with Smellie, 
who left the service after embezzling funds. 37 
Any willingness on the part of the British government 
to experiment with Black officers dissipated by the late 
nineteenth century. By then, War Office policy prohibited 
the normal commissioning of Black officers in the colonial 
34 P.R.O. C.O. 28/100. Warde to Horton, 20 January 
1827, quoted in Eric Williams, ed., Documents on British 
West Indian History (Port-of-Spain: Trinidad Publishing, 
1952) I 219. 
35Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 178. 
36Paul Mmegha Mbaeyi, British Military and Naval 
Forces in West African History, 1807-1874 (New York: Nok 
Publishers, 1978), 54-5. 
37 Fyfe, History of Sierra Leone, 188. 
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forces because the empire was justified and structured along 
racial lines. The commissioning of Asian or African 
officers on an equal basis with Britons threatened the 
underlying assumption of the Victorian empire, inherent 
White moral and intellectual superiority. In 1902, Captain 
Owen Wheeler plainly argued in the Navy and Army Illustrated 
against commissions for Indian princes because, "this might 
conceivably mean the subordination of a British combatant 
officer to one who, although of princely lineage, was still 
not of the blood and colour that mean almost everything in 
India where mastery and leadership, especially in the field 
against alarming odds, are concerned." 38 In other words, 
Black subjects could not be given the opportunity of 
command, as that would demonstrate racial equality in 
leadership roles. 
In addition to the question of White prestige, the 
British rationalized that Asians and Africans did not 
possess nor learn the abilities necessary for command. The 
overwhelming majority of officers in the British crown's 
various colonial forces would have agreed with A.A.S. 
Barnes, an officer with the short-lived Chinese Regiment, 
when he credited the White British officer with possessing 
a way of identifying himself with those under him, 
38Captain Owen Wheeler, "Soldier Princes of India," 
Navy and Army Illustrated (13 December 1902): 333. 
of familiarising himself with their interests, 
their likes and dislikes, that distinguishes him 
from the officers of other races, and gives him 
his unique power of making soldiers out of any 
material that comes to his hand. 39 
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Thus, it was generally accepted that White British officers 
had the natural ability to command soldiers of any ethnic or 
racial background. 
Not only did the necessity of having White officers 
over Black soldiers usually appear self-evident, any White 
officers sufficed during world war expansions of colonial 
military forces. Frequently, colonial forces received 
inexperienced and incompetent "war-time" British officers 
and, in the case of the R.W.A.F.F. in 1941-43, exiled Polish 
army officers possessing little or no knowledge of Africa, 
colonial race relations or the English language. 40 
British authorities often asserted that Blacks could 
not overcome "inherent" character flaws. They assumed that 
Indians lacked the confidence, self-reliance, organizational 
ability, and initiative necessary for command. 41 In 1927, a 
39A.A. S. Barnes, "The Passing of the Chinese 
Regiment," United Service Magazine 25 (1902): 634-6. 
40 See the author's "Polish Officers in the Royal 
West African Frontier Force," presented before the Fifty-
Fourth Annual Meeting of the Polish Institute of Arts and 
Sciences at Georgetown University, June 1996. 
41 F.G. Carden, "The Native army of India," 
Blackwood's Magazine 162 (August 1897): 206. 
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British officer commenting about "Indianization" under the 
pseudonym, "Jewan Singh," wrote that Indian officers, coming 
from diverse backgrounds, would not work well together, but 
British officers would "keep the peace--at least outwardly." 
He warned that weak points in the Indian character such as 
"slackness and indolence" prevented Indians from being 
efficient officers. 42 Leonard Handley, another White 
officer, argued that caste-ridden Indian officers would be 
susceptible to nepotism, bribery and corruption. 43 British 
reactions to the idea of African officers were at least as 
negative as those expressed about Indian officers. For 
example, Kenneth Gandar Dower, an adventurer and journalist 
who celebrated the accomplishments of East African troops 
during the Second World War, chided those calling for 
African officers: "No one who has not been to Africa can 
realise how dependent the African is on the initiative of 
the White man in times of crisis." 44 In other words, 
children had no business being placed in positions of 
parental authority. 
42
"Jewan Singh," "Some Aspects of the Indian army 
and its Indianization," Army Quarterly 22 (June 1931): 361, 
363. 
43Leonard Handley, Time's Delinquency (London: 
Hutchinson & Co., 1935), 53-74. 
44Gandar Dower, Into Madagascar (New York: Penguin, 
n.d.), 41. 
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Even had Britain abruptly changed policies in 1900 to 
allow Black subjects to compete for commissions, other, 
longer-term aspects of British racialism probably would have 
severely limited the number of potential candidates. India 
possessed a large number of western educated middle class 
gentlemen, but they came from southern Indian cities and 
tended toward political consciousness. Neither of these 
characteristics endeared them to the military authorities 
who derided such westernized Indians, "Babus," as 
"effeminate" and untrustworthy. 45 In contrast, education 
policy in Africa actually limited the number of western 
educated Africans. For the first half of the twentieth-
century, for example, British East African education policy, 
whether missionary or government sponsored, focused on 
providing Africans with basic literacy and vocational 
training, but avoided a literary, or liberal, education. 
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, European officials complained about the 
supposedly damaging effects even limited liberal education 
could have on the African character. Educators prepared 
African students to function as laborers and mechanics in 
45 See Suresh Chandra Ghosh, "'English in taste, in 
opinions, in words and intellect:' Indoctrinating the Indian 
through textbook, curriculum and education," in J.A. Mangan, 
ed., The Imperial Curriculum: Racial images and education 
in the British colonial experience (London: Routledge, 
1993)' 175-193. 
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African students to function as laborers and mechanics in 
the settler-dominated economy, and not for a life of 
intellectual reflection and decision-making. 46 Therefore, 
in all likelihood, most "educated" Africans, particularly in 
Kenya, lacked the educational qualifications for 
commissioning, even if African officers had been allowed. 
At the height of the Victorian empire and its related 
racialism, two notable exceptions to the color bar existed 
which did not necessarily challenge White supremacy. No 
"colour bar" to Black officers existed in that portion of 
India normally referred to as the "princely states." These 
territories, which comprised about one-third of India, had 
surrendered their foreign policy to Britain in exchange for 
internal autonomy under their traditional rulers. After 
1885, the British reformed the military forces of the Indian 
princes in order to make them more effective and able to 
assist the imperial forces. Officered by Indians and often 
commanded by the "princes" themselves, these forces became 
known as Imperial Service Troops (I.S.T.), and proved to be 
a welcome addition to the regular forces of the Indian army. 
I.S.T.s served alongside European-officered regiments in 
46G.D. Killan, The 'Educated African' Theme in 
English Fiction About Africa, 1884-1939," Phylon 27 (1966), 
155-64 and Anthula Natsoulas and Theodore Natsoulas, 
"Racism, the school and African education in colonial 
Kenya," in Mangan, 109-134. 
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numerous campaigns within India and overseas. 47 I.S.T. 
officers were a common sight in Europe during the First 
World War; the rulers of fifteen princely states served in 
France and their presence was publicly lauded. 48 One of the 
more prominent Indian princes, Lieutenant-General His 
Highness Sir Pertab Singh of Jodhpore, commanded his 
Jodhpore Lancers in France at age seventy, but survived the 
war despite ardent hopes to die while leading a cavalry 
charge. 49 Britain allowed I.S.T. officers to exist because, 
as soldiers of nominally autonomous states, they did not 
represent threats to White prestige in the parts of India 
directly under the rule of the crown. 
In a second recognized exception to the color bar, 
Britain appointed Blacks to serve as military physicians 
within the colonial forces. The India Act of 1853 opened 
47 Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 220-235. Major Bir 
Bekram Singh, son of the Rajah of Sirmur, commanded the 
Sirmur Sappers on the famous Tirah expedition in 1897. "Two 
Indian Princes," The Navy and Army Illustrated 14, 286 (26 
July 1902), 476. 
48St. Nihal Singh, "Indian Rajas at the front," The 
Windsor Magazine 44 (August 1916): 313-321; Willcocks 
featured photographs of Lieutenant-General His Highness the 
Maharaja of Jodhpore; Major-General His Highness Sir Gunga 
Singh, Maharaja of Birkanir; Captain the Honourable Sir Umar 
Hayat Khan of Tiwana; Lieutenant Maharaja Kumar Gopal Saran 
Narain Singh of Tikari; and Captain Shah Mirza Beg, Jodhpore 
Lancers (I.S.T.). Willcocks, photographs opposite pp. 62, 
8 O, 1O6, 2 3 6, 2 7 O, 31 O, and 3 4 O. 
49 Farwell, Armies of the Raj 231-2. 
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the Indian Medical Service to Indian subjects and by 1909, 
109 Indians received I.M.S. appointments. 50 In the Great 
War, the British commissioned almost seven hundred to serve 
as medical officers with the Indian forces. 51 Several West 
Africans received similar appointments, the best known of 
whom, James Africanus Horton of Sierra Leone, entered the 
army's service in 1860 after being educated in Edinburgh. 
He experienced some resentment at the hands of White 
officers in West Africa, but became a prominent scientist in 
the region. 52 Thus, in limited circumstances, "coloured" 
subjects could aspire to be military physicians but this did 
not signify racial equality, since they never possessed 
powers of command or discipline over White military 
personnel. Instead, the policy shows that White doctors 
willing to risk their lives in tropical regions were 
difficult to recruit. 
The commissioning of Black line officers in colonial 
military units formed a crucial part of the process of 
transferring power from imperial to local control during the 
period of decolonization. In their policies of 
50D.G. Crawford, A History of the Indian Medical 
Service, 1600-1913 (London: W. Thacker & Co., 1914), I., 
504-5. 
51 Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 297. 
52 Fyfe, Horton, 40-1. 
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"Indianization" and "Africanization" of colonial officer 
corps, British military authorities behaved as if they 
accepted racial equality even when, in reality, they often 
did not. 
In the decade before the First World War, British 
policy makers had already begun to discuss when and how 
Indians would be granted commissions in the Indian army. 
Hoping to appease its traditional allies, the British 
granted Indian aristocrats the right to attend Imperial 
Cadet Colleges and obtain commissions in a hollow military 
organization called the "Indian Native Land Forces." These 
commissions, first awarded in 1905, qualified their holders 
to serve in the Indian States Forces and on the staffs of 
British generals. 53 
Debates about commissioning Indians continued and, in 
1917, the Indian government introduced an interim policy of 
sending ten Indian candidates per year to Sandhurst from 
prominent families among the martial races. At Sandhurst, 
Indian cadets often suffered from racism such as paying 
higher tips to servants, sitting separately at the cinema, 
and, under pressure, absenting themselves from situations 
where they might have contact with White women. Also, in 
53DeWitt C. Ellinwood, "A Rajput aristocrat in 
imperial service," Inda-British Review 15 (December 1988): 
93. 
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general, the British did not promote Indian cadets to posts 
of authority. 54 Most revealing of all, on one occasion, an 
Indian army officer attempted to recruit future officers 
from among an assembly of cadets by assuring them, including 
the Indian cadets in attendance, that "there will be no 
chance of you having to serve under Indians." 55 
Successful Indian Sandhurst graduates became King's 
Commissioned Indian Officers (K.C.I.O.s). In 1932, in order 
to increase the pace of Indianization, the Indian government 
established an Indian military academy at Dehra Duhn to 
train Indian Commissioned Officers (I.C.O.s), whose 
authority would not extend to British personnel. Thus, the 
newer and more numerous local Indian commission lacked the 
power and prestige of the sovereign's commission. 56 
Integration of the officer corps proceeded slowly and, in 
1939, the Indian army included 4,424 officers, of whom only 
396 were Indians. 57 
54Muchu Chaudhuri, "Sandhurst Revisited," 
Blackwood's Magazine 306 (September 1969): 200-202; see, 
also Kaul, 23-4. 
55M.R.A. Baig, In Different Saddles (New Delhi: 
Asia Publishing House, 1967), 33. 
56 For discussions of Indianization, see Jacobsen and 
Andrew Sharpe, "The Indianisation of the Indian Army," 
History Today (March 1986) : 47-51, or virtually any history 
of the Indian army. 
57William Gutteridge, "The Indianisation of the 
Indian Army, 1918-45," Race 4, 2 (May 1963): 45. 
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Indianization brought new tensions to the regiments of 
the Indian army. Initially, Indian other ranks appeared to 
be apprehensive about Indian officers. 58 One Indian officer 
attributed this to British officers who, he claimed, had 
"conveyed an impression" to Indian troops that Indian 
officers would be "partial to them in promotion, welfare and 
in other respects ... " 59 Moreover, White officers sometimes 
reacted ambivalently toward Indian colleagues as political 
and racial tensions entered the officers' messes. Mohammand 
Ayub Khan recalled that, 
there was trouble in the Mess because the British 
officers would not let us have the food we 
wanted ... Then there was dissension over the 
question of music, when we wanted Indian records 
as well as western ones in the Mess. 60 
Except for the required social and training activities, 
Britons and Indians usually did not mingle. When off-duty, 
British officers normally frequented local European-only 
clubs although, in Iraq before the Second World War, "Timmy" 
Thimayya's commanding officer forced the Basra European club 
to admit Indians. 61 
58Humphrey Evans, Thimayya of India (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1960), 102. 
59B.M. Kaul, The Untold Story (New York: Allied 
Publishers, 1967), 40. 
60Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1967), 13. 
61Evans, 100. 
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By the late 1930s, Indian applications for army 
commissions declined and Indianization faced serious 
difficulties. The discriminatory restrictions on their 
authority had tempered the enthusiasm of potential officers 
while the Indian police and civil service actually offered 
better chances for advancement. 62 According to historian 
Chandar Sundarum, these forms of racial discrimination 
towards Indian officers (and other ranks) played a major 
role in the creation of the Indian National Army, an anti-
British military formation raised by the Japanese after the 
fall of Singapore during the Second World War. 63 
The wartime expansion of the Indian forces provided 
more opportunities for commissioning and advancement. By 
1945, the Indian army contained 32,752 British and 13,947 
Indian officers. 64 The discrepancies in authority between 
king's and Indian commissions did not survive the war. In 
1942, the War Office considered an Indian government 
proposal to grant I.C.O.s the power to punish White 
personnel, in order to make their authority fully effective 
and equal to White officers. The War Office conceded this 
62 Sharpe, 51-2. 
63Chandar S. Sundaram, "Soldier Disaffection and the 
Creation of the Indian National Army," Indo-British Review 
18 (1990): 155-162. 
64 Perry, 115. 
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measure as a logical consequence of "Indianization," but 
hesitated to implement on the grounds that it would 
undermine White prestige in India at a time of internal and 
external danger. The War Office informed the India Office 
that the change in regulations should be delayed, but if 
this was unacceptable, then the matter should be referred to 
higher authority. 65 Subsequently, the War Cabinet decided 
in favor of the Indian government. 66 Inevitably, some White 
personnel refused to accept this decision. For example, a 
South African officer serving in Burma balked at serving 
under an Indian, and successfully requested to be 
transferred to another unit. 67 
In the decade following the First World War, West 
African colonial authorities occasionally considered 
granting commissions in the R.W.A.F.F. to Africans, but 
policy-makers could not agree on conditions or timetable. 68 
65P.R.O. W.O. 32/10685. Extract from the Minutes of 
the Thirteenth Meeting of the Army Council held on 10 June 
1942. 
66P.R.O. W.O. 32/10685. Extract from the 
Conclusions of the 119th Meeting of the War Cabinet held on 
31 August 1942. 
67Kaul, 68. 
68 Sir George Giffard's comments at the end of 
William Platt, "The East African Forces in the War and their 
future," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 
93 (1948): 412; Killingray, "The Military in the Gold 
Coast," 63. 
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Such was the extent of anxiety over White prestige, that, on 
the occasion of the 1937 coronation, authorities prohibited 
White stewards from waiting on the African N.C.O.s who had 
been invited to attend. Also, the guests traveled by 
steamer to Britain in strictly segregated quarters. 69 In 
that same year, however, both the Colonial Office and Sir 
George Giffard, the military commander in West Africa, 
strongly supported a proposal to open the officer corps of 
the part-time Territorial Battalion of the Gold Coast 
Regiment to Africans. By 1939, the authorities decided that 
an African, who served for two years in the ranks and had 
the educational qualifications, could apply for a commission 
in the part-time Territorial Battalion. The War Office 
agreed to the scheme after it received assurances that 
Europeans would not serve under African officers. The 
Territorial Battalion would be "Africanized" from the bottom 
up, with slots being gradually closed to Europeans. 70 
Only two Africans, Seth K. Anthony and Tom Impraim, 
received commissions in the R.W.A.F.F. before the end of the 
Second World War. Fearful of being accused of racial 
discrimination, the Colonial Off ice overcame deep War Off ice 
69P.R.O. C.O. 323/1469/4. "Points agreed at Meeting 
held at Colonial Office," 7 January 1937. 
70P.R.O. W.O. 32/4142. Gold Coast Local Forces: 
Admission of Africans to Commissioned and Cadet Rank, 1937. 
91 
reluctance to grant King's emergency commissions to African 
officers. Consequently, Anthony, Impraim and those who 
followed held full power of command and punishment over 
White personnel. In 1948, at the end of the wartime 
emergency, the War Office debated whether these King's 
commissions should be replaced by local governor's 
commissions which precluded any authority over White 
personnel. It was decided that this change would be seen as 
racial discrimination, because White British officers 
seconded to the West African forces from regiments of the 
British army would continue to hold King's commissions. 
Also, it would be inconsistent because African residents of 
Britain could already earn King's commissions in British 
regiments (see Chapters Seven and Eight) . 71 In January 
1955, Britain finally granted Africans the privilege to gain 
Queen's commissions in the East African Land Forces. 72 
II. Military Effectiveness: Black v. White troops 
Until the inter-war period, military authorities 
usually cited biology as the reason for the inferiority of 
Black to White troops. However, reflecting the intellectual 
71 P.R.O. W.O. 32/15483. "Grant of Commissions to 
Africans: Memorandum by the Adjudant General," "Extract 
from the minutes of the 84th meeting of the Army Council 
held on 5 October 1948." 
72 See P.R.O. W.O. 32/13636 for the correspondence 
regarding the grant of commissions to East Africans. 
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abandonment of Victorian racialism taking place in Britain, 
British military leaders, by the Second World War, tended to 
attribute differences in military efficiency to cultural 
factors, especially education. 
Historically, the British did not think that the 
"native" troops of the Indian army, with the probable 
exception of Gurkhas, could equal White troops in military 
effectiveness. In 1867, a Parliamentary Select Committee 
investigated the possibility of substituting Indian for 
British troops in overseas garrisons. Several of the 
witnesses who testified before the Committee held that 
British soldiers were twice as effective as Indian troops. 
The Committee accepted that, for merely showing the flag, 
Indian troops were adequate. If, on the other hand, 
colonial garrisons had a genuine military role against 
serious attack, then their effectiveness should not be 
reduced by substituting Indian for British troops. In 
contrast, supporters of a greater Indian role in def ending 
the empire stated that service in the colonies would instill 
loyalty in Indian troops, and prepare them for imperial 
conflicts outside of Asia. Critics feared the possible 
lessening of White prestige by interaction with and friction 
between Indian troops and European colonists. Ultimately, 
the Select Committee recommended that Indian troops should 
93 
be used in colonial garrisons close to India, but never 
exclusively. 73 
In addition to enforcing fidelity, the policy of 
employing British and Indian units alongside each other was 
intended to provide Indian troops with examples of good 
discipline and behavior. General Willcocks, commander of 
the Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15, observed 
that, there was "no one who is more susceptible to good 
example than the Indian soldier." 74 In turn, racial pride 
supposedly forced British troops to exert themselves 
further, lest they be bested by Blacks. 75 
If, in British opinion, Indian troops could not equal 
British troops in military ability, they still compared 
favorably with other European soldiers, especially Russians. 
During the war scare of 1878, when Disraeli brought Indian 
troops to the Mediterranean, the condition of the Indian 
Army became a popular topic of discussion in the Times. 
Several officials with Indian experience favored Indian 
involvement. For example, an Indian army officer, Lt.-Gen. 
Mark Kerr, boasted that the "Native Army in India ... is a 
73House of Commons. Report of the Select Committee 
on the Army in India and the Colonies. 1867-68, vol. 6, 789-
799. 
74Willcocks, 244. 
75Jacobsen, 222. 
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match for any Continental Army in Europe. " 76 Another Indian 
army general, Patrick Maxwell, cited several examples of 
pitched battles in which Indians defeated British troops. 77 
In India, the Times correspondent in Calcutta highlighted 
the examples of many Indian soldiers who eagerly volunteered 
for overseas service. 78 Meanwhile, the Madras Mail praised 
the British government for treating India "as an integral 
part of the great British Empire, ready to contribute her 
resources, to add to the strength of her friends, to share 
in the combat ... " 79 Because the crisis of 1878 subsided 
peacefully, Indian troops never came to blows with their 
Russian counterparts. The War Office did not again 
seriously consider involving Indian troops in White Men's 
Wars until July 1913, when a general European war appeared 
likely. 80 
Two Indian infantry divisions, each one-quarter 
British, arrived at the front in October 1914. Writing in 
1915, Saint Nihal Singh praised his countrymen for 
7 6Mark Kerr, Letter to the Editor, the Times 
(London), 19 April 1878. 
77 Times (London), 29 April 1878. 
78 Times (London), 19 April 1878. 
79Madras Mail, 18 April 1878. 
80Perry, 84-5. 
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introducing unforeseen qualities into the trenches, "that 
uncanny sense of sight and hearing, that panther-like, 
stealthy movement ... the strange weapons which the Indians 
bore ... inspired the Kaiser's hordes with awe." 81 Despite 
such propaganda, the shock of trench warfare, with its 
constant shelling and high casualty rates in a cold, wet 
climate, undermined the troops' morale. Indian soldiers' 
rates of self-inflicted wounds greatly surpassed those of 
British troops. Back in pre-war India, Indian soldiers had 
normally campaigned on the frontiers against various tribes 
and acted as police in aid of civil authorities. Neither 
activity, however arduous, resulted in casualties and 
personal terror on the scale of the western front. A 
frustrated Sikh soldier wrote home and complained about the 
lack of "honorable" combat in France: 
What you say in letter about not being disloyal to 
the Emperor, and it being the religion of the 
Sikhs to die facing the foe--all that you say is 
true. But if you yourself could be here and see 
for yourself ... There is no fighting face to face. 
Guns massacre regiments sitting 10 miles off. Put 
pikes and staves in our hands and the enemy over 
us with like arms, then indeed we should you how 
to fight face to face! 82 
Because of an increasing number of failures in military 
performance on the part of individuals, as well as units, 
81 Singh, "India's Blood Sacrifice," 490. 
82Quoted in Tabili, 24. 
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British commanders decided to relegate Indian troops to 
quiet sectors of the front. Most British military opinions 
cited the high casualty rate among European officers as the 
primary cause of the Indian troops' poor showing. According 
to this argument, the bonds of trust and loyalty between 
soldiers and officers, forged during years of relative peace 
in India, could not be established quickly with replacement 
officers under the stress of modern war. 83 Others 
subsequently attributed the high failure rate to the 
structure of the Indian army, on the grounds that it had 
neither the training, organization or reserves of officers 
and other ranks to fight a modern attritional war against 
the German army. 84 R.W.W. Grimshaw, an "Indian" cavalry 
officer, actually blamed the failures of the Indian Corps on 
poor performance by some of its British battalions. 
Curiously, Grimshaw also cited Indian soldiers' supposedly 
deeper devotion to family for a lack of aggressiveness in 
the trenches. 85 In late 1915, the British withdrew the 
83 For a typical explanation, see Merewether and 
Smith, 481-4. 
84 Jeffrey Greenhut, "The Imperial Reserve: The 
Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-15," Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History 12 (October 1983): 54-73. 
The same arguments were used more recently to explain the 
breakdown of the Indian army during the Mesopotamian 
campaign against Turkey. See Edwin Latter, "The Indian Army 
in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918, Part II," Journal of the Society 
for Army Historical Research 72 (Autumn 1994): 160-178. 
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majority of Indian units from France. For the rest of the 
war, most Indian combatants served in the Middle East, where 
they were deemed suitable for fighting Turks. The Indian 
presence in France remained limited to laborers and cavalry 
regiments usually not employed in the trenches. 
Britain's African colonies contributed thousands of 
soldiers to the imperial war effort in the First World War. 
In 1914, the W.A.F.F. (later R[oyal] .W.A.F.F.) consisted of 
7500 men: five battalions of the Nigeria Regiment, one 
battalion of the Gold Coast Regiment, one Sierra Leone 
battalion, and the Gambia Company, along with engineers and 
light artillery. It fought in the Cameroons and East Africa 
but expanded only moderately. Meanwhile, the K.A.R. 
numbered 2,400 in 1914 but grew to 35,500 by the end of the 
war. 86 
Many British authorities sensed that African soldiers 
possessed an aptitude for army life. In 1883, Sir Garnet 
Wolseley, one of Victorian Britain's leading generals, 
acknowledged that Basutos and Zulus learned military drill 
quicker than Europeans, and cited "some hereditary bias in 
their brain, in their very blood, which fits them for the 
85R.W.W. Grimshaw, Indian Cavalry Officer, 1914-15, 
(Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Costello, 1986) Entry of 28 January 
1915, 64-5. 
86Perry, 199, 203. 
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easy acquisition of a soldier's duties."B7 In addition to a 
talent and motivation for drill, British Captain J.F. 
Whitacre Allen wrote in 1918 that African soldiers possessed 
dash, cunning, and endurance.BB Nevertheless, in contrast 
to France, which brought many thousands of Black troops from 
Africa and Asia to the Western Front,B9 the British 
government never intended to bring African soldiers to fight 
in France. In 1915, Arthur Bonar Law, the Colonial 
Secretary, referred to the idea as "the height of folly." 90 
Likewise, the War Office objected to the wider use of 
African soldiers in combatant roles because of perceived 
limitations regarding African intelligence and ability to 
B7Garnet Wolseley, "The Negro as a Soldier." 
Fortnightly Review (London) 264 (December 1888): 689-703. 
BBAllen, 657-9. 
B90n France's use of African troops during the First 
World War, see Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The 
Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960. 
(Portsmouth, N.H.: Heinemann, 1991), 25-46. Commandant 
Blanchet, a French colonial infantry officer provided the 
British with his evaluation of African troops. He judged 
that Africans did not possess aptitudes for operating 
automatic weapons or constructing complex field works. 
Further, they were unable "to understand and sum up a 
tactical situation quickly, or take a timely and adequate 
initiative." P.R.O. C.O. 445/45 War Office to Colonial 
Office, 11 September 1918. "Notes on French-African troops 
by Commandant Blanchet, Infanterie Coloniale, 19 August 
1918." 
90P.R.O. C.O. 537/604. Memorandum, "Question of 
Raising Native Troops for Imperial Service," 18 October 
1915. 
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withstand the European climate. Also, African units 
required large numbers of European personnel and lengthy 
periods of training in order to make them effective. 91 
Throughout the war, a number of voices in the British 
press and Parliament called for a greater use of the 
empire's African man-power, on both practical and idealistic 
reasons. Early in the conflict, one M.P. offered to finance 
the recruitment of African soldiers himself. Later, in mid-
1915, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, 
"pleaded" for the House of Commons "to take steps to deal 
with the question of coloured soldiers, and to get them from 
South Africa." In July 1916, Josiah c. Wedgewood, M.P., 
perhaps the leading advocate of African military 
participation, praised the military abilities of Black 
troops and urged that greater use be made of them, even if 
shared combat undermined White prestige. 92 In the English 
Review of October 1916, Major Darnley-Stuart-Stephens, who 
commanded African pioneers, urged that 500,000 soldiers be 
91 P.R.O. C.O. 445/45. War Office to Foreign Office, 
10 February 1918 and accompanying comments. 
92Killingray, "The Idea of a British Imperial 
African Army," Journal of African History 20, 3 (1979): 
423-7; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., vol. 84 
(1916), cols. 1530-1536; and vol. 93 (1917), cols. 1107-
1108. Also, see Wedgewood's articles in the Daily Chronicle 
of 27, 30 October, and 7 November; and that of Sir Godfrey 
Lagden, 31 October; Sir Alfred Sharpe, 1 November; Sir Harry 
Johnston, 2 November 1916. 
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raised from African territories and "thrown into the scale" 
against the Germans in France. 93 However, even an advocate 
for a greater utilization of African troops, J.F. Whitacre 
Allen, summed up the limitations of using them in Europe: 
they panicked easier than European soldiers and did not 
possess "the same capacity for withstanding hardships of a 
novel kind, whether mental or physical, as is possessed by 
the latter." 94 Perhaps the last but most interesting plea 
for the use of Black troops in Europe came in September 
1918, when the British commander in France, Field-Marshal 
Sir Douglas Haig, asked the War Office to provide Black 
combatant troops for his depleted divisions for the upcoming 
1919 campaign. The War Office took no action on this "wild" 
suggestion and the war ended within a few months. 95 
Warfare changed significantly between 1914 and 1939 as 
new techniques to kill infantrymen developed including 
mobile armored combat and air-power. By the Second World 
War, combatant soldiers constituted only a small proportion 
of military strength, the balance being technicians or 
laborers. In order to function effectively under these new 
9~ajor Darnley-Stuart-Stephens, "Our Million Black 
Army," English Review 22 (October 1916): 359-360. 
94Allen, 657. 
95 P.R.O. C.O. 445/45. Sir Douglas Haig to War 
Office, 19 September 1918 and attached comments. 
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circumstances, military personnel had to master increasingly 
sophisticated weapons systems and tactics. However, the 
colonial forces never could recruit enough literate 
individuals to handle the more complex tasks of 
"blitzkrieg." For example, military authorities in West 
Africa found it impossible to fill a recruiting quota of 
sixty-three literate recruits per month. In fact, for the 
first three and one-half months of 1944, only twenty-eight 
had been obtained. 96 
In the Second World War, British military officials 
acknowledged that the superiority of White soldiers over 
Black colonial troops was caused by cultural background 
rather than any genetic inheritance. For instance, in 1945, 
Col. E. Collins, adjudant-general of colonial troops in the 
Middle East, explained the significant difference between 
British and African motivation, 
The U.K. soldier has a background of generations 
of political experience, education and recurrent 
major wars, the [African] men under consideration 
have a very different background. The standard of 
education of the modern U.K. soldier has for 
example largely abolished the need for footdrill 
as an essential part of training but footdrill 
because of its psychological effect will remain 
necessary for most colonial troops for many years 
to come. 97 
96P.R.O. C.O. 968/107/7. Extract from Summary of 
West African War Committee Conclusions of Fourteenth Meeting 
held 14 and 15 April 1944. 
97 P.R.O. D.O. 35/1183/Y1069/1/l/PT2. "Colonial and 
Local Troops," Report by Col. E. Collins, July 1945. See 
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In other words, British soldiers required less discipline 
instilled by repetitive drill because their cultural 
background already provided preparation and motivation for 
their military duties. Black soldiers apparently needed a 
more thorough re-conditioning for western military life. 
Because of their ignorance of western political values, 
simple basic military discipline had to suffice to motivate 
illiterate soldiers to carry out their duties. 
At first, the Great War attitude that the Indian army 
could not cope with a European foe would appear to have 
largely subsided during the Second World War. From the 
start of the war, Indian troops played important roles. In 
particular, Indian divisions distinguished themselves 
against mechanized enemies in North Africa from 1941 to 
1943. After that hard fought campaign, the British brought 
Indian troops to Sicily and Italy for two years of mountain 
warfare against the German army. However, Indian brigades 
serving in the Mediterranean contained British battalions, 
reflecting the post-1857 fears of another Mutiny. In 
contrast, the Indian army divisions in the Far East adopted 
a different but more practical organization after 1943. 
also, Sir George Giffard's comments are found in William 
Platt, "The East African Forces in the war and their 
Future," Journal of the Royal United Services Institution 93 
(1948): 412. 
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William Slim, the commander of the British Fourteenth Army 
in Burma, decided to withdraw British units from his Indian 
infantry divisions and cited several benefits including a 
simplification of supply arrangements and enhanced fighting 
abilities. 98 
Shortly after the Second World War began, the Colonial 
Office resolved to press for the acceptance of colonial 
military units, including Africans, for active service 
overseas. Initially, it appeared that the War Office 
concurred. For example, General Sir Robert Gordon-
Finlayson, the Adjudant General to the Forces, agreed that 
colonial troops could be usefully employed to relieve 
British garrisons in Egypt and elsewhere, and possibly be 
deployed on "quiet parts of the front" in France. 99 
Whether sincere or not, Gordon-Finlayson's conciliatory 
opinion did not reflect government intentions regarding the 
R.W.A.F.F. and K.A.R. None of Britain's political or 
military leadership seriously considered employing African 
troops in battle against the German army. Early in 1941, 
Winston Churchill, now Britain's prime minister, protested 
that African infantry divisions should not be termed 
98 Slim, 523. 
99P.R.O. C.O. 323/1672/1. Colonial Office Note, 
September 1939, enclosed in T.H. Lee to Sir John Shuckburgh, 
27 September 1939. 
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"divisions" at all within the imperial order of battle and 
that "no one contemplates standing them in the line against 
a European army." 100 At about the same time, British West 
and East African troops had begun the liberation of Ethiopia 
against Italian and Italian colonial troops. They earned 
high praise in the largely infantry-style campaign but, in 
July, the British commander in East Africa, General Sir Alan 
Cunningham, predicted that it would be "unwise" to send them 
against the German army. They would be "staunch," he wrote, 
but only as long as their White officers survived. 101 
As modern soldiers, illiterate Indian and African 
troops, still largely recruited from so-called "martial 
races," generally did not reach the technical effectiveness 
of British troops. This goal would have required a much 
longer period of training and education than available 
during the war. Had vigorous educational and economic 
development policies been instituted throughout the empire 
in the decades before the war, then the empire could have 
been transformed into a far more massive recruiting ground. 
Since the 1850s, however, Britain's policies toward the 
100
"Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff, 
February 1941, Quoted in Churchill, The Grand 
et. al," 17 
Alliance 
~~~~~~~~~~(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), 623. 
101P.R.O. C.O. 820/48/23. Cunningham 
July, 1941. See also, P.R.O. W.O. 106/5214. 
War Office, 18 July 1941. 
to Moyne, 16 
Cunningham to 
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"improvement" of subject peoples had reflected an assumption 
that Black people could not be "improved" and that such 
education as was provided might actually prove to be 
injurious, either to the individual concerned or to the 
political unity of the empire. 
British military leaders generally thought that Black 
troops could not take the field successfully against modern 
European armies, but they did discover a less glamorous, 
though absolutely necessary, role for Black soldiers behind 
the firing lines. In both world wars, British armies in the 
field required the supporting services of many thousands of 
military laborers. Pioneers, as military laborers were 
usually called, unloaded and transported supplies, built and 
maintained roads, railways, and other means of 
communications. Since physical and intelligence standards 
were lower for pioneers than frontline soldiers, a larger 
pool of potential recruits could be called upon. Training 
requirements were minimal, being usually limited to basic 
drill and less vigorous older White officers could be 
assigned to command them. The utilization of Black laborers 
freed White personnel, who were considered better suited for 
modern war, for service in combatant roles. For example, in 
May 1942, Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief, Middle 
East Forces, asked the War Office for Black troops to 
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replace Whites in secondary static roles such as garrison 
and anti-aircraft duties. He argued that, "the White 
manpower resources of the Empire must be conserved and used 
to the best advantage by the maximum employment of non-
European troops. " 102 
Between 1914 and 1918, the War Office recruited several 
hundred thousand Black laborers from throughout the empire 
and nominally independent China to work behind the battle 
lines in France. 103 In 1939, British leaders planned to wage 
the Second World War in much the same way as they had the 
First in that a British Expeditionary Force, consisting of 
British and dominion combatant formations, would again 
defend the Franco-German Border. Meanwhile, thousands of 
Black military laborers would be imported to unload and haul 
supplies behind the front in France. The War Office 
estimated that there would be fifty thousand military 
laborers serving in France with the B.E.F. by June 1940 and 
150,000 by mid-1941. 104 In early 1940, the War Cabinet 
102P.R.O. W.O. 32/10141. C.-in-C., M.E.F., to War 
Office, 14 May 1942. 
103For a comprehensive study, see Robin Wallace 
Kilson, "Calling up the Empire: The British military use of 
non-White labor in France, 1916-1920," Ph.D. Diss., (Harvard 
University, 1990). 
104 P.R.O. c.o. 323/1672/1. Hore-Belisha to 
Macdonald, 13 December 1939. 
107 
decided to postpone the employment of colonial pioneers with 
the B.E.F. in France because Britain itself still had over 
one million unemployed workers. It would have been 
"politically dangerous" to employ "coloured" colonial labor 
instead of Britons. 105 
III. The "Black Man's Grave" 
Whenever discussing the use of Black troops in Europe, 
as combatants or pioneers, British officials considered the 
potential impact of the European climate on the health of 
Black troops. In British eyes, lung afflictions, especially 
pneumonia, presented the greatest threat to the health of 
Black troops in colder regions. It is unclear just how far 
back this view was held, but the New Orleans campaign of 
1814-1815, in which the 1st and 5th West India Regiments 
took part, apparently confirmed it. G.R. Gleig, an officer 
with a White regiment, blamed the susceptibility of the 
W.I.R.s to the Louisiana climate for the British failure. 106 
Benson Earle Hill, a Royal Artillery officer, recalled that 
the Black soldiers "suffered most dreadfully from the change 
of climate and alteration of fare; they were positively not 
105P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/1. "Extract from Conclusions 
of the War Cabinet held 25 January 1940." 
106 (G.R. Gleig) An Officer, Narrative of the 
Campaigns of the British Army at Washington and New Orleans. 
(London: John Murray, 1821), 241. 
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only useless, but absolutely in the way." Hill witnessed 
many W.I.R. soldiers who simply resigned themselves to 
dying. 107 In fact, according to an officer and historian of 
a W.I.R. regiment, the primary cause of the suffering of the 
"Black Corps" in the unexpectedly cold Louisiana climate was 
that the British had not provided the Black soldiers, who 
normally campaigned among the Caribbean islands, with 
a de qua te clothing. 108 
The "Black Man's Grave" mirrored the "White Man's 
Grave," the belief, based on long experience, that White 
soldiers suffered extremely high mortality rates in tropical 
regions. 109 Whether the concurrent belief in the "Black 
Man's Grave" reflected racial arrogance or a reasonable 
scientific supposition, it persisted for quite a long time. 
In 1885, Alfred B. Ellis, an officer in the 1st W.I.R. 
strongly advocated a greater use of West Indian troops, but 
warned that they could never be used in cold climates 
because, in his words, "the negro suffers from cold in a 
manner which is incomprehensive even to Europeans who have 
107Benson Earle Hill, Recollections of an Artillery 
Officer, vol. I., (London: Richard Bentley, 1836), 333. 
108Alfred B. Ellis, History of the First West India 
Regiment (London: Chapman and Hall, 1885), 145. 
109See David Geggus, "Yellow Fever in the 1790s: The 
British Army in Saint Domingue," Medical History 23 (1979): 
38-58 and Voelz, 311-30. 
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passed the best part of their lives in the tropics." 110 In 
1878, as Indian troops prepared for possible action against 
the Russians in the Mediterranean, the European Madras Mail 
lamented that the vulnerability of Indian troops, especially 
those from southern India, to cold weather, restricted their 
deployment to warm regions. It duly recommended that the 
best suited Indian soldiers to send to Europe included 
northerners such as Gurkhas, Sikhs, and "Musalmans." 111 
Climate remained a crucial factor in military decision-
making in the First World War. For example, in 1915, when 
pondering a greater use of colonial manpower for the war 
effort against Germany, Arthur Bonar Law, the Colonial 
Secretary, reported to the Cabinet that, "West Indian troops 
could not face a European winter campaign." 112 Africans had 
a similar reputation for susceptibility to dampness and 
cold. 113 Despite government fears, medical statistics from 
the First World War did not support the "Myth of the Black 
110E 11 is I 8 . 
111Madras Mail, 2 April 1878. 
112P.R.O. C.O. 537/604. Memorandum, "Question of 
Raising Native Troops for Imperial Service," 18 October 
1915. 
113Allen, 657; P.R.O. C.O. 537/604. Memorandum, 
"Question of Raising Native Troops for Imperial Service," 18 
October 1915; P.R.O. C.O. 537/952. H/W Minute, 9 September 
1916. 
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Man's Grave." In 1917, White (British and dominion) troops 
in France suffered pneumonia at an annual rate of 1.14 
hospital admissions per thousand ration strength; Indian 
troops (mostly cavalry), 1.22; and the multi-ethnic Native 
Labour Corps (N.L.C.), .94. In the following year, White 
troops in France suffered pneumonia at a rate of 1.03 
admissions per thousand; Indian troops, 2.34; and the 
N.L.C., a relatively low .61. 114 Tentatively, these 
statistics suggest that Black colonial soldiers did not 
suffer from the cold significantly more than White troops 
and, in some instances, they suffered less. 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence concerning Black 
susceptibility to the cold, combined with racial 
stereotypes, survived the war and significantly affected 
British military policies in the Second World War. Again, 
in 1939, when the Colonial Office studied the problems of 
again recruiting a contingent of "coloured" pioneers for 
service in France, climate figured prominently. Gold Coast 
Governor Hodson opposed sending Africans to France because 
their exposure to the French climate would be "a form of 
cruelty." 115 The governor of Sierra Leone predicted that, 
114Casualties and Medical Statistics of the Great War 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1931), 164-165, 174-175. 
115P.R.O. C.O. 323/1672/4. Hodson to A.J. Dawe, 8 
December 1939. 
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"the incidence of sickness would be so high that in a very 
short time it would become completely ineffective ... such a 
disaster would have serious political repercussions after 
the war." 116 Cautiously, medical officials in Nigeria 
predicted that, if provided with sufficient clothing, 
accommodations, and food, and time for acclimatization to 
the French climate, the health of Nigerian pioneers would 
"remain reasonably good." 117 
The European climate became an issue again in 1943, 
when British commanders in the Mediterranean hoped to bring 
Black pioneers to Italy with the Eighth Army. Colonial 
medical officials in Nigeria advised that West African 
pioneers would be unable to withstand the rigors of 
campaigning in Italy's winter climate, but they could 
function adequately at stationary hospitals and base camps 
if allowed time to acclimatize. 118 Experience bore out the 
wisdom of this prediction because the British brought 
soldiers from many tropical regions to Italy and found that 
they could withstand the climate as well as White troops, 
116P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/12. Fenton (for Governor) to 
Lloyd, 29 May 1940. 
117P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/12. Orde Brown to Colonial 
Secretary, 13 and 14 January 1940. 
118 P. R. O. C. O. 968/ 97I1. Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, to Allied Forces Headquarters, 14 October 1943. 
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providing that they had time to acclimatize and were given 
sufficient food, clothing, and shelter. 119 Nevertheless, at 
Colonial Office insistence, the commanders in Italy withdrew 
West African units to the Middle East in late 1944. 120 
Neither the military's own figures or scientific 
opinion supported the notion of a "Black Man's Grave." As 
with the First World War, medical statistics for the Second 
World War indicated that Indian and African troops (from all 
regions) serving in North Africa (excluding Egypt) and Italy 
actually suffered pneumonia at lower rates than White 
British troops. 121 In early 1945, a War Office scientist 
informed his superiors that, according to established 
scientific knowledge, racial differences in climatic 
tolerance were slight: 
Each group is on the whole more in harmony with 
the physical conditions of its own habitat than is 
any other group but a short period of 
acclimatization on the part of the foreigner is 
sufficient to bring him into a harmony with the 
conditions of the strange habitat. The coloured 
119See reports in P.R.O. W.O. 106/2190. "Brief 
History of R.W.A.F.F. in MidEast, by Lt. Col. H.A. Lilley;" 
and P.R.O. D.O. 35/1183/Y1069/1/1/Pt.1. "Report by Lt. Col. 
R. Charnock, 9 January 1944. 
120P.R.O. C.O. 968/97/1. Colonial Office to War 
Office, 20 October 1944 and War Office to Allied Forces 
Headquarters, 10 November 1944. 
121Medical History of the Second World War: 
Casualties and Medical Statistics (London: H.M.S.O., 1972), 
247, 256, 259. Unfortunately, the statistics are not broken 
down between West, East or South Africans. 
man can thrive biologically wherever the White can 
flourish and vice versa. 122 
Although "established," this scientific knowledge was 
consistently displaced within the military and political 
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establishment by long-held stereotypes. The British fear of 
killing Blacks by means of pneumonia lacked empirical 
support, but the "Myth of the Black Man's Grave" buttressed 
British reservations about the utility of Black troops. 
For Britain's major defense needs, Black colonial 
troops served as crucial supplements to the White forces of 
the empire. Ordinarily, however, British and colonial 
authorities did not rely on Black soldiers exclusively. 
Racial prejudice, whether in the form of a small and 
exclusive officer corps, a hesitancy to send Black troops to 
kill Whites, or a fear of the "Black Man's Grave," limited 
the usefulness of Black colonial troops. Given that racial 
considerations were intrinsic to existence of the British 
colonial empire in the twentieth century, Britain had, in a 
military sense, acquired an empire it could not exploit to 
the fullest. 
122P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. D[irector]. of 
B[iological]. R[esearch]. to D[irector]. of O[rganisation] ., 
7 February 1945. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CARIBBEAN REGIMENT DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR: 
A CASE STUDY OF RACISM AND BRITISH MILITARY POLICY. 
Most of the British military establishment's racial 
attitudes discussed previously with regard to Asian and 
African colonial troops affected the military participation 
of Black West Indians. However, the case of the West Indies 
is especially instructive because, compared with the Black 
inhabitants of the Indian Empire and the African colonies, 
West Indians were the most "English" in culture and race. 
Because of the degree of West Indian "Anglicization," Black 
West Indians were not considered to be a "martial race." 
Consequently, the War Office strenuously opposed any close 
association of Black West Indian subjects with its war 
efforts during the twentieth century. The experience of the 
Caribbean Regiment, the West Indies' only overseas combatant 
contingent during the Second World War, is discussed in some 
detail here because it shows vividly how colonial politics 
and backward-looking military perspectives clashed. 
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I. Black Military Experience in the British West Indies. 
Black soldiers played important roles in military 
operations in the Western Hemisphere from Europe's Age of 
Discovery onward. In emergency situations throughout the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, all of the European 
colonial powers in the Americas came to rely upon the 
usually enthusiastic response of African subjects, free as 
well as slave, to serve against other European powers. 
Often, such service earned freedom and land for slaves and 
special privileges for free men of color. 1 In the Georgian 
period, West Indian militias, with exclusively White officer 
corps, consisted of a majority of White personnel, but Free 
Blacks formed a significant minority. For example, the 
Jamaica Militia, originally formed in 1661, numbered 8,827 
in 1825, of whom about three thousand were free Blacks. 
During the Napoleonic conflicts, the Trinidad militia 
possessed two infantry regiments of Blacks. Meanwhile, 
Trinidadian Whites comprised three cavalry regiments and one 
infantry regiment. 2 As the century unfolded, limited 
contact with people of color in militias increasingly 
appalled Whites. By mid-century, many colonial governments 
1Voelz, 14-19. 
2
"The Jamaica Militia," 146; R. Chartrand, British 
Forces in the West Indies (London: Osprey, 1996), 39. 
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had disbanded or simply left their militias moribund. An 
1853 Colonial Office report noted that, in Jamaica's case, 
such indifference to militia service was due to "the 
repugnance on the part of the White population against a 
general association with the coloured races." 3 
Public attitudes toward military service changed and, 
concurrent with Britain's volunteer movement, colonial local 
forces experienced a rejuvenation by the late nineteenth 
century. The new West Indian local forces, like the old, 
included racially segregated units, (all of which, of 
course, were officered by Whites). For example, in the 
1890s, Trinidad's "Little Army" of volunteers included the 
527-strong Light Infantry and 142-member Field Artillery 
Volunteers, both of which consisted of Black other ranks and 
White officers. A ninety-nine member Light Horse (cavalry) 
remained the preserve of wealthier Whites. 4 Bermuda formed 
its own segregated local units in 1892: the White Bermuda 
Volunteer Rifle Corps and the predominately Black, but 
White-officered Bermuda Militia Artillery. 5 
3P.R.O. C.O. 537/155. Memorandum, "Militia in the 
Colonies," 14 January 1853, 6. 
4
"The Little Army of Trinidad," Navy and Army 
Illustrated 2, (13 November 1896): 256-7. 
5A.L. Kipling, "The Bermuda Regiment," Bulletin (The 
Military Historical Society) 16 (May 1966): 92-3. 
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Apart from direct combatant roles in part-time or 
emergency military forces, British commanders in the 
Caribbean during the Georgian period assigned slaves to 
White units in order to relieve European military personnel 
of exhausting, and therefore deadly, fatigue duty. European 
troops suffered high mortality rates and military 
authorities hoped that Black labor could help preserve White 
lives. 6 After employing Blacks in strictly controlled 
militias and pioneers, the next logical step for British 
military leaders seemed to be the formation of regular 
regiments of Blacks to permanently replace or augment 
European garrisons in the West Indies. The War Office did 
not adopt this policy until 1795, during the war with 
Revolutionary France. Colonial Whites had opposed any Black 
regiments besides those already existing in the militia. 
For example, in 1782, when the Jamaican government, fearful 
of Spanish and French attack, formed three provisional 
battalions of free Black volunteers (in addition to existing 
Black militiamen), it was delayed by the protests of local 
merchants and planters. 7 The prospect of having more armed 
Blacks on the island brought no feeling of security to the 
6Voelz, 59-71. 
7Albert W. Haarmann, "Jamaica Provincial Corps, 
1780-1783," Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research 48 (Spring 1970): 11-13. 
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ruling elite. 
During the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 
few British regiments could be spared for Caribbean 
garrisons, but various British West Indian colonial 
assemblies strenuously resisted the creation of regular 
Black regiments. Historian Roger N. Buckley writes that the 
British government "demonstrated uncommon toughness in the 
face of determined colonial opposition," 8 and by 1799 twelve 
West India Regiments (W.I.R.s) had been raised. The number 
of West Indian battalions fluctuated between a dozen and one 
before the disbandment of the last in 1927. In contrast to 
locally supported and regulated units such as the Indian 
army and African colonial forces, the W.I.R.s remained 
"imperial" regiments under the direct control of the War 
Office, but separate from White British regiments. 
Originally, the British government had planned to 
purchase slaves in the West Indies for the W.I.R.s but this 
source yielded few soldiers because of the reluctance of 
slave-owners to sell physically fit males to the army. 
W.I.R. recruiters then relied on slaves purchased direct 
from Africa until the end of the British slave trade in 
1807. After this date, escaped and "liberated" African 
8Roger Norman Buckley, Slaves in Red Coats: The 
British West India Regiments, 1795-1815 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), 144. 
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slaves provided most recruits. These "Black Corps" earned 
high praise for their services in the Caribbean during the 
Napoleonic period. From 1818, it became customary for at 
least one of the W.I.R.s to be stationed on the coast of 
West Africa, 9 where they campaigned largely unheralded. 
Imperial and colonial views of the W.I.R.s remained 
ambiguous throughout their existence. As an example of the 
British army's ignorance of the W.I.R.s, the Broad Arrow, a 
military periodical, cited the story of a general who 
received the distinction of being named honorary "Colonel" 
of a W.I.R. and met with one of its officers. The White 
officer's appearance surprised the general who exclaimed, 
"God bless my soul, sir! why, you don't mean to say you're a 
captain in the [W.I.]--Regiment? I thought they were all 
Black. " 10 
White West Indian society, well aware of the "Black 
Corps," did not like or trust Black West Indian soldiers. 
As discussed previously, colonial governments felt that 
London did not understand the racial situation in the 
Caribbean. However, in the face of Britain's determination 
9G. Tylden, The West India Regiments, 1795-1927, and 
from 1958," Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research 40 (March 1962): 43-5. 
10
"A Plea for West India Regiments," The Broad 
Arrow 2 (13 March 1869): 316. 
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to form and maintain the W.I.R.s as imperial troops, West 
Indian governments gradually became accustomed to their 
presence. The degree of comfort lessened by mid-century 
when the sources of African recruits disappeared, and the 
British then sought out West Indian-born Blacks for the 
W.I.R.s. For West Indian Whites, the recruitment of Afro-
Caribbean soldiers seemed threatening to the structure of 
their colonial society. In 1853, Antigua businessmen 
protested to the Colonial Off ice that they preferred African 
recruits because these foreigners did not sympathize with 
the creole population, "whom [the Africans] regard with no 
friendly feelings and by whom they are consequently much 
dreaded, more even than the White troops ... " 11 
II. The Martial Races Theory and the West Indies 
As with Eurasians, Black West Indians did not merit the 
term "martial race" in military opinion because they, "an 
inappropriate hybridism," possessed White blood and were 
exposed to European culture. They were supposedly incapable 
of incorporating the "best" of European characteristics, 
including hard work, thrift, and duty. For example, a 
W.I.R. officer who witnessed the transition from African to 
11Daniel & Co. to Duke of Newcastle 18 June 1853, in 
House Paper 1852-53 (938) 65. 115. Correspondence between 
West Indian Merchants to the Colonial Office, respecting the 
Recruiting for the Black Regiments from the Creole 
population of Antigua. 
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West Indian recruitment in his unit, judged that, "the pure 
African makes a better soldier than a Creole. He is 
generally more subordinate, and is cleanlier than his 
domesticated brother [sic]. " 12 Another observer contrasted 
the African with the creole and found the first "loyal, 
brave, honest, and, ... as faithful as a mastiff," while the 
creoles were "treacherous, dishonest, and ... most brutally 
cruel to one another, to children, and to such animals as 
they can get into their power." 13 Sir Garnet Wolseley, one 
of Britain's most important Victorian generals, summarized 
the racial basis of Black West Indian defects as soldiers: 
The infusion of White blood into the West Indian 
negro has certainly not improved his physical 
strength, whilst the education we have given him 
has as certainly injured his fighting qualities. 
He has lost the best qualities his forefathers 
possessed as savages, and he has failed to acquire 
those which belong to that civilisation [with] 
which he is now more or less associated. 14 
Another reservation about the W.I.R.s was that, by being 
treated and fed like British troops, they were "excessively 
pampered." Being too "civilized," it was believed that they 
could not fight as well in the bush as African troops. 15 
12
"P," "Blacks," St. James Magazine 7 (1863): 46. 
13
"Sketches in the West Indies," Dublin University 
Magazine 56 (November 1860): 612. 
14Wolseley, 691. 
15S.C. Ukpabi, "The Origins of the West African 
Frontier Force," Journal of the Historical Society of 
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Not all late Victorian officers expressed such fondness 
for the "noble savage" and dislike for West Indians. Alfred 
B. Ellis, an officer with the First W.I.R., advocated a 
greater use of Black West Indians in colonial garrisons to 
replace British units, which then could be concentrated at 
home. 16 Ellis differed with the views such as Wolseley's 
that West Indian units were "no longer of the same use to us 
as formerly, when they were composed of liberated 
Africans." 17 Indeed, Ellis thought that creoles made 
excellent soldiers precisely because of their degree of 
Anglicization. While he considered West Africans "dull and 
stupidn and Indians "hostile to us by tradition," Ellis 
found the West Indian soldier to be "docile, patient, brave, 
and faithful." 18 More applause came in 1894 from a former 
head of the West Indian command, Major General Sir Charles 
Pearson, who wrote that the Black West Indian soldier was 
"quite as easily managed as the European." The West Indian 
possessed his "peculiarities ... but, when once his officer 
and he understand each other no one could be more amenable 
to discipline, and his loyalty is unimpeachable." Pearson 
Nigeria 3, 3, (December 1966): 490. 
16E 11 is , 4- 5 . 
17Wolseley, 690. 
18Ellis, 11-13. 
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also argued that the W.I.R.s deserved more recognition. 19 
As if in response, albeit belatedly, the Navy and Army 
Illustrated, in 1898, praised "the cheery and powerful 
Blacks" of the W.I.R.s for extending British authority in 
West Africa. 20 However, within the British military 
establishment, pro-West Indian Black sympathy remained a 
minority opinion. More typical was the view expressed in a 
1901 War Office report that, "the W[est] .I[ndian]. soldier 
in peace time only does well where he can have his Black 
women without interference--otherwise he may become very 
troublesome and insubordinate." 21 
III. White Officers and the W.I.R.s 
In contrast to the sought-after postings in the Indian 
army and African colonial forces, the W.I.R.s usually 
received reluctant British officers who simply had no where 
else to go for a military career. In 1894, General Pearson 
observed that, "of the unpopularity of the [West Indian] 
service among candidates for commissions in the Army there 
can be no doubt." 22 Frequently, W.I.R. officers had 
19Charles Pearson, "The West Indies and its 
Command," United Service Magazine (June 1894): 156-7. 
20
"The West India Regiment," The Navy and Army 
Illustrated 7 (8 December 1898): 278. 
21 P.R.O. CAB. 11/129. Raper to Altham, 17 October 
1901. 
22 Pearson, 157. 
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graduated low from Sandhurst and spent a considerable amount 
of time and effort attempting to "exchange" to better 
postings. The Army and Navy Gazette stated that, 
the fact these regiments are officered at all is 
indeed a striking proof of the anxiety of our 
middle class young men for military service. As a 
profession their calling may be pronounced 
miserable. They command blacks, and their service 
alternates between ... [the West Indies] and the 
pestilential West Coast of Africa ... 
Another military journal, the Broad Arrow, suggested that 
officers disdained serving with the W.I.R.s because, while 
they received the same low pay as their fellows in U.K.-
based units, they were subject to higher costs of living and 
continuous foreign service in far more hazardous climates. 23 
Some officers strongly detested their West Indian 
postings. For example, in the 1890s, Scottish-born Ernst 
Craig-Brown had joined the W.I.R. after Sandhurst but sought 
to transfer to an elite Highland regiment. Sounding much 
like a dissatisfied East India Company officer before 1857, 
he bitterly referred to his Black West Indian N.C.O.s and 
soldiers as "little removed from the Ape" 24 and "the 
rottenest lot of sulky, lazy brutes I ever came across." 25 
23Army and Navy Gazette Quoted in The Times, 10 
December 1867. See Pearson, 158; and "A Plea for West India 
Regiments," 316. 
24 Craig-Brown, Letter to Father, 22 January 1897, 
Craig-Brown Collection, Imperial War Museum, London. 
25Craig-Brown, Letter to Mother, 15/17 December 
125 
Craig-Brown also disparaged his soldiers' marching skills: 
"the nigger can't walk, he only shambles along." Upon 
viewing a newly arrived British battalion, he found it "a 
treat ... to see a European regiment at drill after seeing 
nothing but negroes for 6 months." 26 
A significant proportion of W.I.R. officers came from 
"non-traditional" sources, which included former N.C.O.s and 
temporary war-time officers who had been offered permanent, 
or regular, commissions in the army as rewards for 
distinguished service. Such officers invariably lacked the 
independent income required to participate in the social 
life of a more fashionable U.K. regiment. Perhaps the most 
famous such example was William Slim, a temporary officer 
during the First World War, who received a regular 
commission in the British army. Contemplating the 
considerable expense of regimental life, he chose the 
"cheaper" W.I.R. as his "home" regiment. Slim never 
actually served with the regiment but exchanged into the 
Indian army before the end of the war. 27 
1895. 
26Craig-Brown, Letter to Mother, 2 February 1896. 
27 David Anderson, "Slim," in John Keegan, ed., 
Churchill's Generals (New York: William Morrow, 1991), 302. 
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IV. Reliability and White Man's Wars 
The most notable disciplinary failures on the part of 
the W.I.R.s occurred before the change in recruiting 
patterns from Africans to creoles. 28 From the mid-
nineteenth century until their final disbandment in 1927, 
the W.I.R.s remained loyal, despite the fears earlier 
expressed concerning the fidelity of creole soldiers and the 
disdain of their officers. The one significant revolt of 
creole soldiers between 1850 and 1914 involved not the 
W.I.R.s, but a volunteer corps in Trinidad. In 1896, the 
racial tensions existing in Trinidadian society violently 
erupted during a day-long series of athletic competitions 
which marked the end of annual training periods. A fight 
broke out between Bombardier Alleyne, a Black member of the 
artillery and a Light Horse sergeant, Thomas Gibson. The 
bombardier, who had been drinking, had asked Gibson if he 
could borrow his horse for a race. Gibson refused and, 
after being verbally harassed by Alleyne, struck the 
bombardier. Several of the bombardier's comrades then 
proceeded to batter Gibson. Other members of both units 
joined the fray, their officers having lost control. A few 
artillerymen who had maintained their composure arrested 
28 For examples, see Michael Craton, Testing the 
Chains (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 228-9, 
236. 
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Alleyne on an officer's orders and took him to the barracks, 
where he fell asleep. However, most of the artillerymen 
refused to obey orders to disband, made loud threats and, 
because Gibson had not been arrested, demanded that Alleyne 
be released. After Alleyne had been awakened and released 
by fearful officers, the mutineers carried him through the 
streets in triumph. Within days, the governor formally 
dissolved the Artillery Volunteers and those mutineers who 
held positions with the government or private firms 
immediately lost their jobs, including the unfortunate 
Alleyne, who had been employed by the Port-of-Spain Gazette. 
Subsequently, a court-martial reduced Gibson to the rank of 
private for assaulting Alleyne. 29 In addition to 
illustrating the stresses inherent to colonial society, the 
"Artillery Riot" demonstrated that Black West Indian 
soldiers could react with violence to racial slights. 
In the First World War, the West India Regiment (the 
several W.I.R.s had been by now consolidated into one 
regiment, consisting of two battalions) fought against the 
Germans in the Cameroons and East Africa. The War Office 
refused early offers of a separate West Indian contingent, 
consisting of citizen-soldiers and modeled along the lines 
29 For the saga of this mutiny, see the Times 
(London) 15 September 1899; Port of Spain Gazette, 27, 29, 
and 31 August and 2 September 1899. 
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of Kitchener's "new armies" then being raised in Britain. 
"Respectable" West Indian patriots did not wish to simply 
enlist in the regular W.I.R.s because of the contempt then 
widely held for professional soldiers, who usually came from 
the poorest and most desperate sections of society. 30 In 
1915, after being subjected to lobbying by influential 
organizations and persons, including the Colonial Office and 
King George V himself, the War Office authorized the 
formation of the British West Indies Regiment (B.W.I.R.) for 
war-time service. Only two of the regiment's eleven 
battalions actually served as frontline combat soldiers, and 
that was against the Turks in the Middle East. 31 In 1917, 
the War Office decided to permit West Indian colonial 
governors to nominate "slightly coloured gentlemen" for 
"governor's" commissions, which were limited in authority to 
the B.W.I.R. It is not clear how many were eventually 
appointed before the regiment's post-war disbandment. 32 
30 In early 1918, a scheme to amalgamate reluctant 
members of the wartime British West Indies Regiment with the 
regular 2/W.I.R. in East Africa had to be dropped because it 
would have caused "serious trouble," including murder. 
P.R.O. C.O. 318/347. General Officer Commanding, East 
Africa, to War Office, 9 April 1918. 
31C.L. Joseph, "The British West Indies Regiment," 
Journal of Caribbean History 2 (May 1971): 94-124. 
32 P.R.O. C.O. 318/347. "Men from W[est]. Indies not 
of pure European descent. Enlistment in British Regts." 
Minute of 5 June 1918. 
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Against Germany's African colonies, the W.I.R. fought 
well, but usually without fanfare. In contrast, the 
activities of the B.W.I.R., a publicly proclaimed embodiment 
of West Indian patriotism, remained a subject of acute 
interest for colonial officials throughout the war. In 
general, high ranking British commanders commended the 
battalions of the B.W.I.R. personnel serving under their 
command. In 1916, the British commander in Egypt, W.J. 
Murray, did not initially consider the recently arrived 
battalions of the B.W.I.R. to be fit enough even for pioneer 
duties in the Middle Eastern heat, but he recognized that 
the West Indian soldiers wanted a chance to fight. 33 A year 
of training improved the unit's condition so much that 
Murray reported that "the discipline of the regiment has 
been consistently good, and the fine physique and smart 
turnout of the men has often been noted." In 1918, two 
B.W.I.R. battalions earned praise for an attack they made in 
Trans-Jordan. 34 Meanwhile, in France, Sir Douglas Haig 
found that the B.W.I.R. personnel he used as pioneers were 
cheerful under fire, well-disciplined and possessed high 
33P.R.O. C.O. 318/339. General Officer Commanding-
in-Chief, Egypt, to Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 29 
June 1916. 
34 P.R.O. C.O. 318/344. "A Short History of the 
British West Indies Regiment in Egypt by W.J. Murray, 24 
June 1917." 
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morale. 35 In 1947, E.E. Sabben-Clare, a Colonial Office 
official, concluded that if the War Office had any grounds 
for complaint about the morale and performance of West 
Indian troops in the First World War, army authorities 
themselves were largely responsible because of negligence in 
providing adequate clothing and dividing the regiment in 
question among several fronts. 36 
Meanwhile, individual opinions of lower ranking British 
personnel toward West Indian soldiers ranged from admiration 
to stereotype to ignorance. W.E. Young, a stretcher-bearer 
in France remembered that, "they could give points to 
British [soldiers] in manners, speech and behavior." In 
Africa, West Indian soldiers staged a concert, an event 
which A.F. Bowden described as a "real" minstrel show. 
Roland Mountfort, a corporal with the 25/Royal Fusiliers in 
East Africa, received the impression that West Indians 
"thought no small beer of themselves, always speaking 
35P.R.O. C.O. 318/344. "Service of Battalions of 
the British West Indies Regiment," by L.S. Kiggelf for Field 
Marshal Haig, 8 November 1917. 
36A Colonial Office official, E.E. Sabben-Clare, 
referred back to the unfortunate experiences of the B.W.I.R. 
P.R.O. CAB 21/1689. Sabben-Clare, "The Colonial Military 
Forces in the Second World War," 1947. B.W.I.R. troops in 
England suffered a relatively high mortality rate of seventy 
deaths per thousand during the winter of 1915-16. P.R.O. 
C.O. 318/340. Minute, "Labourers for Light Railways in 
France," 30 September 1916. 
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English if there was a White man anywhere around. " 37 
White resentment of Blacks who felt equal to Europeans 
was returned in kind. Soon after the end of the First World 
War, soldiers of the B.W.I.R. staged mutinies in Taranto, 
Italy. The soldiers had become violent in response to 
racist slurs against them, their lower pay, inferior 
accommodations, and segregated medical facilities. 38 With 
this incident, the War Office learned an irritating and far-
reaching lesson, i.e., that Black West Indian servicemen 
would not willingly accept racial subordination or 
discrimination. The West Indian expectation of equality 
would pose sensitive problems in any future multi-racial, 
imperial war effort. 
In the 1920s, fiscal pressure and prejudice convinced 
the War Office to disband the last regular West Indian 
battalions. The army had judged that a West Indian 
formation would not be as economical as a European one 
because the War Office would never bring it to Europe. In 
37W.E. Young, "Tales from the Trenches, 1915-1918," 
TMs., 52, Imperial War Museum, London; A.F. Bowden, "First 
World War Memoirs of A.F. Bowden," TMs., entry of 16 March 
1918, Imperial War Museum, London; and Mountfort, Letter to 
Father, 1/2 January 1918, Mountfort Collection, Imperial War 
Museum, London. 
38See Sherwood, 3-23; W.F. Elkins, "A Source of 
Black Nationalism in the Caribbean: The Revolt of the 
British West Indies Regiment at Taranto, Italy," Science & 
Society 34 (Spring 1970): 99-103. 
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the 1930s, during a period of economic distress, West Indian 
governments as well as leading White colonial citizens 
unsuccessfully championed schemes to reconstitute the W.I.R. 
as a means of reducing unemployment. 39 
V. Another World War 
A. Demands on the colonial empire 
In early 1940, Malcolm Macdonald, the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, presented his department's opinions 
on the exploitation of colonial man-power to the War 
Cabinet. Macdonald ranked the manpower of the empire 
according to military ability and equipment shortages. He 
acknowledged that, "all the available supplies of equipment 
will be required for units considered to be of superior 
fighting capacity, raised in this country or the Dominions," 
that is, White units. The Colonial Secretary predicted 
that, if and when the problem of the equipment shortage was 
overcome, "it is probable that the fighting races of India 
would be drawn upon rather than any of the races inhabiting 
the colonial dependencies." Other factors discussed 
included the political dangers of deploying colonial troops 
to places where they were not welcome, and the destructive 
impact that France's climate was thought to have on troops 
39P.R.O. C.O. 318/432/3. "West India Regiment--
Reconstitution," 1938/1939. 
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from tropical regions. 40 
B. Calls for a West Indian Contingent 
The concern about Black military participation seemed 
especially acute in regard to the West Indies, which had 
experienced numerous labor disturbances in the late 1930s. 
At the outbreak of war, however, the Caribbean colonies had 
been swept by a remarkable wave of patriotism. Virtually 
all segments of West Indian society, including the most 
militant labor leaders, promised to cooperate fully with 
Britain. 41 
Many disparate voices lobbied for the greater inclusion 
of Black West Indian subjects in the war effort, although 
they often disagreed as to the exact role to be given West 
Indian troops. Early on, a White West Indian subject wrote 
to the Colonial Secretary that many West Indians feared that 
their islands were to be transferred to U.S. sovereignty. 
He admitted that he himself could enlist freely, "but what 
of the many West Indians of like means & views who are of 
mixed or negro[sic] descent ... Surely there is a place for 
40P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/4. "Utilization of the Man-
power resources of the Colonial Empire," January 1940. 
41 P.R.O. c.o. 323/1672/3. Minute by Lee, 11 
September 1939. For an account of pre-war troubles in the 
West Indies, see Howard Johnson, "Oil, Imperial Policy and 
the Trinidad Disturbances, 1937," Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History (October 1975): 29-54. 
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us all in this battle for civilization." 42 In May 1940, 
Jamaica's Legislative Council expressed "unshaken loyalty" 
and "undiminished desire" to form a contingent for the 
war. 43 In July, a public meeting in Trinidad resolved to 
offer 25,000 men to the imperial government. 44 Two months 
later, the Rev. E. Elliot Durant, rector of the heavily 
British West Indian St. Ambrose Episcopal Church in New York 
City, assured the prime minister that, "it would be a 
splendid thing" to reconstitute the W.I.R. and "give these 
loyal subjects of His Majesty an opportunity to help in 
defending Democracy. " 45 In April 1941, Durant appealed 
directly to the King on the grounds that, "Britain does not 
possess more faithful subjects than her colored people. 
They are willing to give their lives for the Empire. " 46 
The Colonial Office wanted to maintain these patriotic 
feelings and inquired of the West Indian governors their 
42 P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10. Smith to Mayne, 3 May 
1941. 
43P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/4. Man-Power--Utilization of 
Jamaica. 
44 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/22. Trinidad Resolution, 4 
July 1940, enclosed in A.C. Burkett to the colonial 
secretary in Port-of-Spain, 4 July 1940. 
45P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/3. Durant to Churchill, 24 
September 1940. 
46P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10. Durant to George VI, 28 
April 1941. 
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opinions on whether, in light of the experiences with ex-
servicemen of the First World War, military units should be 
discouraged. Most of the respondents discounted the problem 
of ex-servicemen but the governor of British Honduras 
strongly differed: 
1. I do not know whether they were any good in the 
field, but I have heard from some of their 
officers that they gave a great deal of trouble 
behind the lines. When they returned here they 
rioted, and they have always been the cause of a 
great deal of trouble locally. Most of them think 
that, having served their King and country as 
soldiers, their King and country should support 
them for the rest of their lives. 
2. I do not know whether any troops will be asked 
for from the West Indies during the present War, 
but for the sake of my successors in off ice I hope 
not. There would, however, be no objection to 
recruiting men for a Labour Corps, and, in fact I 
should welcome this. 47 
Jamaica Governor Richards favored raising local forces, but 
he advised against sending any West Indian unit to a cold 
climate, and doubted whether a combatant unit would be 
successful. Richards reported that, a "certain amount of 
interested local agitation" had called for the revival of 
the W.I.R., but he observed that the scheme was a form of 
unemployment relief and did not support it. 48 
47 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1672/3. Governor of British 
Honduras to Colonial Office, 15 September 1939. 
48P.R.O. C.O. 323/1672/3. Richards, Jamaica, to 
MacDonald, Colonial Office, 25 September 1939. 
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In mid-October 1939, the War Office gave tentative 
permission for raising a symbolic West Indian "field 
company" if the gesture would facilitate the raising of 
labor units. 49 The War Office did not act on this 
concession and, in February 1940, formally postponed the 
establishment of West Indian pioneer units on the grounds of 
climate. It decided that, "the most effective coloured 
labour from overseas for service in France is that from 
Mediterranean territories such as Palestine and Cyprus." 50 
In June 1940, Winston Churchill, the new British prime 
minister, suggested that the W.I.R. be reconstituted: 
It might have three battalions strongly officered 
by British officers, and be representative of most 
of the islands; to be available for Imperial 
Service; to give an outlet for the loyalty of the 
natives, and bring money into these poor 
islands. 51 
At the time, however, "the general feeling" of the rest of 
the government toward West Indian soldiers remained so low 
that, in one colonial official's words, "it was not worth 
proceeding with this proposal." 52 
49P.R.O. W.O. 193/19. R.H. Dewing to H.R.S. Massy, 
30 November 1939. 
50P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/3. War Office to Under-
secretary of State, Colonial Office, 8 February 1940. 
51
"Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies," Quoted in Churchill, Their Finest Hour (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1948), 544-5. 
52 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1787/74. Minute by Poynton, 28 
137 
C. Colonial Office v. War Office 
At the beginning of 1941, the Colonial Office re-opened 
the question of West Indian military participation, this 
time as pioneers. David Margesson, Secretary of State for 
War, wrote to Lord Moyne, the new Colonial Secretary, that 
West Indians were not an "industrious race," the British 
climate would be against them, and that he did not "much 
like the idea of billeting them in" Britain. He assured 
Moyne that "if the need should arise for tapping this source 
of man-power [he would], of course, consult [him] at 
once." 53 Moyne replied that, despite the past poor opinions 
of West Indian soldiers, "the growing shortage of manpower 
in the United Kingdom and elsewhere may well compel us to be 
content with a lower standard than we should have been ready 
to accept hitherto. " 54 In April 1941, the Colonial Office 
again stressed the availability of manpower in the West 
Indies because of unemployment and the "very real desire" of 
West Indian subjects to serve. In response, Margesson told 
Moyne that the creation of West Indian military units might 
have propaganda value but, in the First World War, the War 
June 1940. 
53P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/12. Margesson to Moyne, 11 
February 1941. 
54 P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/12. Moyne to Margesson, 11 
March 1941. 
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Office had experienced "considerable difficulties in 
employing West Indians in labour units in this country owing 
to climatic reasons, difficulties of billeting and 
accommodation, and the difficulty of providing units with 
British staff. " 55 
West Indian governments continued to pursue military 
units. In May 1941, The General Legislative Council of the 
Leeward Islands publicly expressed "the fervent wish of the 
people of this colony that consideration be given to the 
formation of a West Indian unit for any service which H.M.'s 
military advisers may recommend." In response to such 
requests, the Colonial Secretary advised West Indian 
governors to make the following announcement: 
It is with great regret that this decision has 
been taken and I share the disappointment which it 
must cause, but I am sure that West Indians will 
appreciate that in modern warfare, with all its 
complexities, it is not given to all individuals 
or communities even in Great Britain itself to 
serve out common cause in the way in which their 
most generous instincts dictate ... 56 
In July 1941, after being informed that the War Office had 
no plans for raising West Indian units, Churchill urged that 
55P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Resume of Conversation 
between Colonial Office and War Office officials, 8 April 
1941; Margesson to Mayne, 8 May 1941. 
56P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10. Lethem to Colonial 
Secretary, 8 May 1941; Colonial Secretary to Lethem, 27 May 
1941. 
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the scheme "be pressed forward" and suggested that they 
could garrison Singapore. 57 However, West Indian political 
sensitivity precluded the suggested use of Polish officers 
for training the proposed force, a policy Churchill had 
adopted for the R.W.A.F.F. 58 
Armed with Churchill's endorsement, Mayne assured 
Margesson that if enough suitable higher quality recruits 
could not be found to form a brigade, then a single high-
quality battalion of picked men would be preferable. 59 In 
August, Margesson cited the practical difficulties of 
shipping and the lack of officers and that, "on racial 
grounds," it was "undesirable" to mix Black West Indians 
with African or Asian soldiers. "The cold fact of the 
matter," the War Secretary related, was that, "it would be 
an inconvenience" to raise West Indian units, and a waste of 
resources. As a compromise, Margesson offered Mayne officer 
commissions in the African colonial forces for a few well-
qualified individual Black West Indians. 60 
57 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Ismay to Churchill, 3 July 
1941. 
58 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Minute by A. Poynton, 9 
July 1941. 
59P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Mayne to Margesson, 14 July 
1941. 
60P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Margesson to Mayne, 11 
August 1941. 
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The Colonial Office countered with a suggestion that 
Britain could meet West Indian aspirations to participate in 
the war by increasing individual recruitment of both Whites 
and Blacks for service in Britain or, alternatively, perhaps 
yet raise pioneer units. 61 In November, Moyne again 
advocated increased individual recruitment in the British 
forces and pioneer units as alternatives to combatant units. 
He cited an August request from Sir Claude Auchinleck, 
British Commander in Chief, Middle East, for West Indian 
stevedores, a plea which had been rejected by the War Office 
on account of practical difficulties. 62 Margesson decided 
to leave it to Auchinleck to reject Moyne's appeals. In 
December, the War Secretary asked Auchinleck whether Black 
West Indian soldiers, who were paid as White British troops, 
"could satisfactorily work side by side with Indian troops 
and West African labour units on substantially lower rates, 
and without risk or repercussions," and whether he was 
willing to allot some of his shipping space to the West 
Indians. Auchinleck replied negatively to both matters and, 
in turn, Margesson informed Moyne that the War Office had to 
61 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Calder, Colonial Office, to 
Poett, War Office, 23 August 1941. 
62 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. Moyne to Margesson, 21 
November 1941. 
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reject Moyne's proposals. 63 
The debate between ministries over West Indian pioneer 
units continued into 1942. The need for military laborers 
in the Middle East increased substantially as the British 
built up an enormous base there from which to wage war 
against the Axis powers. At an April meeting, both 
ministries agreed that shipping, accommodation, and climate 
did not immediately present insurmountable obstacles to West 
Indian units. At least in principle then, the War Office 
accepted the notion of pioneer units in the future. 64 
Regardless of its theoretical acceptance of West Indian 
pioneers, the War Office preferred to tap African sources of 
manpower for military labor, a tendency which caused Harold 
MacMillan, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Colonial 
Office, to ask, "how can I press Africa still further when 
the voluntary offers of West Indians are rejected?" 65 
Six weeks after the April meeting, the War Office 
stated that the lack of shipping still prevented the 
63P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/1. War Office to Auchinleck, 4 
December 1941, and reply, 13 December 1941, encl. in 
Margesson to Moyne, 17 December 1941. 
64 P.R.O. c.o. 968/74/18. Note of a Meeting to 
discuss a West Indian Pioneer Unit held at the Colonial 
Office, 14 April 1942. 
65P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/18. MacMillan, Colonial 
Office, to Henderson, War Office, 15 May 1942. 
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utilization of West Indian pioneer units. 66 MacMillan then 
appealed to Philip H. Noel-Baker, Minister of War Transport, 
who expressed "utmost sympathy" for the "highest political 
importance" of raising pioneer units in the West Indies. 
However, Noel-Baker agreed with the War Office's analysis of 
the shipping difficulties. American troops would have to be 
delayed in favor of West Indian units and, because the U-
boats were finding the Caribbean a good hunting ground, an 
unusually strong naval escort would have to be provided for 
the West Indian troop convoy. 67 
In April 1943, the Colonial Office again proposed a 
West Indian combatant contingent. The War Office argued 
against such a plan by citing shipping, difficulties of 
maintaining reinforcements, and the effect the relatively 
high pay expected by West Indian personnel might have on 
other Black colonial troops. As an alternative, it 
suggested garrison duty in Ceylon or Madagascar for the 
proposed force. 68 Again citing the prime minister's 
previous support and possible resentment on the part of 
66P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/18. Henderson, War Office, to 
MacMillan, Colonial Office, 31 May 1942. 
67 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/18. MacMillan, Colonial 
Office, to Noel-Barker, Ministry of War Transport, 8 June 
1942; and Noel-Baker to MacMillan, 17 June 1942. 
68 P.R.O. c.o. 968/17/5. Brind, War Office, to 
Holt, Colonial Office, 20 April 1943. 
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Black West Indians, the Colonial Office urged an active role 
for a combatant unit in the Mediterranean. 69 
The War Office commenced its rear-guard action against 
a West Indian overseas contingent in August 1943. Sir James 
Grigg, the newest War Secretary, argued against the scheme 
on several familiar grounds, including the "Black Man's 
Grave" and West Indian expectations of being treated 
equally: 
In the first place West Indians are not a very 
robust race, which would detract from their value 
as combatant troops [and] might easily make them 
something of a commitment from the health point of 
view. Secondly, their advent would mean setting 
up a special administrative staff, and 
complications over their rates of pay if they were 
employed, for example, as labour units outside 
Great Britain. They would presumably have to be 
paid at British rates, whereas other coloured 
labour abroad is not. Thirdly, under existing 
arrangements, they would not provide any accession 
of strength to the British Army, since they would 
count against Army manpower ceiling ... 
With the last point, Grigg implied that, if only a limited 
number of personnel could be supported by Britain, then they 
should be White. Moreover, Grigg cautioned that the 
deployment of a West Indian contingent to the United Kingdom 
would aggravate the tense racial situation already existing 
there because of the arrival of large numbers of segregated 
American forces. The introduction of Black British subjects 
69C.O. 968/17/5. Holt, Colonial Office, to Brind, 
War Office, 6 May 1943. 
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would, the War Secretary warned, be "asking for trouble and, 
therefore, politically open to question." Grigg left it 
ultimately to the Colonial Office to decide if the political 
advantages to an overseas contingent outweighed the military 
drawbacks enough to submit the decision to higher authority, 
i.e, the War Cabinet. 70 
Before referring the matter to the War Cabinet, Oliver 
Stanley, the then Colonial Secretary, persuaded the War 
Secretary by arguing that West Indians were just as "robust" 
as other Black colonial troops; pay differentials already 
existed in the Allied effort, in particular the pay of 
American servicemen versus British; and the proposed unit 
would be sent direct to the Mediterranean instead of the 
United Kingdom. 71 Apparently, the last condition clinched 
the deal, for Grigg finally acceded to Stanley's plan and 
recommended that the West Indian contingent 1) be used for 
garrison duties without calling it a garrison unit, 2) be 
sent to North Africa with summer duty in Italy, and 3) be 
deployed overseas in the summer of 1944. 72 With Grigg's 
70P.R.O. w.o. 106/2854. Grigg to Stanley, 17 
September 1943. 
71 P.R.O. C.O. 968/17/5. Colonial Office Comments on 
Sir James Grigg's Letter, n.d., 1943 and Minute by Sabben-
Clare, 12 November 1943. 
72 P.R.O. C.O. 968/17/5. War Office Memorandum on 
Employment of British West Indian Soldiers in a Theatre of 
War, encl. in Grigg to Stanley, 17 December 1943. 
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acceptance secured, Stanley informed the War Cabinet that he 
and his predecessors had "since the early days of the war," 
pursued the idea of a West Indian contingent and that, "the 
announcement of a decision to send a West Indian contingent 
to a theatre of war would be most warmly received ... " 73 The 
War Cabinet concurred and decided to ship the contingent to 
the Mediterranean area as soon as possible after April 1944, 
the earliest time when shipping would be available. 74 Soon 
afterward, an absent Churchill minuted his approval: "I 
favour this. " 75 
In addition to a combatant contingent, the War Office, 
in 1944, discussed the idea of sending specially raised West 
Indian garrison battalions to British islands in the Pacific 
in order to replace "island hopping" American troops. 76 The 
military and political authorities in the West Indies 
favored the suggestion and began planning for it but, from 
73P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. "Employment of a British 
West Indian Contingent in a Theatre of War," by the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 3 January 1944. 
74 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Extract from the 
Conclusions of the 2nd (44) Meeting of the War Cabinet, 6 
January 1944. 
75P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. SEXTANT to Air Ministry, 7 
January 1944. 
76P.R.O. w.o. 106/2851. Minutes of a meeting held 
to consider the provision of garrisons for the British 
Empire territories in the Pacific, 27 June 1944. 
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the Pacific, the New Zealand prime minister deprecated the 
"introduction of another native race as most undesirable on 
ethnological grounds." 77 In the event, the War Office never 
implemented this scheme. 
VI. The Caribbean Regiment 
The War Office informed its commanders in the 
Mediterranean of the War Cabinet's decision to form a West 
Indian overseas contingent and asked for their opinions as 
to the unit's (to be called the 1st Battalion of the 
Caribbean Regiment or 1/C.R.) eventual role. The War Office 
acknowledged to its commanders that it rated Black West 
Indians' value as soldiers as "dubious," but requested that 
they consider the political implications of relegating the 
unit to a "static role. " 78 Sir Henry "Jumbo" Wilson, Allied 
commander in the Mediterranean, agreed to train the regiment 
in Italy as a commando, a small self-contained unit with 
training appropriate to special tasks such as raiding. Back 
in London, the Colonial Office itself doubted whether the 
soldiers would be "mentally alert enough" for the duty. 79 
77 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2851. High Commission, New 
Zealand, to Dominion Office, 27 July 1944. 
78 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. War Office to Allied Forces 
Headquarters, Algiers, 21 January 1944. 
79P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Minutes of a Meeting to 
Discuss the Proposal for a West Indian force to serve 
overseas, 26 January 1944. 
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Not all British commanders in the Mediterranean 
appeared as accommodating to the l/C.R as Wilson. For 
example, Major General E.A. Sutton, Director of Medical 
Services in Italy, claimed that on the basis of 
"considerable personal experience," (presumably during the 
Great War) he held an "extremely low" opinion of the Black 
West Indian soldier. He found them "very prone to reporting 
sick for the most trivial reasons," they questioned 
diagnosis, and, "they are in the main 'bone idle.'" 80 Sir 
Harold Alexander, the Allied land commander in Italy, 
opposed the idea of a symbolic West Indian contingent being 
attached to his command for military reasons. On a copy of 
the War Office's proposal, he protested that, 
I cannot accept the West Indian troops here--my 
battle front is already far too rigid because of 
the number of nationalities I have. Those 
responsible must be warned now that we shall be 
heading for trouble if the Italian theatre is made 
the dumping ground of all sorts of people who want 
to be in on the show for political reasons. 81 
Ironically, the War Office ignored dissenting opinions and 
dutifully pressed forward with a scheme it had never 
favored. 
The battalion consisted of about 1,200 volunteers 
80P.R.O. W.O. 204/6672. Sutton to Deputy Adjudant 
General, War Office, 26 August 1944. 
81 P.R.O. W.O. 204/7377. TROOPERS (War Office) to 
FREEDOM (Italy), 21 January 1944. 
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(including replacements) selected from the existing local 
military forces of the various Caribbean area colonies and 
Bermuda (Table 3). 
Table 3. Geographic Distribution of the officers and 
other ranks of the Caribbean Regiment. 
COLONY OFFICERS OTHER 
RANKS 
Bermuda 3 97 
Bahamas 1 53 
Br. Honduras 1 60 
Jamaica 6 240 
Antigua 2 75 
St. Lucia 1 93 
Barbados 2 196 
Trinidad 12 194 
Br. Guiana 4 151 
TOTALS 32 1,159 
Source: P.R.O. W.O. 176/41. War Diary of l/C.R., 
Orders for Embarkation, 17 December 1945. 
The War Off ice met colonial concerns about racial 
discrimination by agreeing that Blacks could compete for 
officer commissions on an equal basis with Whites. 82 
However, this concession worried the military authorities in 
Italy because it might have caused resentment in Black units 
which could not have Black officers. 83 Most of the 
regiment's senior officers were White, either West Indians 
or Britons but most of the junior officers were 
82P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. War Office to Commander, 
South Caribbean Area, 15 February 1944. 
83P.R.O. W.O. 204/6672. Minute of 11 July 1944. 
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"coloured." 84 Later, Black Londoner Major Joe Moody joined 
the l/C.R. in the Middle East after several years service 
with British anti-aircraft batteries. He became the 
highest-ranking Black officer and one of the senior officers 
in the unit. 85 
In view of the War Office's intransigence over bringing 
the l/C.R. to Britain because of the growing American 
presence, it was ironic that the authorities gathered and 
trained the new battalion near Newport News, Virginia, for 
six weeks before transporting it to Italy. Before 
disembarking in segregated America, Lt. Col. Wilkin, the 
regiment's commanding officer ordered his soldiers to be 
"particularly careful" when patronizing public 
transportation, public houses, amusement centers, and places 
of businesses in order to avoid "those places or vehicles 
that are obviously reserved for Whites." Wilkin further 
prohibited his soldiers from communicating with or 
befriending White women, but assured them that recreational 
facilities would be provided. "Above all," Wilkin implored, 
"remember that the honour of your Regiment and your island 
rests on your shoulders and that if you conduct yourselves 
84Arundel (Joe) Moody, Interview by author, 10 
December 1995; and H.St.C. Whitehorne to author, 21 May 
1996. 
8 5Moody. 
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properly and only go where you are told, you should have no 
cause to regret the time spent in the U.S.A." 86 H.St.C. 
Whitehorne, a White junior officer, recalled that the 
relationship between the battalion and American civilians 
was generally "amicable," but also remembered that the color 
bar had "affected mildly one of our young officers who was 
coloured and was not welcomed in a club or restaurant, but 
this raised no real issue." 87 
For entertainment, authorities organized dances and 
sightseeing tours. Barbadian Elvey Watson remembered that, 
"if we had stuck to the stringent rules, we would never have 
had a desire to mix with the Americans." Because they wore 
British uniforms, the soldiers of the l/C.R. often managed 
to visit areas of towns which were off-limits to African-
Americans. 88 On 8 June 1944, the l/C.R. had the unique 
distinction of being the first British regiment to celebrate 
the king's birthday on American territory since the American 
Revolution. 89 Fortunately for colonial relations, the 
86P.R.O. W.O. 176/41. Officer Commanding to All 
Ranks, 6 May 1944, in War Diary of 1/C.R.; also reported in 
the League of Coloured Peoples Newsletter 10, 60 (September 
1944): 91, via the Pittsburgh Courier, 24 June 1944. 
87Whi tehorne. 
88Watson, 29. 
89P.R.O. w.o. 106/2854. Anglo-American Caribbean 
Commission to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 June 
1944. 
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battalion emerged largely unscathed from its American stay. 
In Italy, British inspectors found that the training 
which the battalion had received in the West Indies and the 
U.S. was inadequate. They judged that both officers and 
O.R.s of the 1/C.R. required six months of intensive 
training before participating in battle against the Germans. 
The officers, from the relatively old Wilkin down, were 
judged "all unfit to look after their men and command in 
battle." 90 Dismayed, the War Office momentarily considered 
transferring the regiment to the Pacific but, instead, asked 
Wilson to try, within a few months, to make the l/C.R. as 
effective as possible, even if only for use in a quiet 
sector of the front. Speed mattered because winter 
approached. In the course of their late summer training, 
the 1/C.R. earned congratulations for saving a key 
ammunition dump from fire and, on another occasion, for 
loading bridging equipment in record time, an effort which 
contributed to a rapid allied advance across a river. 91 
Inexplicably, the intensive effort to prepare the battalion 
well enough for a quiet sector failed. 92 Worried about the 
90P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Wilson to War Office, 26 
July 1944. 
91 P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. Summary of Overseas Career 
of the 1/C.R., Trinidad (Acting Governor) to Colonial 
Secretary, 28 June 1945. 
92 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Allied Forces Headquarters 
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worsening weather, the battalion's commander reported that, 
Records of the last war show that West Indian 
personnel cannot be suitably trained much less 
fight under damp cold weather conditions without 
incurring a very high sick rate, due to the West 
Indian susceptibility to all pulmonary disease. 
Wilkin recommended that his battalion be moved to Egypt or 
India to complete training. 93 Sutton, the chief British 
medical officer in Italy, agreed and warned that, "the 
presence of these troops in Italy during the winter months 
will be a liability, not an asset, and most of their 
training will have to be done in hospital." 94 In November, 
the War Office informed Wilson that administrative 
difficulties prevented the l/C.R. 's transfer to Southeast 
Asia and asked that Wilson employ it in a warm coastal area 
of Italy in the spring of 1945. 95 
Meanwhile, military authorities replaced many of the 
battalion's original officers and N.C.O.s with experienced 
men, including Major Moody. A White South African officer 
posted to the unit presented a delicate disciplinary problem 
to War Office, 22 September 1944. 
93Wilkin Quote from P.R.O. W.O. 204/6672. Alexander 
to Allied Forces Headquarters, 6 September 1944. 
94 P.R.O. W.O. 204/6672. Sutton to Deputy Adjudant 
General, 26 August 1944. 
95P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. War Office to Allied Forces 
Headquarters, 17 November 1944. 
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for the 1/C.R. and was transferred to a South African 
unit. 96 To further complicate matters, the Colonial Office 
strongly opposed sending the unit to Palestine because it 
might be called upon to quell local disturbances, and "such 
employment of West Indian troops would be objected to by 
both Jews and Arabs on racial grounds." 97 Eventually, the 
British assigned the unit to Gaza, but undertook to move it 
away if violence occurred there. 98 
British commanders worried about the effect of the 
presence of the 1/C.R. on other troops in the imperial 
forces. Soon after its arrival in Italy, the British 
attributed to West Indians the inability to "mix at all well 
with Africans or other Coloured troops." 99 In Egypt, in 
common with White soldiers, members of the 1/C.R. 
contemptuously referred to Egyptians as "wogs" and 
"gippos. " 100 The most serious incident of friction 
96Moody. 
97 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Minute by F. Simpson on 
"Operational Employment of 1. Bn. Caribbean Regiment," 16 
October 1944. 
98 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, to War Office, 21 October 1944. 
99P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Director of Military 
Training's Tour of Mediterranean Theatre, August to 
September 1944. 
100vernon Nicholas, "Overseas with the Carib 
Regiment," Infantry Star 1 (June 1946): 33. 
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experienced by the regiment, however, involved White 
servicemen. A violent altercation started while several 
hundred members of the regiment enjoyed leave in Cairo on 
Christmas Eve, 1944. In Egypt, military authorities 
normally provided separate recreational facilities for White 
and "Coloured" personnel. However, members of the 1/C.R. 
technically counted as "White" because their paybooks were 
stamped "B.O.R." (British Other Ranks) rather than 
"A[frican] .O.R." or "I[ndian] .O.R." At the "Sweet Melody 
Cafe," a dance hall frequented by White servicemen, a 
dispute erupted between a White soldier and a Black 1/C.R. 
sergeant over a woman. A brawl lasting several hours ensued 
and involved many more soldiers, including White military 
police. The outnumbered West Indians boarded themselves up 
in their hotel and refused to surrender to the provost 
marshal. They threw mattresses down upon the military 
police and other White soldiers who attempted to storm the 
hotel. According to Elvey Watson, American military police 
achieved a truce and transported the 1/C.R. back to camp. 
On Christmas Day, Lt. Col. Nicolson, the recently appointed 
O.C., cancelled leaves and lectured the regiment on the 
brawl's impact on its reputation and chances to fight in 
battle. Watson recalled that Nicolson "advised us to count 
ten before striking, and, if possible, to count ten more, 
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but after that, 'Strike, and strike hard!'" Subsequently, 
the unit received a new home in the desert near the Red Sea 
and remained barred from leave in Egyptian cities for 
several months, measures which successfully prevented 
further racial confrontations. Soldiers of the l/C.R. later 
claimed that the fight demonstrated their superiority over 
both other "coloured" soldiers as well as Whites. 101 
The Christmas Eve incident confirmed the fears of 
British generals in the Middle East. The West Indians 
presented a difficult administrative problem for the 
generals because of their expectation of being treated 
equally to White troops. 102 According to the Commander-in-
Chief, Middle East, the battalion's morale and behavior 
remained good only when "actively employed and isolated from 
other t[roo]ps and from women." 103 Even training policy 
reflected racial concerns as officials refused to assign the 
battalion to an Indian division for crucial large formation 
training "owing to difficulties of colour." 104 
101Moody; Whitehorne; and P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. 
Extract from Middle East Military Censorship Summary No. 
106, period 27 December 1944 to 9 January 1945; Watson, 93-
4 . 
102P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. Minute by E.E. Sabben-
Clare, 11 April 1945. 
103P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, to War Office, 12 July 1945. 
104 P.R.O. c.o. 537/1266. Paget to War Office, 26 
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Nevertheless, according to Major Moody, the battalion 
received the best training and equipment available to any 
British battalion, including mountain training in 
preparation for possible operations against German-held Kos 
and Leros islands in the Aegean. 105 The l/C.R. had plenty of 
time to train since British authorities found it difficult 
to find a suitable role for it. In London, officials within 
the War and Colonial Off ices continued to discuss the 
possibility of sending the unit to Burma, but neither 
strongly favored the idea. On a military level, the War 
Office still doubted the regiment's effectiveness, while, on 
a political level, the Colonial Office did not wish the West 
Indians to come into contact with the lower paid African 
troops who already served there in large numbers. 106 
Meanwhile, when not engaged in training exercises, 
personnel of the l/C.R. won four sporting competitions open 
to all units in Egypt, 107 but the lack of action threatened 
the morale and discipline of the battalion. In London, 
March 1945. 
105Moody. 
106P.R.O. W.O. 193/124. Minute by Lt.-Col. Garrett, 
7 February 1945. 
107P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. Summary of Overseas Career 
of the l/C.R., Trinidad (Acting Governor) to Colonial 
Secretary, 28 June 1945. 
Harold Moody of the League of Colored Peoples in Britain 
(and father of Major Moody) urged an active role for the 
unit and alluded to the possibility of another Taranto 
Mutiny: 
We believe that our men are all keen to pull their 
weight to the full and that they will not let down 
their flag. We do hope that you will be able to 
do something to satisfy the yearnings of these men 
and not wait until their sense of frustration 
should result in some act of insubordination for 
which they cannot be wholly regarded as 
responsible. 108 
The Colonial Office assured Moody that the War Off ice 
realized the "general desirability of allotting an active 
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role to this unit if possible," but the Colonial Secretary 
could not intervene in the army's field operations. 109 The 
announced reluctance to interfere notwithstanding, the War 
Office, within days, formally "offered" its commanders in 
the Far East the battalion for any operational role they 
could find for it. The War Office informed Claude 
Auchinleck, now the Commander-in-Chief, India, of the unit's 
political significance, but warned that the men were paid at 
British rates and were "extremely colour conscious," and 
expected to be treated equally. 110 Auchinleck declined on 
108P.R.O. c.o. 537/1266. H. Moody to Stanley, 3 
March 1945. 
109P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. C.H. Thornley, Colonial 
Office, to Moody, 14 March 1945. 
110P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. War Office to Auchinleck, 
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the grounds that the imperial forces in the Far East 
included enough infantry and that no combatant role could be 
found for the battalion. 111 
Rebuffed, the War Office again turned to its 
Mediterranean commanders in order to get the 1/C.R. into 
combat. On 2 May 1945, with the European war's end just a 
few days off, Alexander agreed to "call forward" the 
l/C.R. 112 On 6 May, the War Office advised him that, "honour 
would be satisfied if this Reg[imen]t was used in any minor 
op[eration] in the Aegean or to take part in receiving the 
capitulation of Crete."113 On 9 May, Alexander reported that 
time would not allow either scheme and suggested that the 
l/C.R. be sent to the Far East or remain in Middle East to 
guard prisoners of war. 114 The Air Ministry presented 
another option in July, when it requested that men of the 
l/C.R. be allowed to volunteer for the R.A.F. 115 
10 March 1945. 
111P.R.O. w.o. 106/2854. Auchinleck to War Office, 
30 March 1945. 
112P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Allied Forces Headquarters 
to War Office, 2 May 1945. 
113P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. War Office to Allied Forces 
Headquarters, 6 May 1945. 
114 P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Allied Forces Headquarters 
to War Office, 9 May 1945. 
115P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Colonial Secretary to West 
Indian Colonies, 18 July 1945. 
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The British authorities did not adopt these schemes, 
and once it became clear that the l/C.R. had no real or 
potential military function, British commanders urged that 
it be returned home as soon as possible to forestall 
disciplinary problems. 116 The Colonial Office feared the 
political consequences of sending the 1/C.R. home without 
having been blooded. Following a Colonial Office 
suggestion, the War Off ice asked the commanders in the 
Middle East to "make clear to all ranks that they are 
returning to their own country with honour," and that it was 
regretted that they had not gotten an opportunity to 
fight. 117 Consequently, Sir Charles Allfrey shared the 
following words with the regiment: "you may feel badly for 
not getting a fight, but the fault was not yours ... On your 
return to the West Indies, you must not feel ashamed." 118 
The case of the Caribbean Regiment underscored the 
tensions affecting the British empire during the 1930s and 
1940s. Colonial political and racial relations were 
changing faster than ingrained military prejudices. The 
116P.R.O. W.O. 106/2854. Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, to War Office, 12 July 1945. 
117P.R.O. C.O. 537/1266. Colonial Office to War 
Office 24 May 1945; War Office to Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, 4 June 1945. 
118Quoted by Watson, 109. 
160 
formation of the l/C.R. resulted from the persistence of the 
Colonial Off ice in the face of deeply held War Off ice 
prejudices. The Colonial Office hoped to strengthen the 
bonds of empire by gaining for Black colonial subjects an 
active part in the British war effort. It was wary of 
allowing any suggestion that Black West Indians were valued 
less than Whites. Conversely, the War Office clung to old 
racial prejudices with little regard for the possible 
political ramifications of relegating Black West Indians to 
a distant, secondary role. 
CHAPTER V 
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES, 1689 TO 1914 
British policy toward the service of Blacks in the 
armed forces of Britain to 1914 fluctuated considerably but, 
in general, the same attitudes dictating the utilization of 
Black colonial troops often influenced policies toward 
individual Black personnel in the Royal Navy, British Army, 
and Royal Air Force. Black servicemen frequently and 
successfully served in the Georgian military, although not 
on a basis equal with Whites. In the Victorian era, the 
authorities determined that formal distance had to be 
maintained between White and Black, otherwise, close contact 
would undermine White prestige. As a result, the services 
imposed color bars to keep their ranks racially pure. 
I. Black Sailors and Soldiers, 1689 to ca. 1850 
Black seamen often served in the Royal Navy throughout 
the Georgian era. In 1801, the H.M.S. Ganges had two 
Indians and three Africans in a crew of just under 700. At 
Trafalgar, the crew of Admiral Nelson's flagship, H.M.S. 
Victory, included two Indians, one African and nine West 
Indians. 1 Until the late-nineteenth century, the manpower-
1Dudley Pope, Life in Nelson's Navy (Annapolis: 
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starved "senior service" did not overly concern itself with 
the color or ethnicity of its crews. By 1900, however, the 
Admiralty relegated Blacks sailors to limited local roles, 
such as stokers on the West African station. 
Black servicemen probably made their most pronounced, 
or perhaps, visible, impact in the army. Though the courts 
of Henry VII of England and James IV of Scotland employed 
Black entertainers, 2 the employment of Blacks as bandsmen in 
British military units became fashionable later, probably 
during the wars with France beginning in 1689. 3 Recruited 
from slaves and free men from the West Indies, Africa, and 
India, Black musicians usually held the positions of fifers, 
drummers and trumpeters whose functions included the 
transmission of orders and setting of marching paces. They 
served in all of the major battles of the British army from 
1689 to 1815. At Waterloo, a Black trumpeter served on the 
staff of Major-General Sir Hussey Vivian, commander of a 
brigade of light-cavalry. 4 
Naval Institute Press, 1981), 109. 
2Paul Edwards, 15. 
3Shyllon, 159; Cecil C.P. Lawson, A History of the 
Uniforms of the British Army, I, (London: Norman Military 
Publications), 40, 117-8. 
4Matthew Coglan, "Reminiscence," in Harold Malet, 
ed., The Historical Memoirs of the 18th Hussars (London: 
Simpkin & Co., 1907), 143. Billy Blue, a famous early 
Sydney, Australia, resident, claimed in an 1823 petition to 
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Regimental commanders desired to exploit the foreign 
appearance of Black musicians and several regiments made a 
long tradition of employing them. For example, Farrington's 
Regiment of Foot, included Black soldiers in the 1690s, but 
it is unclear when the regiment abandoned the practice. The 
unit (redesignated as the 29th Foot) re-adopted Black 
drummers in 1759, when Admiral Edward Boscawen "secured" ten 
African youths after the British capture of Guadaloupe and 
sent them to his brother, the commanding officer of the 29th 
Foot, which was then stationed in Ireland. The 29th had ten 
Black drummers in 1774 and three in 1834. The last to serve 
with the regiment died in 1843. 5 As Turkish-inspired 
military music became popular across Europe, regiments 
clothed Black musicians, who now played bass drums, 
kettledrums, cymbals and "jingling johnnies," in exotic 
uniforms, including turbans. In late Georgian and early 
Victorian London, ornately uniformed Black bandsmen added to 
have served in the British military for many years and 
participated in several famous events: witnessing James 
Wolfe's death at Quebec in 1759, serving as a marine in 
Germany in the early 1760s, accompanying Major John Andre 
when he was captured and executed by the Americans in 1780, 
and spying for Lord Cornwallis during the Yorktown campaign 
of 1781. See Meg Swords, Billy Blue, The Old Commodore 
(Sydney: North Shore Historical Society, 1979), 41-4. 
5J. Paine, "The Negro Drummers of the British Army," 
The Leading Note: The Journal of the Military Musician 1 
(August 1930): 26-7; H. Everard, History of Thos. 
Farrington's Regiment (Worcester: Littlebury & Co., 1891), 
74, 265. 
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Victorian London, ornately uniformed Black bandsmen added to 
the ceremony and pomp of the Household regiments that 
guarded the sovereign. 6 Regiments preferred that their 
Black musicians be as dark-skinned as possible. In 1823, 
the 1st (Grenadier) Regiment of Foot Guards discharged a 
Black drummer because he did not possess "a sufficiently 
Black complexion [sic]. " 7 
Despite the popularity of Black bandsmen, there was 
some publicly voiced opposition to their employment. For 
example, Cobbett's Annual Register deprecated the presence 
of Blacks in the army, "where they never ought to show their 
heads, in any capacity, or upon any condition." 8 However, a 
general public acceptance of Black bandsmen is evidenced by 
the fact that many volunteer and militia regiments, 
including the most fashionable corps of London, imitated 
their regular army colleagues. 9 Thus, Georgian racial 
6See, for examples, Edward Croft-Murray, "The Wind 
Band in England," in The British Museum Yearbook 4: Music 
and Civilisation (London: British Museum Publications, 
1980), plates 113, 118, and 124. 
7Reported in the Fourteenth Report of the Mendicity 
Society (1832), 41-2, quoted in Shyllon, Black People in 
Britain, 159. 
8Cobbett's Annual Register, January/June, 1804, 936-
7 . 
9Lawson, III, 149; V, 51, 80, 82; Croft-Murray, 154, 
pl. 114. Edward Dayes' 1799 watercolor, "King George III 
reviewing Eight Thousand Volunteers in Hyde Park," depicted 
most of the assembled bands with at least one Black 
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stereotypes about the "musical nature" of Blacks combined 
with military fashion to over-ride any racial anxiety that 
might have been felt. 
The primary reason why the British army used Black 
bandsmen, their physical appearance, also contributed to 
their being part of the lore of the British army. 10 The 
Wexford militia contained a line-soldier named Myrtle, "a 
half-bred Indian," commonly referred to as "the Devil" 
because of "his satanic ugliness." The Wexford's commander 
wagered that Myrtle, possessing "extraordinary power of 
fascination and agility," could retrieve another regiment's 
monkey-mascot, Jocko, which was hiding in a grove of trees. 
To win his colonel's wager, Myrtle dressed like a monkey, 
climbed a tree and, according to a witness, "commenced a 
series of the most extraordinary ogling, grinning, grimaces, 
and diabolical contortions of his ugly countenance that was 
ever ... made by man, devil, or ape." A pacified Jocko 
eventually jumped into the "Devil's" arms. 11 In another 
episode, a White drum-major of the 88th Foot (Connaught 
Rangers) and the daughter of a Spanish notable attempted to 
bandsman. 
10
"A Ramble Round the Military Exhibition, " The 
British Bandsman 3 (August 1890): 243. 
11T. Ogle, The Irish Militia Officer (Dublin, 1873), 
70-71. 
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elope. When the father searched through the regiment for 
his daughter, she hid among the Black bandsmen by disguising 
herself as "a cymbal-boy, with her face blacked. " 12 In an 
event immortalized on canvass by J.S. Copley, a Major 
Peirson fell dead leading his troops against French invaders 
of Jersey and a Black servant, named Pompey, reputedly 
killed the French marksman. Copley depicted Pompey 
dramatically firing over the body of the martyred Peirson. 13 
Besides being viewed as exotic objects, Black soldiers 
participated in the normal pass-times of British soldiers, 
including brawling, crime, and desertion. In 1768, the 29th 
Foot, with its Black drummers, arrived in Boston, 
Massachusetts, in order to overawe the residents. In the 
months leading up to the Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770, 
its soldiers frequently had violent confrontations with city 
residents. On 2 March, Thomas Walker, a Black drummer of 
the 29th, found a bleeding White comrade who had been beaten 
by some local rope-makers. He then led a group of 
"redcoats" back to the "rope-walks" for revenge. A local 
justice saw the soldiers return and shouted at their Black 
12William Grattan, "Military Reminiscences," United 
Service Magazine (August 1945): 526; T.J. Edwards, 
Military Customs (Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1961), 21-22. 
13Richard Mayne, The Battle of Jersey (London: 
Phillimore & Co., 1981), 68-9. 
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leader, "You Black rascal, what have you to do with White 
people's quarrels?" Walker deceptively replied that he 
would just "look on," but in the ensuing brawl, he received 
a severe battering. 14 Nor was such violence absent from 
internal military relations. On 12 August 1780, two Black 
bandsmen of the Somerset militia stationed in Plymouth, 
England, quarreled with members of the Brecknock militia. 
The confrontation erupted into a full-blown riot between 
regiments which was quelled only after officers called the 
guard out. 15 Individually, Black soldiers committed crimes 
and deserted from their regiments just as White colleagues, 
but their skin-color probably made them somewhat easier to 
punish. 16 
Many Black servicemen fought for the king 
14Hiller Zobel, The Boston Massacre (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1970), 182; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role 
of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 317; See the 
depositions of Thomas Walker and other soldiers' in P.R.O. 
c.o. 5/88. 
15W.J.W. Kerr, Records of the 1st Somerset Militia 
(Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1930), 26. 
16 In 1750, the 4th Dragoons executed a drummer 
convicted for murdering a country-woman; in 1761, another 
drummer in the same regiment suffered fines and one thousand 
lashes for killing his horse. In 1790, Othello and Carter, 
trumpeters, attempted to desert but were captured, flogged 
and transferred to the Royal Navy. R.O. Rickwood, "Black 
Drummers in the Army," Journal of the Society of Army 
Historical Research 4 (1925): 136-7. 
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involuntarily, but it is also true that others chose to 
enlist. For example, an African named Ukawsaw Gronniosaw 
served on a British naval vessel in the Seven Years War and 
received his discharge in New York. Because he wished to 
visit England, he enlisted in the 28th Foot, which then 
fought in the capture of Havana in 1762. 17 During the 
Napoleonic Wars, an escaped slave served as a drummer of the 
25th Foot for seven years and participated in the capture of 
Guadaloupe and Martinique. 18 In 1813, John Baptist, of 
Martinique, joined the Royal Waggon Train but transferred to 
the Third (Scots) Regiment of Foot Guards in 1818 as a 
cymbalist. He served with the regiment until 1841. 19 
The outbreaks of the American Revolution and War of 
1812 presented numerous opportunities for Blacks to enlist 
in the king's forces. Prior to the Revolution, colonial 
governments had been extremely reluctant to recruit Blacks 
for their militias. For example, the colony of Virginia 
17 J. Albert, A Narrative of the most remarkable 
particulars in the life of James Albert Ukawsaw Gronniosaw, 
an African Prince, as related by himself (Bath: 1770), 22-
3 . 
18 Fifth Report of the Mendicity Society(1823), 39-
40, quoted by Shyllon, Black People in Britain, 163-164. 
19C.H. Masse, The Predecessors of the Royal Army 
Service Corps (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1948), 16; Percy 
Sumner, "Jean Baptiste, Cymbal Player of the Scots Fusilier 
Guards, 1832," Journal of the Society for Army Historical 
Research 22 (1943-44): 1. 
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refused even the limited mobilization of Black manpower 
during the Seven Years War because of a fear of teaching 
Blacks how to efficiently kill Europeans, as well as a 
hesitancy to interfere with the property rights of slave-
owners. 20 In November 1775, Lord Dunmore, royal governor of 
Virginia, proclaimed martial law in his colony and called 
upon slaves to side with the king in exchange for freedom. 
He formed the Ethiopian Regiment from runaways, many of whom 
wore the slogan, "Liberty to Slaves," stitched onto the 
front of their uniforms. Soon after its first battle and 
defeat, the regiment withdrew to Royal Navy ships in the 
Chesapeake, where fever and smallpox severely decimated its 
ranks. 21 Except for Dunmore's short-lived scheme, British 
policy regarding Black loyalists remained ambivalent until 
1779, when the war shifted southward to the slave-holding 
southern colonies. Historian Benjamin Quarles concludes 
that British schemes for raising masses of Black troops 
never materialized because of the need for laborers and the 
problem of controlling armed slaves. 22 Indeed, British 
20Larry G. Bowman, "Virginia's use of Blacks in the 
French and Indian War," Western Pennsylvania Historical 
Magazine 53 (1970): 57-63. 
21James St. G. Walker, "Blacks as American 
Loyalists," Historical Reflections 2 (1975): 54. 
22Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American 
Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1967) I 146. 
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military authorities assigned thousands of escaped or 
liberated Black men, women and children to the various 
branches and units of the army to function as orderlies, 
cooks, smiths, carpenters, seamstresses, and, most 
crucially, as pioneers who constructed fortifications. In a 
nice bit of irony, Ralph Henry escaped from the bondage of 
Virginia politician Patrick Henry and, in the spirit of 
"GIVE ME LIBERTY OR GIVE ME DEATH," served with the Royal 
Artillery. 23 
During the first two years of the war, Loyalist units 
welcomed Black recruits as line-soldiers as well as for the 
customary role of drummers and trumpeters. Richard and 
Peter Martin had been owned by a Colonel Butler, a prominent 
New York Loyalist whose property, including slaves, had been 
seized and auctioned off. The Martin brothers escaped, 
rejoined their master, and enlisted in his provincial 
regiment. 24 However, in 1777, Alexander Innes, Inspector 
General of the Provincial Forces, moved to end the "abuse" 
of enlisting "Negroes," "Mullattos" and "Indians" into 
Loyalist regiments because he thought that the practice 
brought "disgrace and ruin" to the provincial service. 
23Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York: 
Capricorn, 1976), 28. 
24
"The Petition of Peter Martin," Papers and 
Records of the Ontario Historical Society 26: 244. 
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Innes attempted to "discharge all improper persons" from 
provincial corps and issued "strict orders" against the 
future recruitment of Blacks. 25 Individual regiments did 
not strictly enforce the color bar. Years later, Butler's 
Rangers still contained Black soldiers Jack Baker, Richard 
Parepoint, James Robertson, and the Martin brothers. 26 The 
Queen's Rangers, probably the most famous Loyalist unit, 
still included drummers listed by the names of "Black 
Prince" and "Black Barney. " 27 
The expansion of the war to the southern colonies 
prompted a rethinking of policy. In 1779, Sir Henry 
Clinton, British Commander-in-Chief in America, proclaimed 
that Blacks captured in rebel service would be sold as 
slaves, but those who sided with the king would receive 
protection and freedom. 28 As a result, loyalists raised the 
Carolina Corps from among Whites and Blacks; consisting of 
25
"A Letter Regarding the Queen's Rangers," Virginia 
Magazine of History and Biography 20 (1922): 369. 
26Ernest Cruickshank, The Story of Butler's Rangers 
and the Settlement of Niagara (Niagara Falls, Ontario: 
Renown Printing Company): 116-122; Green, 365-366. 
27C.J. Ingles, The Queen's Rangers in the 
Revolutionary War, (1956): 289-299. Presumably, the names 
of the drummers were intended to be descriptive. 
28 Sylvia R. Frey, "The British and the Black: A New 
Perspective," The Historian 38, 2 (February, 1976): 225-
238. 
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both infantry and cavalry, it served throughout the southern 
campaign. 29 Curiously, the German regiments hired by 
Britain, popularly known as "Hessians," recruited two 
hundred African-Africans as drummers and line-soldiers, many 
of whom accompanied their teutonic colleagues to Germany 
after the war. 30 Unfortunately for the king's cause, 
British policy regarding Black manpower vacillated. Because 
of a combination of prejudice and fear of offending colonial 
slaveowners, the British did not exploit this massive 
resource of manpower to decisively change the course of the 
war in favor of the king. 
In the War of 1812, African-American slaves again 
represented a potential source of military manpower for the 
British forces but, as in the American Revolution, official 
attitudes alternated between encouraging slave escapes and 
fearing White American outrage. The king's commanders did 
not foment wide-scale insurrection but they normally 
protected any escaped slaves who desired sanctuary. 
African-Americans served the British as guides and, in the 
29Tylden, "The West India Regiments," 43. 
30Elliot W. Hoffmann, "Black Hessians: American 
Blacks as German Soldiers," Negro History Bulletin 44 
(1981): 81-2, 91; and George Fenwick Jones, "The Black 
Hessians: Negroes Recruited by the Hessians in South 
Carolina and other Colonies," South Carolina Historical 
Magazine (1982): 287-302. 
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mid-1814 raids against settlements in the Chesapeake Bay 
area, Black British soldiers played key roles and also 
helped to burn Washington D.C. By September, three hundred 
African-Americans had been organized into three companies of 
Royal Marines and grouped with three White companies to form 
a battalion. 31 Though they provided a welcome reinforcement 
for the British forces, the Black marines were "wretchedly 
equipped; some without blankets, others without great coats, 
scarcely a haversack or canteen between [sic] them, & many 
even shoeless. " 32 
Throughout the Georgian period, the British government 
and military proved to be ambivalent in their treatment of 
Black soldiers and sailors. Historian Sylvia Frey claims 
that "racial prejudice" was "an important formative factor" 
in British decision-making toward African-American soldiers 
during the American Revolution and cites many instances of 
their being treated differently from White personnel in pay, 
punishment and functions. 33 Racial discrimination sometimes 
31Gleig, 84; John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972), 313-4. 
32Colonel Cyril Fields' Britain's Sea Soldiers 
(Liverpool: Lyceum Press, 1924), Vol. I, 302-3, quoted in 
Anthony Gero, "The Use of Ex-slaves in the Royal Marines, 
circa 1814-1815," Military Collector & Historian 31 (Winter 
1979): 154. Rene Chartrand provided the author with a copy 
of the Gero article. 
33 Frey, 225-238. 
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reached across the Atlantic. At an inspection of the 
Wexford Militia during the 1790s, a British general, in "a 
towering passion," demoted Black Dan, an African, from 
sergeant to private because he found it offensive to see a 
Black man commanding Whites. 34 
While Black personnel suffered from racism, other 
evidence suggests that the political need to preserve "White 
prestige" by maintaining distance and racial subordination 
evoked far less anxiety during the eighteenth and mid 
nineteenth centuries than it would later. As proof of the 
Georgian navy's "relatively liberal outlook on questions of 
colour," historian N.A.M. Rodger cites a 1761 court-martial 
in which a Black seaman acted as the principal prosecution 
witness against two White sailors accused of sodomy. The 
defendants objected on the grounds that a Black should not 
testify against "Christians," but the court found his 
testimony trustworthy and hanged the two defendants. 35 One 
of the earliest winners of the Victoria Cross, Britain's 
highest award for gallantry, was a long-serving Black Nova 
Scotian sailor named William Hall. He received the 
decoration while fighting as part of a naval shore party 
34 0gle, 31. 
35N.A.M. Rodger, The Wooden World: An anatomy of the 
Georgian Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), 159. 
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during the Indian Mutiny. 36 
In the Georgian military, Black personnel often 
functioned in disciplinary positions over Whites. In the 
Georgian army, drummers had the task of carrying out 
corporal punishments, which included hundreds and even 
thousands of lash strokes. In his study of the Napoleonic-
era Irish militia, Henry McAnally raised the question of 
whether Black drummers administered the lash, but found no 
evidence one way or the other. 37 In the case of the 29th 
Foot in colonial Boston, Black drummers such as Thomas 
Walker did perform the duties required by their status, a 
situation which caught the attention of Bostonians, who 
generally did not approve of the military practice of 
flogging anyway. For them, the sight of White soldiers 
being "scourg'd by Negro drummers" on the Common, was, 
according to the Boston Evening Post, "a new and very 
disagreeable spectacle." 38 In 1782, a unit of Black British 
36
"Humble Hero: William Hall, Son of Slaves, Brought 
Canada Her First Naval VC," The Crowsnest 4 (1952): 16-17, 
32. Under heavy fire, and with his colleagues dead and 
wounded around him, Hall single-handedly loaded and fired 
the heavy naval gun that breached the wall of a mutineer 
stronghold. 
37Henry McAnally, The Irish Militia: A Social and 
Military Study (Dublin: Conmore and Reynolds, 1949), 204. 
380liver Morton Dickerson, ed., Boston under 
Military Rule, 1768-1769, as revealed in a Journal of the 
Times (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1968), 3, 6. 
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cavalry served in another enforcement role in the Carolina 
countryside by apprehending British deserters. 39 In the 
same year, on the West African coast, Governor Joseph Wall 
of Goree improperly ordered that a White sergeant, Benjamin 
Armstrong, be flogged for mutiny. Because he did not trust 
his other White soldiers, Wall ordered several African 
civilian employees at the fort to execute the punishment. 40 
From the authorities' perspectives, the use of Blacks in 
disciplinary roles as military police or floggers was merely 
a matter of military function. In contrast, by the late 
Victorian era, the British generally did not allow Blacks to 
exert such authority over Whites, a situation which would 
not change until the Second World War. 
II. Black Soldiers and sailors, 1860-1914. 
The Victorian era brought significant changes in the 
officially sanctioned use of Black soldiers. Most regiments 
ceased employing Black musicians by the 1840s, but the 
reason for the end of the practice remains unclear. 41 There 
39William Seymour, "A Journal of the Southern 
Expedition, 1780-1783," Papers of the Historical Society of 
Delaware 2 (1896): 35. 
40Armstrong died from his injuries and Wall was 
hanged for the soldier's murder in 1802. "Proceedings on 
the Trial of an Indictment against Joseph Wall," Howell's 
State Trials, Vol. 28, (London: Longman, 1820), 51-182. 
41 Paul Edwards, 21; Michael Foss, The Royal 
Fusiliers (London: Hamish Hamilton), 52; see also Paine, 27. 
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seems to have been confusion within the late-Victorian 
military establishment as to whether any non-Europeans could 
actually enlist in British regiments. The Army Acts of 
1881, 1884 and 1914 specifically allowed for the enlistment 
of Blacks into the British army according to the following 
provisions: 
... (1.) Any person who is for the time being an 
alien may, if His Majesty think fit to signify his 
consent through a Secretary of State, be enlisted 
in His Majesty's regular forces, so, however, that 
the number of aliens serving together at any one 
time in any corps of the regular forces shall not 
exceed the proportion of one alien to every fifty 
British subjects, and that an alien so enlisted 
shall not be capable of holding any higher rank in 
His Majesty's regular forces than that of a 
warrant officer or non-commissioned officer . 
... (2.) Provided that, notwithstanding the above 
provisions of this section, any inhabitant of any 
British protectorate and any negro or person of 
colour, although an alien, may voluntarily enlist 
in pursuance of this Part of the Act, and when so 
enlisted, shall, while serving in His Majesty's 
regular forces, be deemed to be entitled to all 
the privileges of a natural-born British 
subject. 42 
The exception noted in paragraph (2) had originally 
been made by the War Office to allow liberated African 
slaves, who were genuine "aliens," to enlist in the 
W.I.R.s. 43 Historian David Killingray interprets this 
42War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: 
H.M.S.O.), 1881, 443-; and 1914, 471. 
43Manual of Military Law, 1884, 256, 444. 
legal experts confirmed that, since 1881, British 
technically allowed for both the recruitment and 
In 1947, 
law had 
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stipulation as an example of institutional racism because 
the War Office considered Black people to be "aliens." 44 
However, the Army Act never specifically addressed British-
born Black subjects, "Black Britons," who were neither 
inhabitants of British protectorates nor "aliens." Anyone 
who worked at the War Off ice in London probably had to have 
been aware that Black people lived in Britain. 
"Legal" did not mean "mandatory;" the same Army Acts 
that regulated recruitment also granted the War Office, 
acting in the sovereign's name, the authority to regulate 
enlistment and commissioning. The army's highest officials 
expressed their views on Black enlistment into British 
regiments in 1886. The question had originally arisen 
during the 1870s and '80s, when Europeans and Eurasians in 
India called for the unrestricted enlistment of Eurasians 
into British regiments and the formation of specifically 
Eurasian regiments. Ironically, the Indian government, 
commissioning of "coloured" aliens. "Opinion of the 
Solicitor-General and Mr. Parker," 14 November 1947 and 
"Case for the Opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown: 
Whether Gurkhas serving in the British Regular Forces may be 
Granted Commissions in those Forces." P.R.O. W.O. 32/12319. 
See also the Ninth (1969) edition of the Manual of Military 
Law (London: H.M.S.O., 1969), 304. 
44Killingray wrote that, "Army law classified Blacks 
as aliens." See his "All the King's Men? Blacks in the 
British Army in the First World War, 1914-1918," in Rainer 
Lotz and Ian Pegg, eds., Under the Imperial Carpet (Crawley, 
Sussex: Rabbitt Press, 1986), 166-169. 
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always deeply concerned about matters of race, believed that 
British regiments stationed in India could already recruit 
Eurasians who possessed three-fourths European parentage, at 
the discretion of commanding officers. Eurasian soldiers 
suffered only from the disability that, once enlisted, they 
could not expect to be repatriated home to India at "public 
expense" if, by the end of their service, their British 
regiment had left India. According to the highest Indian 
officials, it was well known that Eurasians often "work(ed) 
their passage ... to England, in order to enter the Army 
there, as they cannot do so out here, owing to the 
difficulty of obtaining the necessary certificate of 
descent." 45 Ever conscious of Britain's tenuous hold on 
India, the Indian government supported unrestricted 
individual Eurasian enlistment in British regiments "in 
order to remove a grievance to which some importance is 
attached, by a class whose tendencies are loyal and 
patriotic. " 46 
In direct contrast, War Office officials in London 
assumed that army regulations already prohibited Black 
45P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Military Department of India 
to Secretary of State for India, 23 July 1886; and Adjudant-
General, India, to Secretary of the Government of Madras, 2 
December 1875. 
46P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Military Department, Simla, 
India, to Lord Kimberly, 23 July 1886. 
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enlistment of any kind. The Duke of Cambridge, Commander-
in-Chief, and Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Adjudant-General, 
both strongly opposed Black enlistment. In particular, the 
latter described the proposal of opening British regiments 
to "men of a cowardly race" as "insidious and very 
dangerous." Such a policy, Wolseley feared, would result 
ultimately in the "enlistment of full-blown Black men" and 
the ruin of the army. 47 
Black men, whether "full-blown" or by degree, certainly 
served as soldiers of the queen despite War Office rhetoric. 
In 1882, a petitioner, using the pseudonym "A. Eurasian," 
claimed that, 
There are more Eurasians in the British Army than 
is commonly supposed. Being sufficiently White to 
pass for Europeans, they have been enlisted as 
such, and of course their identity as Eurasians 
has been lost. Several of the store-sergeants, 
sub-conductors, &c., are to my personal knowledge 
Eurasians, and they have the reputation of being 
efficient men. 48 
Many Black soldiers probably passed for White, but 
others served despite obvious non-European descent. For 
example, the Edwardian-era Durham Light Infantry had a Black 
Corporal of Buglers who had been found as a two-year-old 
47 P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Minute by Wolseley, 29 
September 1886. 
48 P.R.O. W.O. 32/6889. Remarks by "A. Eurasian," 
Proceedings for April 1882, 7. 
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child in the Sudan in 1885. "Little Mustafa's" father had 
been killed in a battle against the British. N.C.O.s of the 
regiment christened him "John Francis Durham," raised him, 
and paid for his education. When he came of legal age, 
Durham enlisted in the regiment, married an English woman, 
and died in Ireland in 1910. 49 Though unique, Durham's case 
was, in all likelihood, not the only exception. Regiments 
at home required no proof of descent for enlistment and, 
within the United Kingdom, British regiments increasingly 
recruited from the urban areas in which significant numbers 
of Black people dwelled. Recruiting officers, perpetually 
short of recruits, probably did not concern themselves much 
with strictly enforcing racial purity. 50 
III. Black Officers to 1914 
The possibility of Black line officers in British 
regiments does not seem to have occurred to the War Off ice 
until the 1880s. Until 1871, most regular line officers 
purchased their commissions, a policy that made the army the 
creature of Britain's landed classes. The regulations for 
49S.G.P. Ward, Faithful: The Story of the Durham 
Light Infantry (Durham: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1962), 274; 
William More, The Durham Light Infantry (London: Leo Cooper, 
1975): 10, 13. 
5
°Killingray, "All the King's men?," 166. On 
general recruiting patterns in Britain, see Alan Ramsey 
Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home (Montreal: McGill-
Queen' s University Press, 1977), 289-298. 
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officer commissions made no mention of color, but, under the 
purchase system, they really did not need it. It seemed 
obvious that, except in rare circumstances, potential 
officers would come from the upper classes of the United 
Kingdom. The end of purchase in favor of application and 
competition necessitated clarification of the regulations. 
In 1884, authorities inserted a clause into the regulations 
which stated that "only British born or naturalised British 
subjects will be eligible to offer themselves for 
examination" for the army's cadet colleges. 51 
A decade later, after an unexplained 1893 case 
involving a man name Ezechiel, a further qualification 
stipulated that "candidates must, in the opinion of the 
Commander-in-Chief, be in all respects suitable to hold 
Commissions in the Army. " 52 The War Off ice defined 
"suitability" in 1896 during an exchange of letters it had 
with Dadabhoi Naoroji, a London-based Indian nationalist and 
Liberal M.P., who had asked by what authority British 
military officials barred non-European British subjects from 
receiving commissions. The War Office replied that no Act 
of Parliament prohibited the practice, but military 
51 P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. "A Statement Giving the 
History of the Case." May {?) 1910. 
52P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. "A Statement Giving the 
History of the Case," May (?) 1910. 
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regulations laid down by the Secretary of State for War 
under the Queen's Royal Warrant on the pay, appointment, and 
promotion of the army, did. 53 Naoriji argued that no 
specific exclusions to Indian officers existed in the Royal 
Warrant authorizing commissions. Also, he cited an Act of 
Parliament of 1833 governing the East India Company which 
stated "that no Native of the said territory nor any 
natural-born subject of His Majesty, resident therein shall, 
by reason of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any 
of these, be disabled from holding any place, off ice, or 
employment." Naoriji then cited the Queen's 1858 
proclamation and its 1887 reaffirmation that there would be 
no racial or religious discrimination in government 
appointments. 54 
Such arguments convinced Lord Lansdowne, the War 
Secretary, that his ministry should be explicit on the 
policy of excluding British subjects "not of pure European 
descent." He reasoned that a British private soldier would 
never follow "a half-caste or native Officer." Nor, 
Lansdowne thought, would "junior Officers of pure British 
blood serve efficiently under a senior Officer of mixed 
53P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651. Copies of Correspondence 5 
June to 23 July 1896. 
54 P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651. Naoriji to War Office, 7 
August 1896. 
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origin." In addition to recognizing these prejudices, 
Lansdowne cited "physiological reasons for which, in an Army 
which may be called upon to serve in all parts of the globe, 
Officers of Eastern extraction would not be suitable." 55 A 
"frank" letter drafted for Naoriji's benefit stated that "it 
is clearly laid down that only such candidates as those 'in 
all respects suitable to hold a commission in the Army,' are 
eligible;" and the War Office had decided that "pure 
European descent" was "an essential qualification." The War 
Off ice further added that, 
nothing whatever, either in the Queen's 
Proclamation, or in the regulations for the 
admission of University Candidates to which you 
have referred ... could have the effect of 
obliging the Military Authorities to grant 
Commissions in the army to candidates who are not 
considered suitable. 56 
In 1900 and 1901, the War Office considered suggestions 
that the army should adopt the navy's recent and open bar to 
commissions for persons not of pure European descent. On 
both occasions, higher officials vetoed the idea because the 
existing rule provided the Commander-in-Chief enough of a 
tool to weed out objectionable candidates on the basis of 
55P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651. Minute by "L" (Lord 
Lansdowne), 15 October 1896. 
56P.R.O. W.O. 32/8651. Haliburton, War Office, to 
Naoriji 21 December 1896. 
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"suitability. " 57 
In 1911, the War Office prepared to revise the 
regulations for entrance to its military colleges at 
Sandhurst (infantry and cavalry) and Woolwich (artillery and 
engineers) to explicitly bar candidates "not of pure 
European descent." The India Office protested on the basis 
that several serving Indian army officers possessed an 
"admixture of Indian blood. " 58 In its reply to the India 
Office, the War Office protested that the ambiguity of the 
regulations allowed "a repetition of cases" in which 
candidates prepared for the entrance examination but 
eventually had to be rejected because of the unclear rule 
that they must be "suitable" to hold an army commission. 
One difficult case involved A.G.C. de Smidt, who, during a 
medical examination for Sandhurst, was reported as "fit" but 
having "the appearance of not being of pure European 
descent." The War Office invited him in for a visual exam 
and decided that he did not have the necessary background. 
Soon after, however, De Smidt successfully appealed on the 
grounds that 1) he could prove his descent; 2) his brother 
had been previously accepted to Woolwich; and 3) that the 
57 P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. "A Statement Giving the 
History of the Case." 
58 P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. Montagu, India Office to War 
Office, 18 August 1911. 
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regulations contained no clause warning that "candidates 
whose complexions happen to be unusually dark" would be 
refused admittance. 59 Far from ending the controversy, the 
War Secretary decided, for unspecified reasons, to retain 
the unclear 1909 regulations. 60 
In 1908, the "vexed question" of Black commissions 
arose again, this time in connection with the Officers 
Training Corps (O.T.C.s) at British universities. The 
presence of "coloured" students at British educational 
institutions was increasing and they demanded equal access 
to all university activities, including the "senior" 
divisions of O.T.C.s. O.T.C.s consisted of junior and 
senior divisions, the former of which was open to any 
students, often including non-Europeans, having an interest. 
The latter was restricted to advanced students who intended 
to gain commissions in the army's Territorial Force and 
Special Reserve. Up to this point, Glasgow had been the 
only university to impose a formal color bar on membership 
to its contingent. The War Office decided to extend the ban 
59P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. War Office to India Office, 1 
September 1911, and Appendix B. "Examples of Recent cases 
of Gentlemen not of pure European descent applying to enter 
the British Army." 
60P.R.O. w.o. 32/3759. Minute, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff to Director of Manpower Training, 13 October 
1911. 
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to all universities on the grounds that it was "economically 
unsound" for "coloured" students to be allowed to enroll in 
O.T.C.s, which had been formed to supply officers for the 
British reserve forces. 61 
Despite War Office vehemence concerning race, the color 
bar did not prevent the commissioning into Britain's regular 
forces of several officers "not of pure European descent." 
For example, R.F. Warburton had an Afghan grandmother but 
earned a commission in the Somerset Light Infantry in 1892 
and later joined the 5th Gurkhas in India. F. Rennick, 
whose mother was an Indian, initially received a commission 
in the North Lancashire Regiment in 1885 and opted for the 
Indian Army, subsequently rising to the command of the 40th 
Pathans. 62 It may be argued that in examples such as these, 
mixed-race officers passed for White, and therefore, did not 
count as Black or "not of pure European descent." However, 
considering the relatively small circle of British and Irish 
families that provided officers to the British army, someone 
in the Colonial, India or War Offices had to have known such 
61 P.R.O. W.O. 32/2734. War Office Minute 11 December 
1908 and Circular War Office to Officer Training Corps, 2 
January 1909. 
62 P.R.O. W.O. 32/3759. India Office to War Office, 
29 September 1911. In 1915, Lt. Col. F. Rennick died of 
wounds incurred while leading his battalion in France. R.S. 
Waters, History of the 5th Battalion (Pathans), 14th Punjab 
Regiment (London: James Bain, 1936), 144. 
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officers' genealogy. Perhaps, out of a sense of fair play 
or favoritism, officials simply looked the other way. In 
1939, Governor A. P. Richards of Jamaica claimed that his 
colony had contributed many officers "of undoubted colour" 
to the army. They had evaded the color bar "presumably 
through having been at the best schools in England and 
having estates there as well as in Jamaica." In particular, 
Richards named H.S. Sewell, who served with distinction with 
the 4th Royal Irish Dragoon Guards, and rose to command a 
brigade of cavalry during the Great War. 63 Moreover, royal 
pleasure could expand War Off ice rules regarding 
"suitability," as in the case of Prince Victor Duleep Singh, 
the British-born son of Sir Duleep Singh, a prominent Indian 
exile and sometime favorite of the Queen. Victor attended 
Sandhurst and obtained a commission in an exclusive 
Household Cavalry regiment, a unit which, ordinarily, would 
not be sent out of Britain. 64 
The matter did not rest there. In 1897, the India 
Office and War Office debated an Indian maharaja's proposal 
63P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5. Richards to Beckett, 
Colonial Office, 6 September 1939. See a similar comment 
made in 1917 by The Daily Gleaner on 15 September 1917. 
64Chandar S. Sundaram, "Preventing 'Idleness': The 
Maharaja of Cooch Behar's proposal of officer commissions in 
the British Army for the sons of Indian Princes and 
Gentlemen, 1897-1898." South Asia 18 (1995): 120, nt. 25. 
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to commission the sons of aristocratic Indian families into 
the British army. The India Office failed to overcome the 
War Office's opposition to implement this plan. But just a 
few years later, Indian princes became eligible for Imperial 
Cadet Corps at "Princes Colleges," which would prepare them 
for honorary commissions. Their aspirations to serve the 
King-Emperor would have to be satisfied by being attached to 
the staffs of British generals as honorary aides. 65 
Despite a lack of consistent enforcement, the political 
need to maintain a formal color bar remained a key factor in 
setting military policy. In addition to injuring 
individuals, the British army's desire to formally exclude 
Blacks from positions of authority inhibited attempts to 
rationalize the administration of the crown's military 
forces. In 1864 and again in 1881, for example, schemes to 
amalgamate the Indian Medical Service with the Army Medical 
Department foundered on the fact that the former accepted 
Indians while the latter prohibited non-Europeans. 66 
The Augustan and Georgian armed forces welcomed Blacks 
to fulfil a variety of functions. In the army, they usually 
65
"Soldier Princes of India," Navy and Army 
Illustrated (13 December 1902): 333-5; Sundaram, 
"Preventing Idleness," 115-130. 
66Crawford, II., 283-4. 
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served as regimental musicians, but they also often found 
themselves fighting as line soldiers. The navy proved 
particularly accepting of Black recruits, especially when 
its ships took station near colonies with Black populations. 
Black soldiers and sailors participated in most of the 
battles of the British army and Royal Navy between the 
Restoration and the Crimean War. Later, during the 
Victorian period, British military policy formally barred 
non-European individuals from enlisting or receiving 
commissions in the regular forces. However, numerous 
individuals "not of pure European descent" did manage to 
serve as officers and other ranks of the Queen. Still, 
officially sanctioned-racial integration would have conceded 
racial equality in an empire increasingly justified by the 
perceived inequality of the races. 
CHAPTER VI 
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES, 1914 TO 1939 
The exigencies of the First World War challenged the 
British government's policy regarding Black soldiers and 
officers. Initially, Britain's massive mobilization caused 
many service recruiters to ignore the color bar when Black 
Britons and colonial subjects volunteered but many other 
Black volunteers were turned away. Late in the war, 
political pressures forced the War Office to amend its rules 
governing Black involvement. However, the military 
establishment did not whole-heartedly welcome its Black 
personnel and the alterations in policy demonstrated how 
colonial political considerations could affect domestic 
policy during times of crisis. 
I. An Imperial War 
The outbreak of war in 1914 quickly brought forth 
numerous British subjects "not of pure European descent," 
who attempted to enlist directly into the British armed 
forces. The army did not desire Black recruits but, 
publicly, the War Office maintained an ambiguous position 
regarding its policy. The 1914 example of W. A. Moore, who 
had held "a good position in the West Indies," typified the 
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problems involved when a recruiter rejected a Black 
volunteer who had actually traveled to Britain at his own 
expense to enlist. Moore complained to the West India 
Committee, a London-based lobbying organization that color 
was the reason. 1 In response, Lord Dundonald, the 
Committee's secretary, deceptively disclaimed any knowledge 
of War Office recruiting policies and suggested that concern 
for Moore's health in the European climate was the probable 
reason for the rejection. 2 In November 1915, the Under-
Secretary of State for War, H.J. Tennant, claimed in 
Parliament that no regulation barred enlistment on account 
of "colour," but he warned that, "the fact of a man being a 
British subject and of military age and fit to serve does 
not in itself entitle him to be enlisted." 3 
The lack of candor on the part of the War Off ice meant 
that Black enlistment often depended on the judgements of 
individual recruiting officers, who may or may not have been 
1 P.R.O. C.O. 318/333/46453. Dundonald to Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, 23 November 1914. 
2C.O. 318/333/46453. Dundonald to W.A. Moore, Nov. 
23, 1914. The correspondence had been forwarded to the 
Colonial Off ice for advice and an official there had 
remarked that Dundonald's reply had been disingenuine. 
Sometimes, such rejections by British recruiters resulted in 
alternate arrangements. See also, Killingray, "Blacks in 
the British Army," 177-8. 
3 Parliamentary Debates (Commons). 5th Ser., vol. 75 
(1914-15), col. 653. 
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aware of the War Office's real intentions. Hundreds of 
Black volunteers from Asia, Africa, the West Indies and 
Britain actually served in the British forces despite 
institutional prejudices. 4 For example, six hundred 
"coloured" Ceylonese joined British regiments, including 
elite units such as the Coldstream Guards and Royal 
Fusiliers. 5 W.R. Clarke, a Black Jamaican, became a pilot 
in the Royal Flying Corps, a forerunner of the Royal Air 
Force (R.A. F.) . 6 
Various pressures eventually compelled the War Off ice 
to officially sanction Black enlistment into the army. In 
fact, an absurd situation developed after 1916 when Britain 
introduced conscription. Britain's Blacks, whether native 
or temporarily resident, were technically liable for service 
and, thus, the Ministry of National Service often called up 
men whom the army did not want. Consequently, the British 
4Norman Manley, "The Autobiography of Norman 
Washington Manley," Jamaica Journal 7 (1973): 4-19, 92; 
Lobagola, An African Savage's Own Story (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1930), 357-62. Two Nigerian brothers studying in 
Britain, Eugene and John Brown, served in the 5th North 
Staffordshire Regiment. Philip Vasili to author, 19 March 
1996. 
5Charles Lucas, The Empire at War (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1921) Vol. V, 357-8. 
6Roger Lambo, "Achtung! The Black Prince: West 
Africans in the Royal Air Force, 1939-46," in David 
Killingray, ed., Africans in Britain (Ilford, Essex: Frank 
Cass and Co., 1994), 146. 
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government alternately prosecuted and ignored Blacks who 
failed to answer call ups. 7 Further embarrassment arrived 
from overseas because the War Office sought out British 
subjects of pure European descent for military service 
wherever they could be found, including the United States. 
Because of fears about political ramifications in the West 
Indian colonies, the War Office could not ask that only 
White subjects overseas enlist in the British forces. 
Meanwhile, for Black British subjects in the United States, 
the War Office held out the prospect of a separate labor 
battalion. In February 1918, General White, head of 
Britain's military mission in New York, informed his 
superiors that an insufficient number of Black West Indian 
subjects had come forward to form a complete battalion but, 
he warned that rejection of "British subjects of colour" 
would create "adverse comment." At the bottom of a copy of 
White's dispatch to the War Office, an unidentified person 
spelled out the army's views on individual Black enlistment 
with the following lines: 
Wooly headed niggers. We now refuse to post 
coloured men to 'White units.' These 'niggers' 
must therefore go to native units, if 
accepted. 8 
7Killingray, "Blacks in the British Army," 175-6. 
8 P.R.O. W.O. 32/4765. General White, New York, to 
War Office, 19 February 1918. 
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To better exploit their manpower, the British and 
American governments had signed a recruiting convention 
whereby British citizens living in the United States who had 
not registered for enlistment in the British forces could be 
conscripted into the American military. The fear of being 
drafted by the United States brought forward over two 
thousand Black West Indian applicants for British service by 
March 1918. Although the numbers exceeded those required to 
form a single battalion, the War Off ice no longer wished to 
take them, claiming that the transportation of American 
troops to Europe required every ton of available shipping. 
From Washington, D.C., Britain's Military Attache cautioned 
that the situation created ill-feeling and fed into anti-
British propaganda among West Indians. 9 Appeals from the 
West India Contingent Committee persuaded the War Office to 
formally accept a Black Trinidadian who had traveled to 
Britain ignorant of the color bar. The Committee had warned 
the War Off ice that the color bar would have the "most far 
reaching and regrettable results." 10 
Mounting political pressure caused a change in policy. 
In June 1918, the War Office formally, but quietly, agreed 
9P.R.O. W.O. 32/4765. Military Attache, Washington, 
D.C., to War Office, (?) March 1918. 
10P.R.O. C.O. 318/347. Aspinall, West Indian 
Contingent Committee to War Office, 24 May 1918. 
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to enlist "British subjects of colour" into British units on 
three conditions: 1) that they had to eat British rations, 
2) that they be paid as British soldiers, and 3) that they 
had to understand and speak English. 11 The Colonial Office 
informed colonial governments that as long as these 
conditions were strictly followed, the War Office would 
allow the enlistment of any British subjects of "pure Negro 
decent," "pure Oriental descent," and of mixed descent. 12 
Alarmed, the War Office protested that its intention had 
been only to recruit "British subjects of colour resident in 
Great Britain and the United States" and those colonies not 
already possessing combatant units. 13 In other words, 
military authorities hoped to simultaneously allow, but 
limit, the enlistment of Blacks at a time when the British 
army desperately needed soldiers at the front. The war 
ended in November, before these more inclusive policies 
could possibly affect its outcome. 
It is difficult to gauge the everyday experiences of 
individual Black soldiers in the British forces during the 
11P.R.O. W.O. 32/4765. Cubitt, War Office, to 
Ministry of National Service, 13 June 1918. 
12P.R.O. C.O. 323/781. Circular, Colonial Office to 
Colonial Governments, 15 July 1918. 
13P.R.O. W.O. 32/4765. War Office to Colonial 
Office, 24 August 1918. 
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Great War. Near the end of the war, several hundred White 
patients, incited by soldiers with South African experience, 
attacked fifty Black patients at a military hospital in 
Liverpool. 14 These Black men appear to have been the 
victims of a racial bigotry originally adopted in a colonial 
setting and exacerbated by the frustration caused by the 
sudden end of the war. The Liverpool attackers possibly 
felt their position threatened by those who obviously 
appeared not only to be different and inferior, but also 
present in significant numbers. 
Most individual Black British soldiers probably served 
in the forces without incurring such blatant hostility. For 
example, in the summer of 1918, two merchant sailors from 
Sierra Leone, Ernest Marke and his friend Tommy, took 
advantage of the army's new policy of toleration and 
enlisted in Liverpool. The war ended while they trained: 
The two months I spent in the army were very happy 
times. I encountered no colour prejudice of any 
kind and the feeling that we were all in the same 
uniform was a strong one ... Tommy and I became 
favourites in the camps. 15 
In contrast to the besieged men of the B.W.I.R., White 
soldiers did not perceive Black individuals such as Ernest 
14 Shryer, Staying Power, 297. 
15Ernest Marke, In Troubled Waters: Memoirs of my 
Seventy Years in England (London: Karia Press, 1986), 24-25. 
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Marke and Tommy as any sort of threat. Indeed, they were 
treated as novelties. A possible explanation for the 
relatively good relations between Whites and individual 
Black service personnel may be found in the nature of the 
U.K.'s war-time forces. The small pre-war regular forces of 
several hundred thousand had served as imperial guardians 
and upholders of White British rule. In colonial settings, 
British servicemen had become accustomed to treating non-
European subjects disrespectfully and brutally. In 
contrast, the expanded war-time army achieved a strength of 
about five million men and the navy, about one million. The 
sheer expansion of the forces diluted the number of virulent 
racists who had thrived in the small "peacetime" 
professional forces. If anything, skin color or cultural 
difference ensured that individual Black soldiers frequently 
became novelties in their respective units. 16 
The notion of commissioning Black officers conflicted 
with the empire-justifying idea of White superiority. A few 
years prior to the First World War, racial anxiety had 
caused the War Off ice to refuse a request from an African 
officer of the Gold Coast Volunteers to train with British 
units in the United Kingdom. It had been decided that the 
16This theme is discussed more fully in later 
chapters. More evidence exists for the Second World War and 
post-war period than for the First World War. 
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visiting officer would probably not be treated with respect 
by the N.C.O.s and men he would command. 17 In this 
decision, the War Office implicitly denied its ability and 
responsibility to influence the attitudes and behavior of 
its ranks. Also, the reply disguised the War Office's 
prejudices against Black people with a contrived concern for 
the well-being of the officer in question. 
During the war, racism sometimes impeded promotion. 
Norman and Roy Manley enlisted in the Royal Artillery after 
the former had been refused entrance into Oxford 
University's Officers Training Corps (O.T.C.). Norman 
attained the rank of corporal and recalled that, "the rank 
and file disliked taking orders from a coloured N.C.O. and 
their attitude was mild by comparison with that of my fellow 
N.C.O.s." The latter resented sharing equal status with 
Manley and he found that he could turn only to his White 
officers for "ordinary decency." 18 A Jewish African named 
Lobagola actively recruited Jews for British military 
service while a resident of New York City. He eventually 
17 P.R.O. C.O. 96/502. Ward, War Office, to Under-
secretary of State, Colonial Office, 10 May 1910. 
18Manley, 7. During the First World War, Cambridge 
University's O.T.C. allowed Indian enrollment into an 
ambulance unit, though not into the regular unit. Hew 
Strachan, History of the Cambridge University Officers 
Training Corps (Tunbridge Wells, Kent: Midas Books, 1976), 
143. 
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enlisted and joined the predominately Jewish 38th battalion 
of the Royal Fusiliers in Palestine. Lobagola experienced 
occasional resentment at the hands of White other ranks but, 
because he found favor with his officers, he attained the 
positions of quartermaster sergeant and orderly sergeant. 19 
Political and military realities gradually wore down 
the color bar in officers' commissions. Indian officers of 
the Imperial Cadet Corps and Imperial Service Troops became 
a common sight in Britain and on the Western Front. For 
example, Sir Douglas Haig's headquarters staff included Lt. 
Narain Singh of Takari, who alternated between delivering 
messages by motorcycle at reckless speeds and sniping at 
Germans with his tiger gun. 20 The legality of commissioning 
Black officers was conceded in November 1917, when the War 
Office's Judge Advocate General, Sir Felix Cassel, 
interpreted Section 95 of the Army Act as allowing for the 
commissioning of alien persons of colour. 21 It is unclear 
what effect, if any, Cassel's decision had on the 
commissioning of Blacks because several persons "not of pure 
19Lobagola, 357-62. The 38th was one of three 
Jewish battalions of the Royal Fusiliers to serve in the 
Middle East. 
2
°Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 231-2. 
21 P.R.O. W.O. 32/12319. Cassel to War Office RE: 
Elie Avout, 22 November 1917. 
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European descent" had received commissions well before the 
ruling. Also, Cassell did not negate the army's authority 
to restrict precisely who it commissioned. 
Walter Daniel Tull, a professional footballer and 
Folkestone native, became one of the first war-time officers 
of obviously African descent. Along with other footballers, 
he had originally enlisted in the 23rd (1st Football) 
battalion of the Middlesex Regiment. In May 1917, Tull 
received a commission and, according to a fellow officer, he 
"bore a very high reputation for courage and devotion to 
duty." Superiors recommended Tull for the Military Cross 
and his divisional commander sent him a note of appreciation 
for "gallantry and coolness." German fire killed him in 
March 1918. 22 Other Black officers included G.A.R. Williams 
of St. Lucia, who obtained a commission in the North 
Staffordshire Regiment, 23 Rama Jodha Jang Bahadur of Nepal 
who earned a Military Cross at Ypres in 1915, 24 and Mahaduv 
Singhji, who received a British army commission, but 
22Major Poole to Tull's family, 12 April 1918; 
Pickard to Tull family, 17 April 1918; and "Note of 
Appreciation," Sydney Lampnel to Walter Tull, Finlayson 
Collection. 
23P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/6. Governor, Windward 
Islands, to Malcolm MacDonald, 17 November 1939, and 
enclosure. 
24 Farwell, Armies of the Raj, 231-2. 
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transferred to the Indian army in 1918. 25 At least four 
Indians received commissions in the Royal Flying Corps, and 
one of them, Indra Lal Roy, scored ten victories and earned 
the designation of "ace."26 
Thus far, no evidence has surfaced to indicate that 
Black officers experienced racism in uniform. In all 
likelihood, the resentment directed at Black N.C.O.s by 
White N.C.O.s and privates did not affect Black officers to 
the same extent because a wide legal and social gulf 
formally separated officers on the one hand from N.C.O.s and 
privates on the other. Officers and N.C.O.s existed in 
worlds with different rules, responsibilities, and 
privileges. A Black officer, who, by definition, was a 
"gentleman," was too high ranking to be a threat to the 
status of a White sergeant or corporal. 
II. Inter-War Color Bar 
The services' acceptance of Black enlistment and 
commissioning ended soon after the war. The navy and the 
newly formed Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) specifically barred 
"coloured" recruits in their published recruiting 
regulations. In contrast, the War Office prohibited the 
enlistment of Blacks, not through formal regulations, but, 
25Menezes, 310-11. 
26Lambo, 146; Menezes, 313. 
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by ordering medical officers to reject "undesirable" 
recruits on the basis of medical reasons, which would not be 
disclosed to the applicants themselves. 27 
Explicit racial discrimination by the army appeared a 
decade later, during a period of internal reform. Because 
of a recruiting shortfall in the 1930s, the army had, by 
1937, instituted several measures including an improvement 
of conditions, lower physical requirements, and an 
acceptance of illiterate recruits. 28 At the same time, 
however, the War Office decided to alter its regulations to 
explicitly bar Blacks. Army authorities adopted this 
restriction because of "the difficulty experienced in 
placing a coloured British subject" who had been 
inexplicably allowed to enlist. All of the regimental 
depots "to which the man was offered were extremely 
reluctant to accept him." 29 Thus ended the discrepancies 
and confusions between army regulations and those of the 
27 P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. "Report of the Committee on 
the post-war regulations respecting the nationality and 
descent of candidates for entry to the army." 16 March 
1945. The Ministry of Defence has confirmed to the author 
that the relevant files on the case do not exist. 
28Gerald F. Spillan, "Manpower Problems in the 
British Army, 1918-1939," D. Phil. diss., (Oxford University, 
1985)' 179, 185. 
29P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. "Report of the Committee on 
the post-war regulations respecting the nationality and 
descent of candidates for entry to the army," 16 March 1945. 
204 
other services. 
The enforcement of the color bar in the armed forces 
usually relied on a simple visual examination to ascertain 
whether or not an individual met the requirement of "pure 
European descent." To prevent embarrassing questions, the 
Air Ministry issued instructions that a candidate for 
enlistment could be rejected if he voluntarily provided 
written evidence that he was not of pure European descent 
or, if he appeared to possess non-European blood. Hoping to 
avoid controversy, the R.A.F. required its recruiters to 
conceal the reasons for a Black candidate's rejection unless 
directly asked. 30 
In 1936, the R.A.F. applied its racially exclusive 
policy in several cases with varying degrees of success. 
Patrick Thomas Blake was born in India in 1917 to a British 
soldier and a woman of unidentified descent in India. The 
Manchester Recruiting Depot had passed Blake through his 
medical and educational exams but, just a few minutes before 
the oath, the attestation officer rejected him. The officer 
informed Blake that he did not possess sufficient knowledge 
of electricity, but the recruit claimed to have informed the 
30P.R.O. AIR 2/2248. Air Council to the Inspector of 
Recruiting, 5 December 1932. I am uncertain as to the case 
involved in the production of this document, which was 
referred to in 1935-6. 
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recruiters about his expertise earlier. Afterwards, Blake 
sarcastically claimed that he may have appeared as a spy 
because of his "dark complexion and decidedly foreign 
appearance." To support his appeal, Blake provided evidence 
only on his father's descent and military service. An 
investigation of army records revealed that his father had 
married a Marcella Josephine Baptiste in India but the 
inquiry yielded no evidence as to her descent. The Air 
Ministry decided to inform Blake only that he had no 
possibility of being accepted. In the event Blake appealed 
through a Member of Parliament, the Air Ministry intended to 
explain the real reason to him "sympathetically. " 31 
In a second case, the father of J.F. Adam appealed his 
son's rejection, whereupon the Air Ministry admitted to the 
color bar. Mr. Adam responded by castigating the 
attestation officer for being a "super Solomon-cum-Daniel." 
He provided a family genealogy to assure the Air Ministry 
that his son had pure European descent. 32 At the Air 
Ministry's request, the applicant reappeared so that an 
official could have a "final look" at him. The R.A.F. 
31 P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. Blake to Officer Commanding, 
R.A.F., Altrincham, Cheshire, 10 November 1935; War Office 
to Record Office, R.A.F., Ruislip, 29 November 1935. 
32P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. J.A. Adam to Air Ministry, 3 
April 1936. 
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interviewer judged that the younger Adam's "eyes and perhaps 
his mouth and head" were oriental and his color dark, "but 
no darker than many south Europeans." Ultimately, the Air 
Ministry decided to accept Adam although it considered his 
to be a borderline case. 33 A third case went more smoothly 
for the R.A.F., which informed the father of D.J.L. 
Gabbatiss that his son had failed to fulfil a vaccination 
requirement before a required deadline. 34 Mr. Gabbatiss 
then asked the R.A.F. if any future possibility existed for 
his son to enter the R.A. F. 35 Avoiding mention of "race," 
the true reason for rejection, the R.A.F. responded that it 
had "given the matter careful and sympathetic consideration" 
but the younger Gabbatiss could not be considered for any 
openings. 36 
Despite having secretive schemes in place to reject 
unsuitable applicants, British military recruiters failed to 
keep the British forces racially pure. For example, 
Londoner Cyril Charles Alcindor enlisted in the 1930s and 
33P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. Minutes of 24 and 27 April 
1936. 
34 P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. Pollock to E. Gabbatiss, 10 
June 1936. 
35P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. W. Gabbatiss to Officer-in-
Charge of Records, Air Ministry, n.d. 
36P.R.O. AIR. 2/2248. J.M. Spaight to W. Gabbatiss, 
28 August 1936. 
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served with the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment in 
volatile Palestine and attained the rank of sergeant by 
1939. 37 The Air Ministry made an outright exception to its 
color bar in 1938 for Cyril Wellesley Bourke, a twenty five 
year old Black Jamaican who had traveled to London to apply 
for a commission. An R.A.F. selection board interviewed and 
rejected him on account of color. He then attempted to 
enlist in the ranks but was again rejected because of race. 
In order to prevent controversy, the Air Ministry decided to 
make an exception for Bourke. 38 
At the end of 1938, the color bar nearly became a 
public issue because Sir Stafford Cripps, M.P., championed 
the cases of "half-castes" who wished to enlist in the 
R.A.F. Cripps, a prominent critic of colonialism, had 
received a letter from an indignant schoolmaster regarding a 
mixed-race pupil who had been "made to feel that he is not 
as other men are" by being rejected because of color. 39 
After making inquiries, Cripps received what he considered 
to be an unsatisfactory explanation from the Secretary of 
37Jeffrey Green to author, 17 February 1996. 
38P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Air Ministry Minutes, 28 
September 1938; 6 October 1938; and 11 October 1938. 
39P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Schoolmaster to Cripps, n.d., 
encl. in Cripps to Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for 
Air, 20 December 1938. 
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State for Air, Kingsley Wood, on the supposed need for a 
color bar. Cripps then asked for a full explanation of the 
color bar from Wood and threatened to publish the 
correspondence. 40 
Before replying, the Air Ministry conferred with the 
other two services on the necessity of maintaining the color 
bar. The War Office assured the Air Ministry that it faced 
the same problem of rejecting men "not of pure European 
descent" but "would most certainly exclude a man who had any 
noticeable mixture of non-European blood, even though he had 
been educated in England." The army cited the "prejudice 
among the men in the ranks against serving with men who show 
any signs of color." The navy replied in a similar vein: 
men "not of pure European descent" would be miserable in the 
service due to "ragging" by other sailors. 41 Rather than 
sending a written explanation, Wood persuaded Cripps to meet 
with him personally to discuss the matter. The position of 
the Air Ministry was that, while the R.A.F. opposed racial 
discrimination, the good order and discipline of the 
service, as well as the happiness of individuals "not of 
40P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Cripps to Wood, 30 December 
1938. 
41 P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Roseway, War Office, to 
Sandford, Air Ministry, 13 January 1939, and Admiralty to 
Sandford, 23 January 1939. 
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pure European descent," necessitated a color bar. In turn, 
Cripps impressed upon Wood the importance of allowing Black 
subjects opportunities to serve and suggested the formation 
of segregated units. 42 
The inter-war color bar reflected the British military 
establishment's deep racial anxiety, an abhorrence of any 
close association between the regular army and Black people. 
For example, in 1937, the Jamaica Engineer Corps, a unit of 
the mostly Black Jamaican local forces, applied to the War 
Office to be officially "affiliated" with the Royal 
Engineers. 43 Such relationships involved exchanges of 
personnel for training, gifts, and greetings on the 
anniversaries of glorious events in the regiments' pasts. 
In effect, the units concerned shared in each other's 
prestige. White military units from the colonies and 
dominions commonly obtained affiliations with British 
regiments, especially those with which they had some 
connection. 44 Ultimately, the War Office refused the 
42 P.R.O. AIR. 2/3936. Minutes by Sandford to 
Secretary of State for Air, 9 February 1939, and Draft (not 
sent), Secretary of State for Air to Cripps, (?) February 
1939. For the question of segregated units, see Air 
Ministry Minutes of 14 and 17 February 1939. 
43P.R.O. W.O. 32/4153. Denham to Ormsby-Gore, 
Colonial Secretary, 15 March 1937. 
44 For example, in 1929, the all-White Bermuda 
Volunteer Rifle Corps established an affiliation with the 
Lincolnshire Regiment because, during the Great War, 122 of 
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Jamaica Engineer Corps' request on racial grounds, but 
offered the compromise of a "local alliance" between it and 
a Royal Engineers company then stationed in Jamaica. 45 The 
maintenance of "White prestige" via separation remained of 
paramount importance and the army probably felt that a full 
affiliation between a regular army unit and a Black colonial 
unit would have been a step toward the inclusion of Black 
soldiers in the armed forces. 
After the end of the war, the forces re-adopted their 
color bars to commissions and in 1920, the issue of non-
European candidates at Sandhurst emerged again. The War 
Office decided to bring Sandhurst's regulations into line 
with those of the Navy. The amended rule stated that a 
candidate had to "be a British subject and the son of 
British subjects, and ... he must be of pure European 
descent." 46 Because of the recently introduced program of 
"Indianization," the regulations did allow Indian candidates 
destined for the Indian army to attend Sandhurst. 
Almost two hundred Indians attended Sandhurst and some 
claimed to have suffered from British prejudice. For 
its members served with the British regiment. Kipling, 92. 
45P.R.O. W.O. 32/4153. War Office to Colonial 
Office, 30 June 1937. 
46P.R.O. W.O. 32/3763. Memorandum, "Naturalization 
of foreigners for commissions in the Regular Army." 
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example, some Indians were not allowed to command British 
cadets. 47 Once commissioned, Indian officers normally 
served with British regiments in India for one or two years 
before joining an Indian regiment. The purpose was to give 
young officers experience and confidence before facing 
"native" troops. Presumably, White troops would be less 
damaged by an inexperienced officer than Indians. In 
British regiments, Indian officers normally received the 
proper respect and treatment due their rank. Ayub Khan 
served with a battalion of the Royal Fusiliers in the late 
1920s, and "got along very well" with British colleagues. 48 
"Timmy" Thimiyya was apprehensive about commanding a platoon 
of the elite Highland Light Infantry, but he found that they 
would follow him anywhere. On his last day with the 
regiment, his Glaswegian soldiers carried him on their 
shoulders, an honor rarely bestowed on anyone. 49 P.K. 
Sahgal claimed to have made many White friends in the 
British units in which he served and won some over to what 
he thought was the immorality of the British presence in 
India. 50 As recently as 1995, the Cheshire Regiment 
47Khan, 10; Chaudhuri, 201. 
48Khan, 11-12. 
49Evans, 93-4. 
50The I.N.A. Heroes (Lahore: Hero Productions, 
1946)' 107-8. 
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maintained close contact with a former guest officer who 
became a general in the army of the Republic of India. 51 
Certainly, not all Indian officers experienced smooth 
relations in their British regiments. B.M. Kaul joined the 
1/East Surrey Regiment in 1933 and participated in most of 
the unit's customary activities, including sports, but he 
refused to hunt and drink. Instead of Anglicizing himself, 
he engaged in "heated arguments with fellow British officers 
who argued in favor of the inevitability and the benevolence 
of the British raj. 1152 
Government policy in relation to university O.T.C.s 
laid bare the military's prejudices against Black people 
more publicly than the regulations for commissioning into 
the regular forces. Membership in the racially exclusive 
senior division of the O.T.C.s became a sore point for the 
increasing number of African and Asian subjects who attended 
universities in the United Kingdom. In April 1920, the War 
Off ice sanctioned the enrollment of Indians in the senior 
divisions as part of Indianization but cancelled this policy 
in 1921. Rejected Indian applicants were to be informed 
that O.T.C.s existed solely for the training of potential 
51Major John Ellis (Ret.), Cheshire Regimental 
Museum, to author, 29 November 1995. 
52Kaul, 36-7, 40. 
213 
officers for the British army. 53 The War Office revisited 
the matter later in the decade. The Colonial Office 
pressured the War Office to open O.T.C.s on the grounds that 
local colonial defense forces, especially those in Ceylon, 
needed suitably trained officers. On the political side, 
the Colonial Off ice argued that the color bar was 
"antagonistic to our general policy and is looked upon as a 
slur by the colonies themselves." The War Office repeated 
its stance that O.T.C.s existed solely to provide officers 
for Britain's reserve forces which had color bars. In 
1929, the War Office elicited opinions from officials at the 
Universities at Glasgow, London, Cambridge, and Oxford. 54 
D.J. Medley of Glasgow University wrote that its O.T.C. 
would become "stigmatized" as the "Club of the Nigger" and 
that White interest would decline. 55 L.N.G. Filan, 
University of London, admitted "that one of the strongest 
attractions of the O.T.C. for these lads is the fact that it 
is the only University Institution which excludes women and 
53 P.R.O. W.O. 32/18651. Creedy, War Office, to 
Officers Commanding, all Senior Division Contingents, 
Officers Training Corps, 2 August 1921. 
54 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7. Ling, War Office, to 
Officer Training Corps Commanders at Glasgow, Cambridge, 
London, and Oxford, 1 January 1929. 
55P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7. D.J. Medley to Ling, 12 
January 1929. 
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those whom they call 'niggers.'" 56 However, Charles Searle 
of Cambridge answered that enrollment would probably not 
suffer because the only members who would object would be 
White "colonials." 57 Most respondents agreed in their 
deprecation of the idea of accepting Indian students, who 
were regarded as unreliable and solely intent on causing 
trouble. 58 
Eventually, university students became embroiled in the 
O.T.C. issue. In July 1935, R. Nunn May, the Secretary of 
the National Union of Students of the Universities and 
University Colleges of England and Wales protested to Lord 
Halifax at the War Off ice about the color bar to the Senior 
Divisions of the O.T.C.s. Nunn May thought that the color 
bar caused much resentment and constituted one of the Indian 
students' major grievances. 59 Once again, the War Office's 
objections to the admission of Indians included the stated 
purpose of O.T.C.s, i.e., to provide officers for the 
56P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7. Filan to Ling, 4 January 
1929. 
57 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7. Searle to Ling, 13 
January 1929. 
58P.R.O. C.O. 323/1060/7. Letters from Medley, 12 
January 1929; Filan, 4 January 1929; Stratton, 12 January 
1929. 
59P.R.O. W.O. 32/2738. R. Nunn May to Lord Halifax, 
10 July 1935. 
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British forces. India had, by then, established similar 
training facilities for the program of Indianization and did 
not need O.T.C.s in Britain. Again, the army cited the 
potential resentment among White members. Also, the 
majority of Indian students in Britain were considered to be 
from "non-martial" races, their desire to enroll in O.T.C.s 
being "purely political." The War Office predicted 
"incidents" between civilians and Indians in uniform, 
especially at Scottish universities because the O.T.C. 
uniform included the kilt. More significantly, if the War 
Office dropped the color bar for Indians, then other non-
European and "mixed" British subjects would potentially 
expect admittance, and all these together might clamor for 
the opening of army commissions. 60 
Before responding to the National Union of Students, 
the War Off ice sought out the opinions of other ministries 
on the issue. Neither the India or Colonial Offices wished 
to officially raise the matter. 61 Major S.J. Cole, a 
military officer attached to the Colonial Office reasoned 
that if O.T.C.s accepted Africans, then, logically, they 
60 P.R.O. W.O. 32/2738. Memorandum, "Admission of 
Indians to the Senior Division, Officer Training Corps," (?) 
August 1935. 
61 P.R.O. w.o. 32/2738. War Office Minute, 5 May 
1936. The Colonial Office's Major S.J. Cole informed the 
War Office that his ministry did not desire the scheme. 
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would have to be admitted to Britain's Territorial Army and 
Reserve. Another official cited a sartorial concern: "a 
Black man in kilts -I think the majority of W[est] 
A[frican]s go to Scotland- would be even more ridiculous 
than an Indian." The Colonial Office surmised that only 
Ceylonese students could benefit because Ceylon alone had a 
local defense force in which graduates of O.T.C.s could be 
commissioned. 62 Bolstered by these arguments, the War 
Office responded negatively to the National Union of 
Students, stating that "a change in the present policy would 
have many far-reaching effects ... " but would produce very 
few interested students. 63 
In 1937, Cambridge's O.T.C. officials briefly discussed 
the possibility of accepting Egyptians and Iraqis, but did 
nothing constructive about it. A second proposal, to allow 
the enrollment of Indian members, received more thorough 
consideration. On this occasion, the officials expressed 
the common concerns about Indian mischief, but they agreed 
that such fears were outweighed by the good records of 
Indian students who had previously attended Cambridge and 
62 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1348/5. Cole, Minute, 25 February 
1936; Robinson, Minute, 27 February 1936; and other 
Correspondence in this file regarding the admission of 
colonial students to the Senior Divisions of O.T.C.s. 
63P.R.O. W.O. 32/2738. War Office to R.Nunn, May and 
September 1936. 
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Sandhurst and the potential value of Indians being involved 
in their own country's defense. However, the proposal 
failed to win any further support. 64 In April 1939, Black 
students at several British universities, including 
Cambridge, complained that they had been prohibited from 
enrolling in their local O.T.C.s. The Colonial Office 
referred the matter to the War Off ice which did not reply 
before the outbreak of the Second World War. 65 
To summarize, between 1914 and 1939, British policy 
toward the racial purity of the United Kingdom forces 
alternated between lip-service to political concerns and a 
stubborn adherence to racial prejudice. Once colonial 
political considerations faded with the end of the Great 
War, the services re-imposed their pre-war color bars. When 
Britain turned to face Germany in another world war, the 
racialist ideas that had prevented a fuller mobilization of 
the empire during the Great War, dominated the British 
military mindset. The services did not want Black people 
serving as enlisted men or officers within their ranks and 
only allowed it as acknowledged exceptions or under narrow 
restrictions. Nevertheless, even at their most virulently 
64 Strachan, Cambridge O.T.C., 156. 
65Sherwood, 3-4. 
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racist moments, the services accepted individual Blacks who 
had evaded or had been allowed through the color bar. The 
forces' public image as racist institutions became 
politically embarrassing during the Great War and 
increasingly in the inter-war period because the empire was 
changing. Simple White supremacy justified on biology no 
longer matched British scientific beliefs, imperial 
politics, or recruiting realities. Increasingly, 
westernized colonial peoples demanded concessions toward the 
recognition of racial and political equality. These rising 
expectations fell on deaf ears in the armed services where 
the assumptions and prejudices of the Victorian empire 
remained current. 
CHAPTER VII 
BLACKS IN THE BRITISH FORCES DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR. 
I. Second Suspension of the Color Bar 
Immediately preceding and following the outbreak of war 
in 1939, several Blacks encountered rejection at the hands 
of British recruiting authorities. Almost immediately, the 
government received warnings about the adverse consequences 
of the color bar on imperial relations. 1 In September 1939, 
military service in Britain was no longer strictly a matter 
of voluntary enlistment, as the British had adopted 
conscription several months before the war. The National 
Service (Armed Forces) Act contained no provisions for 
racial exclusion and the War Off ice decided that "coloured 
people" in Britain would, in fact, be called up. 2 This was 
not an enthusiastic affirmation of racial equality. The 
army's Adjudant General, General Sir Robert Gordon-
Finlayson, actually deplored the inclusion of Blacks and 
1P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5. A.P. Richards to Colonial 
Office, 6 September 1939; Ministry of Information to 
Colonial Office, 29 September 1939. 
2P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5. War Office Meeting to 
consider employment of Dominion and Colonial personnel, and 
Aliens, by the British Army in the War, 28 September 1939. 
220 
stated that, "for practical reasons the admission of 
coloured British subjects into the Army here would involve 
very serious difficulties." 3 On the other hand, any attempt 
at rejecting Black conscripts at the depots would be 
administratively difficult and politically controversial. 
In mid-October, the Colonial Office announced the Cabinet's 
decision that, 
British subjects from the colonies and British 
protected persons who are in this country, 
including those who are not of pure European 
descent, are to be on the same footing as British 
subjects from the United Kingdom as regards 
eligibility for voluntary enlistment in the armed 
forces and for consideration for the grant of 
emergency commissions in those forces ... 4 
Since the decision had been made largely for political 
reasons rather than service enthusiasm, misunderstandings 
and individual cases of rejection continued well into 1941. 5 
Colonial governments, private companies, and business 
associations, particularly in the West Indies, encouraged 
and arranged to pay for the passages of Black volunteers who 
wished to enlist in Britain. However, in July 1940, the 
3P.R.O. c.o. 323/1672/1. Colonial Office Note, 
September 1939, enclosed in T.H. Lee to Sir John Shuckburgh, 
27 September 1939. See also Sherwood, 4. 
4P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/5. Communique, 18 October 
1939. 
5See Sherwood, 6-7, and Killingray, "Race and Rank," 
280-1. 
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Colonial Office warned the Jamaican government that, while 
"coloured" Black British subjects in Britain were eligible 
for service in the British forces, "it was never 
contemplated that coloured persons should be specially sent 
to England for enlistment." 6 
Instead of displaying patriotic zeal, some Blacks in 
Britain reacted to the services' pre-war color bars by 
refusing to answer conscription summons. For example, 
George Price, who had unsuccessfully attempted to join the 
navy before the war, applied as a conscientious objector to 
protest British racial policies. 7 Also, Pan-Africanist 
activists Ras Makonnen, Joma Kenyatta, and George Padmore 
answered call-ups by hiding from authorities and expressing 
anti-colonialist sentiments on their conscription notices. 8 
II Evasions by the Services 
Dissatisfied with the Cabinet's ruling, the armed 
forces attempted to hinder Black enlistment in several ways. 
The professional naval officers at the Admiralty intended to 
simply reject Black men who, once called up, chose to join 
6P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/4. Colonial Secretary to 
Governor, Jamaica, 4 July 1940. 
7P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/13. Rev. Charles A. Smith to 
Arthur Woodburn, M.P., encl. in Harold Moody to Malcolm 
MacDonald, 1 February, 1940. 
8Ras Makonnen, Pan-Africanism from Within (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), 132-3. 
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the Royal Navy. Otherwise, they reasoned, if the navy had 
to accept a few Black recruits out of political expediency, 
they would be enlisted for "hostilities only." The admirals 
also wanted to discourage Black colonial subjects from 
traveling to Britain to enlist and provided local service 
opportunities such as minesweeping in the West Indies and 
West Africa. 9 
In contrast, the newly appointed First Lord of the 
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, opposed this racial 
discrimination and minuted that, 
There must be no discrimination on grounds of race 
or colour ... I cannot see any objection to Indians 
serving on H.M. Ships where they are qualified and 
needed, or if their virtues so deserve rising to 
be Admirals of the Fleet. But not too many of 
them, please. 10 
Despite the qualified tolerance expressed by the navy's 
civilian head, it appears that the navy was the service most 
evasive in recruiting Blacks. In a clearly discriminatory 
gesture, the Admiralty decided to accept British-born 
"persons of pure European descent," whose fathers were 
"British either by birth or by naturalisation," but in the 
9See the internal correspondence in P.R.O. ADM. 
1/10818. Allan C. Wilmot, a Jamaican, served in the Royal 
Navy on a minesweeper on the West Indian station until 1944, 
when he transferred to the R.A.F. in Britain as a rescuer. 
Wilmot to author, 29 June 1995. 
10P.R.O. ADM. 1/10818. Minute by Churchill, 14 
October 1939. 
223 
cases of Black applicants, their fathers had to be "British 
by birth." 11 Although concerned, the Colonial Office 
hesitated at pressing the matter while the navy was busily 
fighting the Germans: " ... great harm would be done if we 
were now seriously charged with a breach of faith to the 
colonial peoples. If all publicity can be avoided, that 
might be all right." 12 A few Blacks did serve in the navy 
during the war, but as late as 1943, its recruiting 
regulations stated that Blacks were ineligible for entry 
unless granted specific sanction by the Admiralty. 13 
By the summer of 1940, various colonial governments 
received requests from White residents for funds to travel 
to Britain and enlist in the forces. 14 What worried the 
colonial authorities, in Britain and overseas, was that 
Black subjects would make the same demands for the 
opportunity to enlist. 15 The War Office held that, "if the 
11P.R.O. C.O. 323/1801/13. Poynton to Calder, 30 
January 1940. 
12P.R.O. c.o. 323/1801/13. Minute by M(alcolm). 
M(acDonald) ., 16 April 1940. 
13Sherwood, 42, nt. 24. 
14 P.R.O. 323/1801/22. Governor, Trinidad, to 
Colonial Secretary, 22 May 1940; Colonial Secretary to 
Governor, Trinidad, 4 and 5 June 1940. 
15P.R.O. c.o. 323/1801/13. Calder, Colonial 
Office, to Woods, War Office, 30 May 1940. 
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enlistment of White personnel entails accepting coloured we 
would prefer to do without the White ... ," but the army would 
accept colonial Whites who managed to come to Britain 
discretely. 16 In 1943, the contradiction between Britain's 
need for manpower and the military's antipathy toward Blacks 
prevented the British government from conscripting Britons 
who resided in the West Indies lest Black West Indians 
construe the action as a form of racial discrimination. 17 
Eager for active service, hundreds of Black West 
Indians arrived in Britain on their own and presented 
themselves to recruiting offices. Some initially 
encountered an initial army hesitancy to accept Black 
volunteers, but the Colonial Office and the West India 
Committee usually persuaded the military authorities to 
accept them. In a significant shift, the War Office agreed, 
in December 1940, to pay for the passages of Black West 
Indian skilled tradesmen to Britain for enlistment in the 
army. 18 In May 1941, the Colonial Office tested the War 
Office's enthusiasm by requesting that the army pay 
16P.R.O. c.o. 323/1801/13. Woods, War Office, to 
Calder, Colonial Office, 24 June 1940. 
17 P.R.O. C.O. 968/76/5. Mayle to Williams, 19 
March 1943. 
18P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/13. Minute by Calder, 2 
January 1941. 
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additional "incidental expenses" incurred by colonial 
applicants en route to the recruiting offices in Britain. 
The War Off ice refused because it did not wish "to make any 
further concession which would encourage more direct 
volunteers." 19 By the end of 1941, the War Office sought to 
limit the enlistment of West Indian tradesmen on the grounds 
that it was dissatisfied with their performance. 20 
In June 1942, the War Office again agreed to accept 
skilled West Indian tradesmen provided that, "enlistment 
should be carried out in the West Indies in all cases and 
the men [sent] to Middle East by the most direct route ... " 21 
The Jamaican press widely advertised the scheme and five 
hundred applied, but, within a few months, the War Office 
suspended it because of shipping constraints. 22 The army's 
underlying desire to prevent or limit a Black influx to 
Britain was revealed to the Colonial Office in late 1942 and 
19P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/4. Poynton, Colonial Office, 
to Hobbs, War Office, 28 May 1941 and War Office to Colonial 
Office, 11 September 1941. 
20P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10. Minute by Calder, 24 
November 1941 and Colonial Office to Caribbean Colonial 
Governors, 26 November 1941. 
21 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/17. Williams, War Office, to 
Thomas, Colonial Office, 19 June 1942. 
22 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/17. Extract from Report by 
General Kerr, British Army Staff, Washington, D.C., on the 
Local Forces in the Caribbean, October 1942. 
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1943. In August 1942, the War Office indicated that it 
would help find transportation for Jamaican lorry drivers to 
come to Britain before being sent on to the Middle East. The 
Colonial Office suspected that the War Office was being 
disingenuous, to which suggestion the War Office assured the 
Colonial Office that it had no objections to "looking after" 
the drivers. 23 In fact, the War Office did have a "policy" 
against bringing Jamaican drivers to Britain, a secret 
"carelessly referred to" during a phone call between low-
level bureaucrats in September. 24 In March 1943, the War 
Office agreed to resume recruiting skilled West Indian 
tradesmen for the Middle East, but only for a few specific 
categories. 25 The army imposed the condition that 
recruitment was "subject to facilities being available for 
direct shipment to that area." In Colonial Office opinion, 
this condition meant that there would be no actual 
recruitment. 26 
As a compromise designed to placate West Indian 
23P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/18. Henderson, War Office, to 
MacMillan, Colonial Office, 17 September 1942. 
24 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/18. Minute by Mayle, 26 
September 1942. 
25P.R.O. c.o. 968/74/17. Colonial Office to War 
Office, 10 March 1943. 
26P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/17. Minute by Mayle, 5 March 
1943. 
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aspirations, the Colonial Office informally encouraged West 
Indian enlistment into the Canadian military. In May 1942, 
about one hundred Black West Indians served with the 
Canadian forces in Britain. 27 Always seeking a more direct 
outlet for West Indian desires to serve in the British war 
effort, the Colonial Off ice did not formalize the Canadian 
scheme because it feared that the War Office might have 
seized upon the idea as the logical and sole outlet for West 
Indian military aspirations. 28 
The color bar to the Auxiliary Territorial Army 
(A.T.S.), the army's branch for women, outlived that for the 
rest of the military by several years. The War Office 
wanted to recruit White West Indian women to serve as 
clerks, drivers, and mechanics in Britain and at its offices 
in America and the Caribbean, but it resisted the enlistment 
of Black West Indian women for the A.T.S. In 1943, after 
mistakenly accepting a Black Bermudian, a compromised War 
Off ice reluctantly agreed to accept Black West Indian women 
along with Whites, with the notable exception of service in 
Washington, D.C. By the end of the war, over half of the 
27 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians serving with 
the Forces in the United Kingdom, 27 May 1942. 
28 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/15. Enlistment of West Indians 
in the Canadian Forces. 
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six hundred West Indian A.T.S. recruits were Black. 29 
Black servicemen made their most celebrated and 
numerous contribution serving with the R.A.F. However, for 
the first year of the war, the Air Ministry resisted 
accepting Blacks. Until June 1940, the R.A.F. rejected 
Black applicants as being unnecessary and possibly 
disruptive for the service. 30 The Air Ministry had been 
unwilling to integrate Blacks into aircrews because "the 
team of an aircraft crew is so small and there has to be 
such a high degree of mutual confidence between them that 
they have never liked to take the risk of putting a coloured 
man in among the crew. " 31 The fall of France in June 1940 
and the Battle of Britain (August-October) convinced the Air 
Ministry to extend the recruitment of aircrew to the 
colonies but it quickly reversed itself. In April 1941, the 
Air Ministry informed the Colonial Off ice that, for existing 
training vacancies to provide maximum output, the R.A.F. had 
to reduce the number of Black entrants in favor of Whites: 
"On the experience gained ... [with Indians] it is clear that 
29P.R.O. C.O. 968/81/4. Stanley, Colonial Secretary 
to Grigg, War Secretary, 15 April and War Office to 
Caribbean Commanders, 21 April, and Grigg to Stanley, 19 May 
1943. See also, Bousquet and Douglas. 
30Lambo, 150-1. 
31 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1729/40. Colonial Office Minute 
by Poynton, 2 July 1940. 
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non-Europeans require about half as long again to complete 
their training as the normal British entrant." 32 Aghast, 
the Colonial Office persuaded the Air Ministry to reconsider 
this discrimination on political grounds. 33 
R.A.F. authorities in the colonies had difficulty in 
finding physically and educationally qualified candidates 
for aircrew training. Only four out of the fifty-eight Gold 
Coast applications made during the first two and a half 
months of the overseas recruitment program passed the 
medical exam. 34 As of July 1942, Gambia had produced no 
aircrewmen; Sierra Leone, five; the Gold Coast, two; and 
Nigeria, six. 35 In Nigeria, rumors circulated that Africans 
were being rejected by authorities on the grounds that they 
all possessed malarial parasites. 36 Political pressures 
caused some colonial governments to recruit personnel 
specifically precluded by the Air Ministry. For example, in 
32 P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/19. Air Ministry to Colonial 
Office, 4 April 1941. 
33P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/19. Bigg, Colonial Office, 
to Shone, Air Ministry, 31 May 1941. 
34 P.R.O. c.o. 323/1828/38. Gold Coast to Colonial 
Secretary, 23 July 1941. 
35 P.R.O. C.O. 968/55/8. Minute by Bigg, 24 July 
1942. 
36P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/28. Minute by Bigg, 12 
December 1941; See Also, West African Pilot, 18, 24 
September, and 14 October 1941. 
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1941, the Duke of Windsor, Governor of the Bahamas, 
enthusiastically recruited ground crew although the Air 
Ministry sought only aircrew. The governor reported that it 
would "be very desirable on political grounds if they could 
be accepted ... " 37 
By the end of the war, over four hundred of the "most 
carefully selected" Black colonial aircrew flew with R.A.F. 
squadrons based in Britain. In general, they "settled down 
well" in the service. 38 In May 1944, the Air Ministry ended 
the overseas recruitment of aircrew on the grounds that it 
no longer needed them. Exceptions were made for Black West 
Indians already accepted for training and for British 
subjects in foreign countries. 39 In addition to aircrew, 
from 1943, the R.A.F. also recruited and transported to 
Britain about 5,500 Black West Indians for ground-crew 
duties. They served as armorers and maintenance technicians 
for aircraft and base facilities. 
The number of Black servicemen and women in the U.K.-
based forces is unknown, but assuming that the visibly Black 
37P.R.O. C.O. 323/1828/34. Windsor to Secretary of 
State for Colonies, 13 June 1941. 
38 P.R.O. AIR. 20/1022. Manpower Contribution of the 
Colonies to the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945. 
39P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Air Ministry to Colonial 
Office, 6 May 1944. 
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population in Britain numbered between fifteen and twenty 
thousand, perhaps fifteen hundred to two thousand --
representing ten percent of Black people in Britain -- so 
served during the war. In May 1942, the British forces also 
included over one thousand West Indians, of whom the R.A.F. 
accounted for about half. Meanwhile, West Indians served in 
about forty different corps of the army, but only a few had 
enlisted in the navy. 40 By the end of the war, 
approximately eight to ten thousand Black colonial subjects 
traveled to Britain at their own expense or under the 
sponsorship of the services, especially the R.A.F., in order 
to enlist. 41 
III. Black Over White: Black Officers 
Once again, British authorities confronted the question 
of commissioning Blacks as officers. The racial purity of 
an O.T.C. kilt became an issue again in July 1940 when a 
Jamaican student, R.A. Peat, attempted to enroll in the 
O.T.C. of Aberdeen University. The commander of the 
contingent rejected Peat's application on the grounds of 
40P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians serving with 
the Forces in the United Kingdom, 27 May 1942. 
41 P.R.O. C.O. 968/74/14. West Indians on Service. 
Totals registered with the West India Committee at the end 
of September 1944 and 1945, enclosed in West India Committee 
to Colonial Office, 22 October 1945. In September 1944, 
4,421 West Indians had registered with the Committee; in 
September 1945, the total was 8,054. 
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color. The student angrily appealed and the matter was 
referred to the Colonial Office. He wrote that, "I can only 
be a Private ... whereas White 'worms' who have neither my 
education nor refinement, are readily accepted as Officers 
merely because of a difference in pigmentation ... " 42 The 
War Office attempted to evade the issue by arguing that 
O.T.C.s technically did not form part of the armed forces of 
the Crown, and, consequently, did not fall under the order 
suspending the color bar in 1939. Moreover, the War 
Secretary, James Grigg, reminded the Colonial Office that 
Aberdeen's contingent wore the kilt, and the officer who 
refused Peat's application "no doubt had in mind the 
probability that a Scotsman's susceptibilities might be hurt 
by the sight of a gentleman of distinctly non-Scottish 
appearance wearing the kilt." 43 Nevertheless, the War 
Office relented on O.T.C.s and, subject to Colonial Office 
assurances that they would receive commissions in their own 
local forces, Black colonial students became eligible to 
enroll. 44 Questions about this discriminatory policy at 
42P.R.O. c.o. 820/45/22. Peat to Colonial Office, 8 
August 1940. 
43P.R.O. C.O. 820/45/11. Grigg to Hall, 20 
September 1940. 
44 P.R.O. C.O. 820/45/11. Peat to Strathdee, 6 
August 1940; War Office to all Universities furnishing 
Contingents of the Senior Training Corps, 14 December 1940; 
and P.R.O. C.O. 820/49/12. Colonial Secretary to Gold 
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universities continued into 1941. 45 
After the 1939 Cabinet decision, Black Britons and 
colonials became eligible for promotions and commissioning 
on an equal footing with Whites. According to Allan C. 
Wilmot, a Black sailor on a naval minesweeper in 1942 and 
1943 and later an R.A.F. sea rescuer, there was an 
unwillingness among the services to promote Blacks to 
positions of authority over Whites. 46 This may have been 
the case in Wilmot's unit and others, but, overall, the 
evidence indicates that, for the wartime emergency, the 
services granted Blacks opportunities for considerable 
advancement and responsibility. Even the Royal Navy 
commissioned at least one Black West Indian officer during 
the conflict. 47 
With the assistance of the Colonial Office, Arundel 
"Joe" Moody received his commission by early 1940, 48 thus 
setting a precedent for other "openly Black" officers. 
Coast, 19 June 1941. 
45P.R.O. C.O. 829/49/12. Enlistment of Coloured 
Students in the O.T.C., 1941. 
46Allan C. Wilmot to author, 2 9 June 1995. 
47 P.R.O. c.o. 968/38/10. Minute by Thomas, 15 
December 1942. 
48Moody was the son of noted West Indian physician 
and political activist, Harold Moody. 
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Prior to the announcement of the color bar's suspension, 
Moody, who possessed a public school education and O.T.C. 
experience, applied for officer training with one of the 
Guards regiments. At first, the interview board attempted 
to dissuade him by explaining the high expenses incurred in 
the social life of the regiment. After Moody assured the 
board that his father would support him financially, the 
officers presented an Attestation Form stipulating that only 
British subjects "of pure European descent" were eligible 
for commissions and advised him to enlist in the ranks and 
hope for a commission. Moody's father then appealed 
directly to the Colonial Office. Soon after, the government 
announced the color bar's suspension, and Moody tried again. 
The Colonial Off ice regarded Moody as a test case for the 
government's new policy and sent an official, Colonel Cole, 
to accompany Moody through his entire enlistment process, 
including physical examinations. 49 In Moody's case, the War 
Office waived the recently imposed requirement that all 
aspirants for commissions serve in the ranks before applying 
for a commission. 50 He joined an Officer Cadet Training 
49Moody. A Colonial Official had minuted that 
Arundel Moody had answered an advertisement to the Royal 
Tank Regiment. P.R.O. C.O. 323/1673/6. Minute of 26 
September 1939. 
50P.R.O. C.O. 323/1692/7212/4. Note on Dr. Moody's 
Memorandum Calling for the Permanent Removal of the Colour 
Bar, November 1939. 
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Unit (O.C.T.U.) in December and received a commission in the 
Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment. 
At the regimental depot, Moody's superiors warned him 
that, while he was a first-class soldier, there would be 
"dead silence" the first time he entered the regimental 
officers' mess, but that he should not worry about it. The 
advice proved correct. Moody fitted in well with his White 
colleagues and did not experience any racism on the part of 
British personnel. The one possible exception occurred when 
he attempted to transfer to the commandos, a request his 
commanding officer refused on the grounds that the Black 
officer would be required to infiltrate enemy lines, but 
would stand out. The government's interest in Moody 
continued throughout the war. A few years after 
commissioning, a superior informed him that, according to 
his file, the War Off ice would not allow Moody to be demoted 
except in the case of a very serious violation of military 
regulations. Presumably, this was a guard against potential 
charges of institutional racism. 51 
Another notable Black officer, Surrey-born Jimmy 
Clarke, received his lieutenancy in March 1942, and 
captaincy in October. In 1943, at the age of twenty three, 
51Moody. 
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he achieved the rank of major in a battalion of the Royal 
Irish Fusiliers (R.I.F.). Also, he earned a Military Cross 
and Bar for gallantry in Tunisia and Italy, and became, 
according to a regimental historian who does not mention 
Clarke's "descent," a legend in the regiment. 52 According 
to Joe Moody, who had heard rumors of a Black officer 
serving with an Irish regiment in Italy, there was some 
embarrassment about Clarke's attainment of such high rank 
and responsibility in a White unit. 53 Another Black 
officer, Sergeant Cyril C. Alcindor, had been a pre-war 
regular soldier, and received a commission in 1944 and 
attained a captaincy in 1946. 54 Though not a commissioned 
officer, Sergeant Major Benjamin MacCrae commanded a platoon 
in the Royal Norfolks and received the Military Medal for 
skill and initiative at leading fighting patrols and killing 
Japanese soldiers in Burma. 55 
Britain's colonies in West Africa provided several 
52Amanda Moreno, Royal Irish Fusiliers Regimental 
Museum, to author, 13 August 1996; Officeial Record of 
Major Clarke's action of 1/2 December, quoted in Letter 
(League of Coloured Peoples Newsletter ) 10, 56 (May 1944): 
31. See also, John Horsfall, Fling our Banner to the Wind 
(Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1978), 10. 
53Moody. 
54Jeff Green to author, 17 February 1996. 
55Macrae, Interview, 1993, tape recording, Reel 2, 
Department of Sound Recordings, Imperial War Museum, London. 
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officers to the British army as part of the program of 
"Africanization." The first, Seth K. Anthony had been a 
teacher at Achimota College near Accra. In 1939, he spotted 
the announcement of the Local Forces Ordinance which 
established, for the first time, officer cadetships for 
Africans in the 5/Gold Coast Regiment, a territorial 
battalion. War came before Anthony had been in the program 
for more than a few months, and he had to join the 5/G.C.R. 
on a full-time basis, quickly earning promotion to sergeant. 
In May or June 1941, General Sir George Giffard, British 
commander in West Africa, summoned Anthony for a brief 
interview and informed him that he was going to be sent to 
Britain for officer training. On 2 April 1942, Anthony 
received a King's emergency commission, thus becoming the 
first African officer commissioned for the R.W.A.F.F. In 
general, his White colleagues treated him well. However, in 
Burma, a British N.C.O. once refused to serve under Anthony, 
but submitted after having been threatened with disciplinary 
action by higher authority. Ironically, after a time, this 
N.C.O. did not wish to be transferred away from Anthony. 56 
The second African R.W.A.F.F. officer, Tom Impraim, 
recalled that White officers in Africa were polite, but 
56Anthony to author, 11 February 1997; and P.R.O. 
C.O. 820/48/18. Commanding Officer, No. 17 Infantry 
Training Centre, to Major J.C. Preston, 18 May 1942. 
238 
there were few who would deal with him on equal and honest 
terms. 57 Before the end of the wartime emergency in 1948, 
several more West Africans received commissions. Higher 
military authority concluded that properly selected and 
trained African officers "have held and are holding 
commissions with full powers of command and punishment over 
British troops with success." 58 
Certainly, more Blacks received army commissions or 
otherwise held positions of authority, but they possibly 
passed for "White," or have simply gone unnoticed so far. 
The R.A.F. probably commissioned more Blacks than the army 
simply because it was the most glamorous of the services, no 
doubt in part because of the publicity surrounding the 
Battle of Britain. No matter what their skin pigmentation, 
many young men throughout the empire wanted to fly and the 
R.A.F. wanted qualified individuals, no matter their color. 
Of the four hundred Black colonial aircrew recruited during 
the war, at least seventy gained officer commissions. Most 
Black aircrew, either officers or highly qualified N.C.O.s, 
served successfully with White colleagues, but, in 1944, the 
57 T.K. Impraim to David Killingray, Answers to 
Questionnaire, 22 December 1980, Killingray Collection, 
Rhodes House Library, Oxford. 
58 P.R.O. W.O. 32/15483. Grant of Commissions to 
Africans, by Nicholson, 26 August 1948. 
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Colonial Off ice reported the case of a Black pilot who 
complained that "some of his brother pilots said quite 
openly that they refused to sleep alongside a -coloured 
man." 59 With Flight Sergeant Sylvestre, a bomber pilot, the 
R.A.F. faced the question as to whether Black pilots could 
or should be placed in the command of large aircraft. In 
early 1944, dissension occurred among Sylvestre's White crew 
on account of color and Sylvestre had previously earned a 
reputation for being racially "super sensitive." 
Unfortunately, Sylvestre's commanding officer took his 
example as proof that Blacks could not make effective 
Captains of Aircraft on the grounds that they could not 
inspire the complete trust and confidence of their White 
crew members. 60 Superiors removed Sylvestre from the 
resistant crew and placed him in command of another. It 
appears that this case was an exception as most Black 
aircrew flew, lived, and sometimes died alongside Whites 
free of racial antagonism. 
IV. Black Experiences in the British forces 
As in the case of officers (and R.A.F. aircrew), 
evidence suggests that most individual Black other ranks 
59P.R.O. c.o. 537/1223. Minute by Hutchinson, 16 
March 1944. 
60P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Headquarters, No. 3 Group, 
R.A.F., to A.J. Capel, Bomber Command, 17 May 1944. 
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encountered relatively little racial animosity during this 
period. Alfie Lawes had superb relations with other Welsh 
soldiers, officers, and even with his German prison guards. 
Ramsay Bader, a gunner in the Essex Yeomanry, found a 
friendly attitude among most people in uniform but, in one 
instance, suffered at the hands of a regular soldier with 
Indian experience. Notably, Benjamin Macrae felt that the 
harassment and bullying he initially experienced had been a 
normal aspect of army life and reacted accordingly. 61 
For most White soldiers, Black comrades were a 
curiosity, a point emphasized in 1962 by a Ministry of 
Defence official: 
the ordinary British soldier (at least in the war) 
was able to assimilate the odd one or two coloured 
man [sic] very happily (indeed, they tended to 
make "pets" of them, a fate which the people in 
question accepted graciously, though goodness 
knows what they really felt about it!) . 62 
Perhaps being even more of a curiosity, Black service women 
suffered little or no racism from other military personnel. 
Black females, if anything, were considered to be more of a 
attractive novelty than a threat to White-dominated 
61 This generalization is based on the accounts given 
by the Black service personnel on file at the Imperial War 
Museums as well as interviews conducted by the author. 
62 P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1043. Minute by W.B. Wilton, 2 
January 1962. 
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forces. 63 Overall, it appears that the diluted nature of 
the services during war-time aided in making their White 
members more hospitable to individual Blacks than they had 
been in the small regular forces. 
Nominally equal conditions of service did not extend to 
the posting of Black service personnel who could not be sent 
anywhere that their presence might prove embarrassing for 
allied or colonial race relations. For example, the R.A.F. 
trained most of its aircrew overseas in the dominions but, 
because of racial feeling in those places, Black colonial 
personnel had to be brought directly to Britain for their 
training. However, in 1942, the Royal Canadian Air Force 
agreed to accept Black R.A.F. candidates for training. 64 
Blacks entered the British forces under the same 
conditions as Whites and, therefore, their presence in 
colonial settings raised questions about traditional racial 
subordination. In 1942, Black R.A.F. men in the Middle East 
encountered "a distinct colour bar particularly amongst 
63Bousquet and Douglas mention no instances of 
animosity against Black A.T.S. or Women's Auxilliary Air 
Fore personnel. Norma Best, of British Honduras, and Lilian 
Bader, of Yorkshire, told the author that Black servicewomen 
were, in fact, quite popular. 
64 P.R.O. C.O. 968/55/14. Colonial Office to 
Caribbean Colonies, 7 November 1942, and Governor Sir A. 
Gimble to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November 
1942. 
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White colonial personnel." They complained about the 
discriminatory treatment they received in "cinemas, 
restaurants, and other public places in towns in Egypt and 
other countries ... " In response, the Air Ministry decided to 
withdraw Black R.A.F personnel to Britain, including V.A. 
Bunting, a fighter pilot. 65 Inexplicably, in early 1943, 
five West African airmen were posted to West Africa, which 
resulted in the "most unhappy results" regarding 
transportation and holding facilities. Subsequently, the 
Air Ministry withdrew them and undertook not to send any 
more Black personnel to West Africa. 66 For similar reasons, 
thirty four Black West Indian aircrew training in Canada had 
to be informed that they could not be sent to their 
squadrons in Southeast Asia because of color restrictions. 67 
Curiously, Roland Alcindor, brother of Charles, an army 
officer, flew with the R.A.F. as a Warrant Officer in 
India. 68 Either Alcindor passed for White or he slipped 
65P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Air Ministry Minute, "Posting 
of Coloured Personnel," 1 September 1942. 
66P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. 
Africa, to Secretary of State 
and reply, 12 March 1943. 
Resident Minister, West 
for the Colonies, 1 March 1943 
67P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. United Kingdom Air Liaison 
Mission, Ottawa, to Air Ministry, 9 June 1945. 
68Green. A Warrant Officer was an intermediate rank 
between commissioned and non-commissioned officer and 
denoted a special qualification. 
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through the cracks in the racial barrier. 
As was the case with the R.A.F., the army dealt with 
the overseas assignment of its Black personnel 
inconsistently. Early in the war, Alfie Lawes volunteered 
for service with a battalion of The Welch Regiment stationed 
in India but was rejected because of racial considerations. 
However, "race" did not prevent another Black Briton, 
Benjamin Macrae, from serving as a senior N.C.O. and platoon 
commander with the Royal Norfolk Regiment in Burma. 69 The 
example of Joe Moody's voyage to the Middle East illustrates 
the extent of racial hyper-sensitivity on the part of 
dominion and colonial Whites. In 1942, the army sent Moody 
to East Africa to train African troops in anti-aircraft 
tactics. En route, his ship stopped over in Capetown but 
the South African authorities forbade him to land. Moody's 
fellow passengers, mostly White British officers, "raised 
hell." The South Africans subsequently presented Moody with 
a certificate asking that full courtesy be extended to this 
British officer. Once ashore, Moody's circle of friends 
took the precaution of sending a White colleague ahead to 
restaurants and bars to gauge the likely reaction to a 
"coloured" officer. Consequently, Moody's stay, which 
69 Lawes, Interview by author, May 1996; Macrae, 
Interview. 
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lasted several weeks, passed without serious incident. 
In East Africa, local authorities proved to be even 
less receptive to Moody than those in South Africa. The 
White officers with whom Moody had arrived quickly received 
postings but Moody remained at a depot, presumably isolated 
as far as possible from Kenya's racially stratified society. 
Nothing publicly happened to Moody, but he found himself 
assigned to the French island of Madagascar. There, he got 
on well with the White British officers and African other 
ranks. The army then posted Moody to the Royal Artillery 
Depot in Cairo, Egypt. Before being assigned to a 
particular battery, his superior officers discussed who 
would take the Black officer. Once accepted, Moody 
experienced no outward signs of friction, but was told 
afterwards that there had been problems because the unit 
included a large proportion of bigoted Liverpudlians. In a 
demonstration of the "strange bedfellows" cliche, Moody 
befriended several South African officers in the Middle 
East, one of whom admitted that they could never be friends 
in South Africa. Incredibly, Moody accepted an invitation 
to the South African officers' mess in Cairo. 70 
After the United States entered the war, Britain and 
its service personnel became involved in the "domestic" 
70Moody. 
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racial conflicts of their American allies. During Operation 
Bolero, the American build up in Britain, violence 
frequently occurred between European- and African-American 
soldiers, especially in villages and towns where Black 
soldiers competed openly for friends, women, pubs and 
cinemas. 71 
In order to foster good relations with its American 
Allies as well as protect its own colonial service personnel 
from precisely those same Allies, the British government 
generally acquiesced to American segregation policies. In 
Britain, U.S. and British military officials often divided 
the recreational facilities in a given town between their 
respective personnel. 72 Also, certain postings became "off-
limits" to Black British servicemen in deference to White 
American racism. Thus, Black R.A.F. personnel could serve 
in Bomber, Fighter and Coastal Commands based in Britain, 
but R.A.F. Transport Command requested that it not be 
assigned Black personnel because of its close contact with 
1 73 U.S. personne . American sensibilities similarly affected 
71 See Graham A. Smith, When Jim Crow met John Bull: 
Black American Soldiers in World War II Britain (London: 
I.B. Tauris & Co., 1987). 
72Baron Baker's account, in Forty Winters On: 
Memories of Britain's Post-War Caribbean Immigrants 
(Lambeth: Lambeth Council, 1988), 17. 
73P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Transport Command to Air 
Ministry, 18 December 1943. 
246 
British overseas assignments. For example, in July 1943, 
Flying Officer R.C.F. Foresythe, an R.A.F. code and cipher 
expert, was transferred from North Africa to Britain because 
of U.S. racial prejudice toward him. 74 The War Office 
similarly refused to allow Black West Indian A.T.S. to serve 
at its military mission in Washington, D.C. 75 
Black and White members of the "integrated" British 
forces often found themselves victims of American inter-
racial conflict. At a "Jim Crow" indoctrination lecture for 
British military personnel, an American lecturer, according 
to a British observer, "made no bones about the fact that 
not to conform with the American view of race was to be the 
victim of actual physical violence." 76 In a typical 
occurrence White American soldiers threw "a coloured member 
of the R.A.F." out of a pub. On the following night, the 
victim returned there with White comrades and "beat up the 
Americans. " 77 Cy Grant, later a performer on the British 
74 P.R.O. AIR. 2/8269. Headquarters, Northwest 
African Air Forces to Air Ministry, 28 July 1943. 
75P.R.O. C.O. 968/81/4. Stanley to Grigg, 15 April 
and War Office to Caribbean Commanders, 21 April and Grigg 
to Stanley, 19 May 1943. 
76Roe Ottley, "Dixie Invades Britain," Negro Digest 
3 (November 1944): 6. 
77 P.R.O. C.O. 537/1223. Minute by Poynton, 17 March 
1994. 
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stage and screen, arrived in Britain from British Guiana in 
1941 and became a navigator in R.A.F. 's Bomber Command. In 
Britain, he experienced no racism but, when a prisoner of 
war in Germany, Britons and Nazis alike treated him with the 
respect appropriate to his rank. However, an American 
P.O.W. called him a "nigger." In Piccadilly Circus, an 
American serviceman confronted Flying Officer Johnny Smythe 
of Sierra Leone with the same racial slur as well as some 
physical jostling. The accosted R.A.F. officer, who had 
been speaking with a White female, laid the offender out 
cold. After a brief investigation, Smythe's commanding 
officer unofficially congratulated his six foot six-inch-
tall subordinate. 78 In July 1944, an American court-martial 
tried and convicted an American soldier of striking yet 
another Black R.A.F. officer at a dance. The victim 
received an apology from a U.S. general while the offender 
was sentenced to two years of hard labor and a dishonorable 
discharge. 79 Beyond being onlookers or victims, Black 
R.A.F. personnel at times acted as protectors of African-
American servicemen who sometimes felt reluctant to fight 
back against White American military police. 80 
78Cy Grant, Interview by author, 16 June 1995; 
Johnny Smythe, Interview by author, 4 June 1995. 
79News-Letter 10, 60 (September 1944): 97. 
80Allan C. Wilmot to author, 29 June 1995. 
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Echoes of America's segregation policies existed in the 
nominally desegregated British forces. In November 1942, in 
order to prevent Black colonial servicemen from being 
demobilized in the United Kingdom after the war, the War 
Cabinet had recommended that the forces concentrate these 
men "in separate units," restrict their service to theatres 
of war overseas, and repatriate them in complete units. 81 
The tangible impact of this statement is difficult to 
measure but, at least, it indicates the general frame of 
mind of the British government. 
In fact, informal types of segregation actually took 
place. Many of Britain's Black army and R.A.F. personnel 
served together in small groups of a few numbering from two 
or three to several dozens within predominately White 
support units where they endured the boredom and anxiousness 
of rear area routine. In units with significant numbers of 
colonial Blacks, Black and White members commonly separated 
themselves as much as possible. The tendency for 
individuals to cling together intensified as a result of low 
morale, itself caused by the boring routine of military 
life. For example, at an army base at Clitheroe, 
Lancashire, a number of West Indian soldiers complained 
81 P.R.O. AIR. 20/9051. Extract from War Cabinet 
Paper W.P. (42)498, 16 November 1942. 
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about the slowness in assignment to army workshops, a lack 
of promotion, the cold weather, lower family allowances, the 
slowness of the mail, and, ironically, of being unwillingly 
inducted into the army. 82 Many expressed their resentment 
at the cold climate and military discipline by disobedience 
and assaults on N.C.O.s. According A.J. Lane, a White 
soldier, officers and N.C.O.s became reluctant "to have 
anything to do with the wild men of the West Indies ... " 
Lane forestalled deadly violence by secretly destroying a 
cache of ammunition hidden by several disgruntled West 
Indians. 83 
In Egypt and Palestine, Black army personnel faced 
problems similar to those in Britain. In early 1944, a 
group of Jamaican soldiers at No. 2 Electrical Base Workshop 
in Egypt charged (a) that they were segregated from U.K. 
soldiers; (b) that the men received no opportunity to take 
trade tests which would earn them promotion and pay 
increases; (c) that their letters were tampered with by 
censors; and (d) that they had received no encouragement in 
sports or congratulations when a West Indian team had won a 
82P.R.O. C.O. 968/37/10. Harold Moody to Lord 
Moyne, 22 November 1941. 
83A. J. Lane, "What more could a soldier ask of a 
war," TMs., n.d., Imperial War Museum, London. 
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cricket competition. 84 British commanders on the spot 
discounted (b) and (c) and discovered that the segregation 
of facilities had been introduced voluntarily when the West 
Indians first joined the unit in November 1942, but had 
since lapsed. The authorities regretted non-recognition of 
the cricket victory, but, overall, the investigators 
concluded that, "there are no reasonable grounds for any of 
the allegations of discrimination which have been made." 85 
The R.A.F., although only about one-third the strength 
of the army, included most of the services' total Black 
colonial personnel. Relatively good relations existed 
between West Indian and British ground crew during most of 
the war. However, by the last year, the racial situation 
within the R.A.F. worsened. Following VE-Day, violent 
clashes became frequent as all servicemen waited anxiously 
for demobilization. 86 The Air Ministry blamed the 
background of West Indians for these difficulties. It cited 
a correlation between poor upbringing, intelligence, 
84 P.R.O. C.O. 820/58/9. Leonard Lyle, M.P., to 
Oliver Stanley, 12 January 1944. 
85P.R.O. C.0. 830/58/9. Memorandum, "Treatment of 
West Indians," by Lt.-Col. Whitbread, for Commander-in-
Chief, Middle East Forces, enclosed in War Office to 
Thornley, 5 May 1944. 
86The correspondence in P.R.O. AIR. 20/9051 details 
the breakdown in West Indian moral and discipline after the 
end of the war. 
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education and adaptability on the one hand with racial 
friction on the other. 87 R.A.F. authorities reported that a 
significant proportion of the later drafts of West Indians, 
were not amenable to discipline and were inclined 
to take the law into their own hands. The 
mentality of some of these was so low, their 
unreliability so pronounced that they could only 
be used for menial tasks and the effort of 
administering them was not repaid by the output of 
work. They resented being given orders by N.C.O.s 
and spoiled the reputation of the West Indian 
Contingent as a whole by their outbreaks of 
violence ... 88 
Also, West Indian R.A.F. men complained directly to the 
British government about racial discrimination instead of 
seeking out their officers. 89 This would suggest that the 
airmen did not feel confident of their officers' concern, a 
most dangerous situation in and of itself. 
It should be noted that the experiences of groups of 
Black servicemen contrasted sharply with those of Black 
individuals, whether officers or other ranks. Once White 
and Black personnel within a given rear area unit became 
separated as visibly and culturally different groups, 
friction and segregation in some form commonly developed. 
87 P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437. "Recruitment of Personnel 
from Colonies into post-war Air Force," 21 May 1945. 
88 P.R.O. AIR. 20/1022. "Manpower Contribution of 
the Colonies to the Royal Air Force, 1939-1945." 
89P.R.O. C.O. 537/1223. "Welfare of H.M. Colonial 
Forces in U.K.: Appointment of Liaison Officer, R.A.F." 
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Thus, with the exception of individual Black personnel, a 
situation emerged that resembled that of the U.S. military. 
Despite its traditional racial anxiety over Black 
servicemen's contact with White settings, it does not seem 
that the British government ever prohibited socializing 
between its Black personnel and civilians. Throughout the 
war, the British people welcomed colonial personnel into 
their villages and homes. The behavior of a group of West 
Indian R.A.F. ground crew training at a nearby base so 
impressed the Yorkshire village of Hunmanby Moor that its 
inhabitants signed a petition praising the behavior of Black 
West Indian airmen. 90 E.M. Noble's description of an 
English village he encountered as a member of the R.A.F. 
reveals the ignorance of many British people: 
On my walk almost everyone gave me a greeting, and 
some, more bold than others, even stopped for a 
chat. They wanted to know what part of the world 
I was from, and marveled at the fact that I spoke 
English perfectly, and without any trace of a 
foreign accent. The high spot of my afternoon's 
walk for me was a darling old couple, who humbly 
begged to be allowed to shake my hand for luck. 
Until then I thought that sort of superstition was 
confined to uneducated colonials. 91 
When it came to wartime inter-racial romance, families 
expressed surprise and White British personnel, occasional 
90Noble, 42. 
91 Ibid., 41. 
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jealousy, but, in general, Black servicemen associated 
freely with, and, not infrequently, married, White British 
women. 92 In a rare exception, British authorities 
apparently attempted to assuage American sensibilities by 
discouraging, though not prohibiting, White service women 
from associating with African-American personnel. 93 This 
attitude may have influenced race relations within the 
British forces. Baron Baker, a Jamaican R.A.F. policeman, 
remembered an aloofness on the part of W.A.A.F. personnel at 
service dances: "When we tried to get dances all the 
W.A.A.F.s would want to rest. But when an English airman 
approached, they would take the floor with them[sic] ." 
Baker's commanding officer then instructed that W.A.A.F.s 
not wishing to dance should avoid attending dances. 94 It 
might have been that these particular W.A.A.F.s simply did 
not wish to dance with Black servicemen. In any case, 
formal restrictions on inter-racial contact would have been 
inoperable. With regard to Black personnel, War Office 
bureaucrats and generals had more pressing concerns than 
enforcing sexual color bars. 
92Grant, Interview; Noble, 46-9; and Wilmot. 
93 Smith, 64-80. 
94 Forty Winters On, 17. 
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The decolonization of Britain's Black empire had begun 
in the inter-war period with constitutional concessions to 
India, but the Second World War hastened the transition in 
colonial relations. In the process of transferring 
political power, the British government hoped to maintain 
close relations with current and former subjects. One of 
the consequences of this priority was the suspension of the 
color bar in the British military. The temporary end of the 
color bar testified to Britain's anxiety to distance itself 
from its no longer fashionable or tenable racial policies. 
The ten thousand Black servicemen and -women made a 
significant contribution to the British military effort 
although many endured an unhappy existence within the 
forces. 
CHAPTER VIII 
OLD PATTERNS AND NEW REALITIES IN THE BRITISH FORCES 
For most of the Second World War, the leadership of all 
three branches of H.M. forces assumed or hoped that they 
would be allowed to re-impose the color bar once the war 
ended. In 1947, the British government decided that a 
formally restored color bar would weaken Britain's 
relationship with Black peoples of the empire and 
Commonwealth. Over the following five decades, the forces 
as well as Black British subjects struggled with the 
consequences of what would prove to be the government's 
rather indifferent policy. 
I. The Future of the Color Bar 
In April 1941, the League of Coloured Peoples informed 
the Colonial Secretary, Lord Mayne, that one of their 
members who was serving in the forces received a printed 
notice regarding re-enlistment for regular service after the 
end of hostilities. It stipulated that applicants had to be 
"of pure European parentage." 1 The War Office explained 
that, "these instructions embodied a pre-war practice which 
1 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/10. Extract from Letter, League 
of Coloured Peoples to Lord Mayne, 24 April 1941. 
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was due to the fact that a large part of the army served 
abroad, and that it was undesirable to have coloured men in 
the ranks of British units in Indian, Egypt, Singapore, and 
so on." 2 The War Office acceded to a Colonial Office 
request to revoke the restriction and adopt a non-committal 
stance with regard to post-war enlistment and commissions. 3 
However, in August 1943, when planning for the post-war 
army, the War Office summarily decided to re-impose the 
color bar to candidates for regular commissions. Oliver 
Stanley, the latest Colonial Secretary, asked that the War 
Office remove this stipulation because it flatly 
contradicted colonial policy and that Black officers had 
proven themselves worthy. Stanley wanted to have the 
question of the color bar re-examined, something with which 
the War Office concurred, but with far different 
intentions. 4 
In December, the War Office informed the Colonial 
Off ice that the good of the army required a color bar 
because of the prejudices on the part of White soldiers and 
2 P.R.O. C.O. 968/38/10. Speed, War Office, to 
Eastwood, Colonial Office, 12 July 1941. 
3P.R.O. c.o. 968/38/10. Speed, War Office, to 
Thornley, Colonial Office, 15 January 1942. 
4P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Memorandum, "Nationality and 
Descent of Candidates for Permanent Commissions in H.M. 
Forces," 28 November 1944. 
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officers alike. At the same time, the War Office 
established a committee to study the issue in case it became 
a matter of general government policy. 5 One of the factors 
on which the War Office hoped to base its opposition was 
physiology. However, a scientific report prepared by an 
army biologist for the War Office's "Nationality and Descent 
Committee" repudiated any idea that physical limitations 
impeded the efficiency of Black officers. The report stated 
that, "experience during the war has shown that every ethnic 
group can provide successful candidates for commissions ... " 
Apparently, the author of the report went beyond his 
original brief by analyzing the origin of British racial 
prejudice: 
The color bar which looms so large in certain 
human societies is mainly rooted in social and 
economic considerations ... It would seem that 
males of our own group dislike the thought of 
males displaying a constellation of 
characteristics markedly different from our own, 
mating with females of our own kind .... The 
attitude of our own people toward individuals of 
other ethnic groups and cultures is almost 
entirely if not completely an acquisition from 
their education. 6 
The committee's chairman, Major General J.F. Hare, decided 
5 P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Extract from the Minutes of 
the 190th Meeting of the Excecutive Committee of the Army 
Council held on 1 December 1944; and Draft Letter from War 
Secretary to Colonial Secretary (marked 56A), n.d. 
6P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. D.B.R. to Director of 
Organization, 7 February 1945. 
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that these sentiments would not be circulated. 7 
In its report, issued on 22 March 1945, the committee 
formally objected to the inclusion of Blacks on several 
grounds: 
(a) [The Committee] consider that although non-
Europeans may possess many of the necessary 
officer qualities, the crux of the matter is the 
question of racial and traditional background. It 
cannot be expected that such officers will be able 
to establish the relations with their men which 
are essential if leadership is to be fully 
exercised. They feel that man-management would 
never be satisfactory and in particular that the 
officer could never be capable of dealing with the 
family and domestic problems of his men. They 
are, therefore, unanimously opposed to the 
commissioning of men of non-European descent in 
U.K. forces. 
(b) The Committee also feel that the enlistment 
of non-Europeans in U.K. regiments and corps of 
the Regular Army is undesirable. The case is 
perhaps not quite so strong as it is against 
commissioning, but there are two good reasons. 
Firstly, there is evidence that in general the 
non-European is not acceptable as a companion and 
brother-in-arms to the British soldier. Secondly, 
it is considered that in the post-war Army it will 
be essential that no man entering the ranks should 
be regarded as ineligible for a commission as 
would be the case if our views at (a) are 
accepted. 
The committee's most startling conclusion was that, "to get 
the best results units must as far as possible be 
homogeneous ... it must surely be undesirable for British 
7P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Minutes of the Third Meeting 
of the Committee on the Post-War Regulations Respecting the 
Nationality and Descent of Candidates for Entry to the Army 
held 12 February 1945. 
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soldiers to be commanded by men of another race." 8 At that 
moment, thousands of British army officers served in the 
various colonial forces throughout the empire. 
In May 1945, the Air Ministry considered the "external" 
difficulties involved in accepting Blacks for regular 
enlistment. First, Black R.A.F. personnel could not be 
posted where they would encounter the color bars of the 
United States, Rhodesia, and South Africa. Secondly, 
difficulties would be created by Black R.A.F. personnel 
serving alongside Black colonial troops who were paid 
considerably less than British servicemen. 9 In September 
1945, George H. Hall, the new Labour government's Colonial 
Secretary, adhered to his Conservative predecessor's policy 
of ending the color bar and pressed the armed forces on the 
issue. In view of the successful service of Black aircrew 
during the war, the Air Ministry over-rode its own racial 
anxieties and broke with the other services, deciding that 
the color bar should not be re-imposed for regular 
commissions and enlistment. 10 In order to avoid 
8 P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. "Report of the Committee on 
the Post-War Regulations Respecting the Nationality and 
Descent of Candidates for Entry to the Army," 16 March 1945. 
9P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437. "Recruitment of Personnel 
from Colonies into post-war Air Force," 21 May 1945. 
10P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. Air Ministry to War Office, 
3 October 1945. 
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embarrassing the other ministers, the Secretary of State for 
Air, Lord Stansgate, undertook to enact the R.A.F.'s open 
policy "as unobtrusively as possible." 11 Unilaterally, the 
R.A.F. had decided to accept Blacks for regular enlistment 
and commissioning provided that they met the standards of 
Whites; that "they satisfy the Selection Board or recruiting 
officers that they are likely to mix with other entrants and 
hold their own in the corporate life of the Service;" and 
that they travel to Britain at their own expense to attempt 
their enlistment, in which success was not guaranteed. 12 
Hoping to effect similar changes in policy elsewhere, 
the Colonial Secretary circulated the R.A.F.'s new policy of 
inclusion around to the other ministries. The First Lord of 
the Admiralty, A.V. Alexander, recognized that there were 
"political and moral objections to the colour bar pure and 
simple," but he still wished to maintain it. Because of the 
probable shrinkage of the service, Alexander argued that, it 
was "essential that every man recruited to the Royal Navy is 
of the highest possible calibre, capable of being used in 
any ship or establishment ... in any part of the world, 
nP.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. Secretary of State for Air 
to First Lord of the Admiralty, 19 November 1945. 
12P.R.O. AIR. 2/13437. Air Ministry to Inspector of 
Recruiting, 21 February 1946. 
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whatever the climate and local racial prejudices may be." 13 
In the spring of 1946, J.J. Lawson, the War Secretary 
faced considerable pressure in Parliament regarding the 
color bar. Because the Colonial Secretary was determined to 
raise the matter in Cabinet, Lawson proposed to his formal 
body of advisors, the Army Council, that the color bar be 
terminated in principle and allow practical difficulties to 
impede Blacks from becoming officers. The Army Council 
unanimously balked at this compromise. 14 Lawson disagreed 
with the professional officers but, nevertheless, presented 
their views to the Cabinet as follows: 
To describe the exclusion of coloured persons from 
the British Army as an example of the colour bar 
is an undue simplification of the problem. 
Service in the British Army is not one of the 
rights of man, nor indeed of British subjects .... 
Moreover, it is the accepted policy of the Army 
Council that men should be commanded by officers 
having the same territorial connections as 
themselves with some part of the British Isles, 
e.g. that Scottish troops should be commanded by 
Scottish officers ... Distrust of coloured men as 
commanders may be a prejudice; but this prejudice 
is nonetheless a fact which cannot be ignored in 
assessing the fitness of the Army for its primary 
duty, which is waging war. 15 
13P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. Alexander to Hall, 18 
December 1945. 
14 P.R.O. W.O. 32/10592. Extract from the Minutes of 
the Sixty-Fourth Meeting of the Army Council held on 12 
April 1946. 
15P.R.O. W.O. 32/14692. Draft Cabinet Paper, 
"Admission of Coloured Persons into the Armed Forces of the 
United Kingdom," n.d. 
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Yet again, the army refused to recognize and exercise its 
control over the minds and bodies of its soldiers. 
In June 1947, over War Office and Admiralty objections, 
the Cabinet finally decided that, 
British subjects and British protected persons of 
non-European race should be admitted to the Royal 
Navy and the British Army, provided that they 
attained the requisite standards, were resident in 
this country, and could satisfy the selection 
authorities that they were likely mix with other 
entrants and hold their own in the corporate life 
of the services. 16 
The Cabinet's decision followed the Air Ministry's 
restrictive formula and embodied a minimum requirement to 
formally end the color bars of the reluctant forces. 
Shortly before the Cabinet's decision to end the color 
bar to regular enlistment, Lord Montgomery of Alamein, the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (the professional head 
of the army), informed his staff that the regular army was 
threatened by a dangerous lack of recruits. 17 Ironically, 
but perhaps predictably, the army followed as restrictive a 
recruiting policy as possible in order to perpetuate what it 
considered to be necessary, if informal, racial 
16Quoted in Killingray, "Race and Rank," 282. 
17P.R.O. W.O. 163/282. "The Final Post-War Army: 
Outline Statement of the Dangerous Situation that is likely 
to develop unless we get more regular recruits," by Lord 
Montgomery of Alamein, 30 May 1947. 
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discrimination. Adhering to the minimum requirements of the 
Cabinet's decision, the War Office required that a Black 
volunteer for the army must be a British subject or British 
protected person and be resident in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, a Black applicant had to "satisfy the selection 
authorities that he is likely to mix with other entrants and 
hold his own in the corporate life of the army." 18 In 
contrast, British subjects "of pure European descent" could 
enlist at any British military base in the world. 19 
The War Office's determination to retain an informal 
color bar thwarted Black individuals throughout the empire 
and commonwealth who wished for a career with the British 
army as a method of escape from the lands of their birth. 
For example, Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Indian (formerly 
"Eurasian") children of British fathers and local mothers 
looked to an uncertain future and they desired employment 
and a secure life in Britain. Similarly, many West Indians 
hoped to be allowed to enlist as an escape from chronic 
unemployment at home. Generally, neither of these groups 
could afford the luxury of a passage to Britain for a chance 
to gain admission, but the War Office repeatedly rejected 
18 P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. Memorandum for All Home 
Commands, 13 October 1947. 
19P.R.O. w.o. 32/12913. War Office Minute, 25 
November 1952. 
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appeals for a change in policy. 20 
A 1953 episode illustrates the army's determination to 
remain as White as possible. For administrative simplicity, 
responsibility for army recruiting of White subjects in 
Ceylon fell on the R.A.F. Several Anglo-Indians 
successfully enlisted in the army via the R.A.F. in Ceylon 
by claiming European ancestry. They were then sent on to 
army authorities in Singapore, who subsequently discharged 
them because "their retention in the army would establish a 
dangerous precedent."21 Obviously, these actions caused 
hardship for the individuals involved and created potential 
embarrassment for Britain. The War Office resolved the 
difficulty by transferring authority for army recruiting 
from the R.A.F. in Ceylon to the army headquarters in 
Singapore. The British government continued to receive 
large numbers of applications by Anglo-Indians for 
enlistment, but the War Office steadfastly reaffirmed its 
policy and told officials in India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to 
tell prospective Black recruits to travel on their own to 
Britain. 22 
20 See the correspondence dated from 1948 through the 
mid-1950s in P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. 
21P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. Minute of the Director of 
Manpower Planning, 16 July 1953. 
22 P.R.O. W.O. 32/12913. Director of Manpower 
Planning to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, 17 
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II. Gurkhas: Britain's Beloved Black Soldiers 
In contrast to its reluctance to accept individual 
Blacks, the army enthusiastically employed Gurkha 
mercenaries. After India and Pakistan achieved independence 
in 1947, both Britain and the new government of India 
retained the services of several Gurkha regiments. 
Britain's Brigade of Gurkhas served within the British 
army as an administratively segregated element and the 
Gurkhas' treatment has differed significantly from the rest 
of the army. While Gurkhas have been eligible for Queen's 
commissions since 1947, the army did not appoint a Gurkha as 
battalion commander until 1995. Until February 1997, they 
received less pay than other British soldiers and, under the 
treaty governing Britain's employment of Gurkhas, they 
received their army discharges and pensions in their 
homeland. Consequently, officers and N.C.O.s commonly 
discouraged soldiers from marrying British or Chinese women. 
Until 1997, the Gurkhas' primary mission had been to 
patrol Hong Kong's borders against illegal immigrants from 
mainland China, but the British army has used them in 
various roles around the world. For example, Britain 
employed Gurkhas extensively to kill communist guerrillas in 
Malaysia during the 1950s. A battalion has occasionally 
March 1954. 
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served in Belize to protect that country against Guatemalan 
imperialism and, for several decades, Britain has regularly 
leased one battalion to the Sultan of Brunei. Also, there 
has usually been at least one battalion stationed in 
Britain, where its members frequently perform ceremonial 
duties. A battalion recently served in Bosnia as part of 
the British peacekeeping force, but Gurkhas have never been 
deployed to Northern Ireland. In 1989, George Younger, 
Minister of Defence, reported to the Parliamentary Defence 
Committee that, "We do not exactly bar it, but we think they 
would not on the face of things be very suitable for 
[Northern Ireland] duty, particularly owing to the language 
difficulties." 23 In all likelihood, concerns about racial 
antagonism have figured into this policy, beyond the problem 
of language. In the past, individual Black soldiers in 
predominately White units have been "targets for special 
abuse" by Irish mobs. 24 Propagandists on both sides of the 
issue would probably protest the insertion of Gurkhas into 
their own tribal conflict. 25 
23House of Commons, The Government's Announcement on 
the Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas; Minutes of Evidence 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1989), 10. 
24Angus MacPherson, "The colour clash that shook the 
Army," Daily Mail, 21 November 1972. 
25 It was Gurkha soldiers who fired on the unarmed 
civilians in the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, an event still 
officially mourned in India. Ironically, the Republic of 
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In successive budget reductions since 1947, the number 
of Gurkha soldiers in British service has dwindled from 
fourteen to three thousand, but a considerable lobby within 
the government and army allowed them to continue, although 
on a modest scale, in British service. Historically, of all 
the "martial races" which had comprised the Indian army in 
the colonial period, the British military establishment and 
public generally felt the greatest warmth and literary 
interest for the Gurkhas recruited from Nepal. 26 In 1989, 
however, parliamentary supporters of the Gurkhas disclaimed 
sentimentality as their reason for maintaining the Brigade 
of Gurkhas. Instead, they cited a "dispassionate analysis 
of the future role of the British army." 27 Although 
practical arguments for maintaining the Brigade of Gurkhas 
possess some merit, had the British not historically 
romanticized the fighting abilities of the Gurkhas, they 
India currently employs at least fifty thousand Gurkha 
mercenaries, presumably because they are neutral and 
effective instruments. 
26See, N.S. Lawrence, "The Gurkha as I know him," 
Chambers's Journal 104 (Aug. 6, 1927): 574. For a typical 
"scholarly" tribute, see Farwell, The Gurkhas (New York: 
Norton, 1984). For an analysis of how British military 
historians treat the subject, see Lionel Caplan, "'Bravest 
of the Brave': Representations of 'The Gurkha' in British 
Military Writings," Modern Asian Studies 25, 3 (1991): 571-
597. 
27David Beneke, "Keep Gurkhas, say M.P.s," The 
Guardian, 3 March 1989, p. 2. 
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would have been disbanded decades ago. 
The Gurkhas' reputation as loyal and enthusiastic 
soldiers among Britons has been rivaled by accusations by 
critics that Gurkhas were "savages" and tools of a 
tyrannical New World Order. Rumors of cannibalism preceded 
a battalion that served in the 1982 Falklands-Malvinas war 
between Britain and Argentina. Argentines spread many 
blood-curdling stories about the Nepalese "savages," 
accusations the British did little to dispel. In New York 
City, Argentine sympathizers protested the deployment of 
Gurkha soldiers to the South Atlantic by greeting the 
wartime troopship Queen Elizabeth II with a sign stating the 
following: "Beware! In this ship are hiding 500 young 
Argentinian head[sic] decapitated bye its fomers[sic] 
passengers, the Gurkhas[sic] mercenaries." 28 More 
incredibly, Gurkhas have been implicated in a supposed plot 
to form a world dictatorship. A number of American 
conspiracy enthusiasts believe that a Windsor family-
controlled United Nations is conquering the United States by 
means of Gurkha troops in Black helicopters. 29 Such fears 
28 Farwell, The Gurkhas, photo and caption on page 
172. 
29Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "The British are coming, 
says the apple pie home guard," Electronic Telegraph, 1 May 
1995. 
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have probably been fueled by mainstream suggestions that 
Gurkhas be employed as professional peacekeepers in United 
Nations operations. 30 
III A Final End to the Color Bar? 
Gurkhas aside, by the end of the 1950's, the army 
experienced acute difficulties in maintaining the regular 
voluntary core of its mostly conscript army. The War 
Office's aversion to Black soldiers declined in proportion 
to the rise in manpower requirements. In 1947, the Cabinet 
had compelled the army and navy to accept a few Black 
applicants able to meet basic requirements, but nothing was 
intended by the decision to prevent the forces from adopting 
more open recruiting regulations in the future. In 1957 and 
1958, it considered the possibility of tapping Black 
manpower from the colonies and newly independent 
Commonwealth countries. By the early 1960s, in a complete 
reversal of policy, the army had begun actively recruiting 
overseas in the West Indies, Seychelles and Fiji. 31 In 
1968, 2,087 Blacks, excluding officers, were serving in the 
army. About 40 percent held non-commissioned rank, although 
30See, for example, Jennifer Griffin, "Homecoming 
Blues: Famed warriors lead difficult lives in Nepal after 
being discharged," Far Eastern Economic Review 157 (7 July 
1994) : 48-50. 
31 P.R.O. W.O. 32/194521. War Office Paper, 
"Recruitment of West Indians, 11 August 1961." 
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largely at the lower end of the rank scale, i.e., corporals 
and lance-corporals. 32 For the next twenty years, the 
forces maintained no official published statistics 
concerning Black service personnel. However, in 1967, the 
Times revealed that the army operated a 4 percent cap on 
Black soldiers in most of its units and a complete ban in 
"sensitive" assignments such as signals, intelligence and 
advanced weapons. 33 
Concerns about overseas posting continued into the era 
of decolonization. Throughout the 1950s, the army, "in 
order to protect the dignity and status of coloured 
personnel," prohibited Black soldiers from accompanying 
their units to Kenya. The army claimed that it did not wish 
to send them "where they might suffer possible discourtesy 
or embarrassment. " 34 The Admiralty came under public 
criticism in 1961 because it withdrew seven Black sailors 
from the aircraft carrier H.M.S. Victorious prior to an 
official visit to South Africa. Exceptions had been made 
for Black sailors with family in that country because they 
32E.J.B. Rose, Colour and Citizenship: A report on 
British Race Relations (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969), 306. 
33
"Army Quota," Times (London) 8 May 1967, p. 4. 
34 P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1040. P.D. Martyn to Montgomery, 
17 May 1960. 
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already understood the racial climate. 35 Meanwhile, the 
R.A.F avoided posting its Black personnel overseas, 
including South Africa, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Kenya, Norway, 
and "certain areas of the United States where colour 
difficulties might be experienced." The R.A.F. did not 
officially compile statistics on race but, in order to 
enforce its posting policy, maintained an informal list of 
known (or, the author supposes, "suspected") Black 
servicemen. 36 In September 1967, Britain's Middle East 
Command banned Black airmen from the Persian Gulf, and, in 
March 1967, from Aden for two reasons. First, difficulties 
developed with the local populations. Secondly, and more 
galling for the Black R.A.F. men, White R.A.F. police often 
stopped and searched them as possible Arab terrorists. In 
contrast, both the R.A.F. and the army posted Black 
personnel to Malaya served with no reported difficulty. 37 
The Black experience in the scaled down regular forces 
of the post-war era varied considerably, but generally seems 
35P.R.O. DEFE. 7/1040. Lord Carrington, First Lord 
of the Admiralty, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 5 June 1961. 
36P.R.O. DEFE 7/1040. "Policy for Posting Coloured 
Personnel to Overseas Stations," by A.W.B. McDonald, Air 
Member for Personnel, 7 June 1960. 
37
"Coloured R.A. F. men 'humiliated,'" and Minister 
explains Aden ban," Times (London), 8 May 1967, p. 4. 
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to have worsened over the decades. Black servicemen 
suffered from racism in the form of outright verbal or 
physical violence, stereotyping, or in being made a "pet." 
Barbadian John Ashton Brathwaite was an outstanding example 
of a man thoroughly embittered by his army career in the 
early 1960s. He witnessed many cases of racism, especially 
vicious name calling and intimidation. At considerable 
financial loss, he obtained an early discharge, citing the 
fact that he gained no benefit from the army, could not 
integrate socially, and "most important," he perceived the 
British army to be "a brutal and racist organisation" in 
which, he, "being a Black person, was wasting precious 
time." 38 In addition to outright hostility, Black personnel 
faced stereotyping by Whites. For example, Allan C. 
Wilmot's colleagues asked him whether he lived in a tree or 
never needed a wash, or where he learned to speak English. 39 
A former, and perhaps, typical, White officer informed the 
author that "From my own experiences of [West Indian 
soldiers] when we served in West Germany 1959-63 they 
complained of the cold and when we were posted to Libya in 
1963-66 all they wanted to do was lie in the shade of a palm 
38 J. Ashton Brathwaite, Black British Soldier (New 
York: Kibo Books, 1986), 64. 
39Wilmot. 
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tree." 40 More positively, but still patronizingly, many 
individual Black servicemen became popular, 41 often being 
remembered for their athletic abilities. 42 
Black individuals have achieved high rank within the 
forces. In 1996, The King's Regiment had a Sikh captain who 
had risen through the ranks 43 while the Royal Regiment of 
Wales had a captain of Arab descent who had also been a 
private soldier. 44 Trinidadian Larry Osborne joined the 
R.A.F. in 1943 and remained with the service after the war, 
served in a number of capacities and rose to the rank of 
Group Captain before retiring in 1977. 45 Also, Jamaican 
Vidal Dezonie enlisted in the R.A.F in 1944 and remained 
until 1982, retiring at the rank of Flight Lieutenant. 
Throughout his long service, he found the R.A.F. free of 
40N.D. Mcintosh to author, 27 November 1995. 
41R.A. Bonner wrote of two St. Lucians in the 
Manchester Regiment: "They were very popular young men, 
although rather fond of the German girls." Bonner 
(Manchester Museum Committee of the King's Regiment) to 
author, 24 January 1996. 
42 J.S. Cowley (Light Infantry Office) to author, 28 
November 1995; J.M. Grundy (Regimental Museum of the Royal 
Regiment of Wales) to author, 6 December 1995. 
43Bonner. 
44 Bryn Owen (Curator, The Welch Regiment Museum), to 
author, 27 November 1995. 
450bituary, Sunday Guardian (Port of Spain), 14 
April 1996, p. 14. 
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racism. 46 In 1987, the highest ranking Black army officer 
was a major general in the signals branch. 47 Although 
Blacks can attain high rank, the author has not discovered 
any Black officers in command of infantry or mounted units, 
with the exception of a Gurkha battalion. 
IV. The Return of the Color Bar? 
It appears that the 1970s witnessed the largest 
presence of Blacks, proportionately as well as numerically, 
in Her Majesty's forces, especially the army. It has been 
estimated that, during the 1970s, Blacks made up 10 percent 
of the army's Royal Green Jackets, an elite regiment, 48 and 
about one hundred members of the Royal Anglian Regiment. 49 
In 1987, however, only 1.6 percent of applications to the 
forces came from minorities, although they comprised 5.7 
percent of Britain's fifteen to twenty four year-old age 
bracket. The fear of racial abuse was believed to be a 
factor for the low figures. 50 By 1990, the only infantry 
regiments with a "noticeable number" of Blacks included the 
46Vidal Dezonie, in Forty Winters On, 11. 
47Killingray, "Race and Rank," 284. 
48Antony Beevor, Inside the British Army (London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1990), 26. 
49Quoted in St. Jorre (de), 199. 
50
"Forces Aim to breach colour barrier," Times 
(London), 19 February 1988, p. A8. 
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Green Jackets, the Parachute Regiment, and southeast English 
regiments. According to a recent account on the British 
army, Scottish regiments have a well-known reputation for 
loathing Blacks, "yet they have a great affinity for the 
Gurkhas, presumably because they are fellow highlanders and 
play bagpipes. " 51 
From the mid-1980s, the forces have experienced 
numerous publicized instances of racism. Perhaps the most 
embarrassing situation involved the Queen's personal 
bodyguards, the Foot Guards and Household Cavalry regiments 
of the Household Division. These exclusive regiments, whose 
ceremonial duties draw hundreds of thousands of tourists to 
London annually, have stubbornly and notoriously resisted 
accepting Black volunteers. One of the tactics used by the 
Guards to prevent Blacks from joining them had been to allow 
applicants to go through the recruiting process, including 
tests, medical exams, and interviews. Black applicants 
would then be told that, for undisclosed reasons, they 
failed the physical or that no vacancies currently existed, 
and that other regiments should be considered. 52 In 1986, 
Prince Charles, in opposition to his father, the Duke of 
Edinburgh, publicly criticized the Guards' color bar. In 
51Beevor, 2 6. 
~Quoted in St. Jorre (de), 198. 
276 
response, the Grenadier Guards admitted Richard Stokes who, 
on 16 May 1988, became the first Black member of the 
Household Division to stand guard at Buckingham Palace. 
However, he left the regiment in 1990, ostensibly because of 
racist threats and bullying. 53 In June 1995, the Commission 
for Racial Equality charged that the elite Household Cavalry 
regiments systematically excluded Blacks from enlisting or 
transferring in from other units. Soon after, the Royal 
Life Guards accepted Mark Campbell. 54 
Public pressures forced the Ministry of Defence to 
encourage minority enlistment by adopting equal 
opportunities directives and monitoring the number of Blacks 
in the forces. In 1988, the forces recorded the entrance of 
28,652 Whites (35 percent of 81,098 applicants), 195 Blacks 
(24 percent of 825 applicants), seventy three Asians (18 
percent of 398 applicants), thirty four Other Ethnic Groups 
35 percent of ninety six applicants), 459 not specified (39 
percent of 1,174 applicants) . 55 The Ministry of Defence 
rejected an all-party committee's demand that it monitor the 
53
"Black Guard at Palace," Photo., Times (London), 
16 May 1988, p. 3. 
54
"Army racism under fire," Sunday Times (London), 
18 June 1995, sec. 1, p. 5; "First Black Life Guard asks to 
leave the Army, Times (London), 9 December 1995, p. 9. 
55Ministry of Defence, U.K. Defence Statistics 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1994), 34. 
277 
number of Blacks enlisted into each particular regiment of 
the army. 56 The refusal allowed individual regiments to 
continue barring Blacks. 
Discriminatory recruiting policies coincided with 
accusations of rampant racial abuse within the forces, 
especially the army, to discourage prospective minority 
applicants. In the late 1980s and 1990s, a number of Black 
servicemen and ex-servicemen filed suit against the Ministry 
of Defence. In early 1987, Stephen Anderson left the army 
because, while a private in the Devon and Dorset Regiment, 
he allegedly suffered verbal and physical abuse at the hands 
of White soldiers. 57 In 1991, the Ministry of Defence 
awarded him five hundred pounds. 58 In 1988, the army 
discharged Winston Lindsay, the second Black Grenadier 
Guard, for going absent without leave, just nine months 
after enlistment. Two years later, he sought damages from 
the Ministry of Defence for racial harassment and 
discrimination. 59 Similarly, Geoffrey McKay, formerly of 
56
"Race check rejected," Times (London), 19 July 
1988, p. 2. 
57
"Forces aim to breach colour barrier," Times 
(London), 19 February 1988, A8. 
58
"Compensation," Times (London), 16 October 1991, 
p. 8. 
59
"Big guns fail to quell army racism claims, Times 
(London), 28 January 1990, p. clO. 
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the Queen's Own Royal Irish Hussars, received eight thousand 
pounds in 1992; and Anthony Evans of the Royal Regiment of 
Wales, eighty-five hundred pounds in 1993. 60 Evans 
testified that a kangaroo court of his colleagues had 
charged him with "being Black." 61 
The decisions in favor of the soldiers directly 
challenged the services' long-held assumption that soldiers' 
behaviors and attitudes could or should not be controlled by 
higher authorities. The army confirmed the change in 
attitude in early 1996, when it issued all soldiers with a 
code forbidding racist jokes, graffiti, nicknames, terms, 
and the "exclusion of indi victuals from social occasions. " 62 
Also, the commanding officer of the Household Cavalry, a 
regiment which had been singled out by the Commission for 
Racial Equality for "institutional discrimination," ordered 
every member of the regiment to attend race relations 
classes as part of his training. 63 Furthermore, in July 
60
"Army racism under fire," Times (London), 18 June 
1995, sec. 1, p. 5. 
61Hugh Muir, "Officers mostly to blame," Electronic 
Telegraph, 5 March 1996. 
62 Philip Johnston, "Army aims to curb racism in its 
ranks," Electronic Telegraph, 28 March 1996. 
63
"Household Cavalry to be taught a lesson on racial 
discrimination, Times (London), 29 March 1996, p. 1. 
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1997, the Ministry of Defence created a confidential 
telephone help-line for Black service personnel "who feel 
they are being bullied and do not know what to do about it 
or how to make an official complaint. " 64 Thus, Black service 
personnel received permission to circumvent the chain of 
command to seek relief. 
Despite the current trend of downsizing, the army has 
been unable to recruit enough men to meet its shrinking 
requirements, in part because of low minority enlistment. 
Minority recruitment in 1993-4 stood at 1.8 percent in the 
navy, 1 percent in the army, and .5 percent in the R.A.F. 65 
To deflect criticism, the Ministry of Defence produced a 
number of recruiting brochures in the 1990s specifically 
targeted for racial minorities. Often presented in several 
languages, they invariably contained personal testimony by 
serving Black service personnel disclaiming any experience 
of discrimination. 66 Unfortunately for service recruiters 
and public relations officers, in April 1996, the minority 
presence in the forces stood at 1.4 percent with only 1.1 of 
64 Joy Copley and Hugh Muir, "MOD acts to stamp out 
racism in the ranks," Electronic Telegraph, 28 July 1997. 
65
"Advisors to combat racism in Army, Times 
(London), 28 March 1996, p. 6. 
66 The Ministry of Defense provided the author with 
recruiting literature developed with racial minorities in 
mind. In a navy brochure, an officer of Sikh descent is 
featured in a naval version of the turban. 
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all off ice rs being Black. 67 
In 1996, the Office of Public Management (O.P.M.) 
reviewed the ethnic recruiting initiatives and racial 
atmosphere of the three branches. The navy, according to 
the O.P.M.'s report, was "not justified in describing itself 
as an equal opportunities employer. " 68 Meanwhile, the 
O.P.M. criticized the army because "racially offensive 
language, behavior, and attitudes remain a significant 
feature of life in the Army." 69 The O.P.M. urged the 
services to reform themselves in order to better reflect the 
diversity of the British population and tap an under-
represented source of manpower. 70 
As part of the military's new policy of racial 
inclusion, an updated version of the famous First World War 
"Your Country Needs You" poster has been adopted by the 
Ministry of Defence's public relations firm. In it, the 
face of a Black Royal Artillery officer replaced that of 
Lord Kitchener, one of the most successful and influential 
imperial generals of the Victorian and Edwardian eras. 71 
670ffice for Public Management, Review of Ethnic 
Minority Initiatives: Final Report (London: 1996), 14. 
680.P.M. Review: Royal Navy/Royal Marines, 4. 
690. p .M. Review: Army, 6. 
700.P.M. Review: Final Report, 11-2. 
71Andrew Gilligan, "'We got it wrong on Blacks, ' 
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Army chief admits," Electronic Telegraph 12 October 1997. 
Dr. Jo Hays pointed the new recruiting strategy out to the 
author. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has attempted to trace how the racial 
attitudes of the British military establishment affected 
imperial defense policy from the Glorious Revolution through 
the present, with an emphasis on the period from 1900 to 
1950. Historically, Black colonial troops formed a crucial 
part of the imperial order of battle, but British racial 
views limited the extent of colonial military participation. 
By adhering to the "martial races" theory, British 
authorities relied upon a relatively small proportion of 
their subjects for military service. Also, the degree of 
White racial anxiety was expressed through policies 
regarding locally raised militia and volunteer corps. 
Further, the fear for White prestige, which would be 
supposedly weakened by inter-racial sex and violence, made 
the British reluctant to bring Black troops into contact 
with Europeans outside of structured colonial settings. 
Other, seemingly "practical," matters limited the 
involvement of colonial troops in British war efforts. 
First, a lack of "suitable" officers restricted the 
expansion of colonial forces during the world wars. Prior 
to Indianization and Africanization, the empire-justifying 
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idea of White prestige had necessitated Black subordination. 
Non-European officers were introduced into the colonial 
forces gradually and only as part of the process of de-
colonization. Secondly, colonial troops never received the 
confidence of British authorities in regard to military 
effectiveness. In the nineteenth century, the British 
assumed that White troops were inherently better than Black 
soldiers. However, as Social Darwinism lost ground in 
Britain and the complexity of warfare increased during the 
twentieth century, British authorities generally cited 
cultural and educational background for the superiority of 
White soldiers. The lack of education, in turn, owed much 
to British policies informed by stereotypes and political 
requirements. Finally, the British had decided that Black 
colonial troops could not be brought to Europe because they 
would die in the cold climate, a belief that had mirrored 
the British army's own medical experience in tropical 
regions. 
In the British armed forces proper, formal policies 
concerning Black enlistment and commissioning changed 
significantly over time, although the actions of the forces 
usually reflected a desire to restrict Black enlistment as 
much as possible. The Georgian army and navy frequently 
sought out Black recruits to serve in the roles of musicians 
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or seamen. To appear superior in a growing multi-racial 
empire justified by Victorian constructions of "race," the 
forces had to be or, at least, pose as racially pure. 
British military policy and attitudes limited who could 
serve and these policies ran counter to the chronic scarcity 
of recruits experienced by the forces throughout their 
histories. The acceptance of the scarcity of recruits was 
part of the trade off of colonial rule over Black subject 
peoples. In the First World War and again in the Second, 
the imperial government over-ruled military sentiment and 
temporarily suspended the color bar. These actions 
reflected a political anxiety about the racial situation 
within the empire. 
The period since the Second World War witnessed many 
changes in the colonial relationship between Britain and its 
Black subject peoples although one nostalgic throwback to 
the "glory" days of empire has been the continued employment 
of Gurkha mercenaries. Reflecting new political realities, 
the government permanently removed the color bar in 1947. 
However, within the forces, it appears that race relations 
have not been harmonious. During the past decade, they 
actually deteriorated and minorities have been discouraged 
from enlisting. The forces have now come under close public 
scrutiny for widespread racism, but they have retained a 
remarkable degree of internal autonomy in resolving their 
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chronic race problems. The army's sentimental attachment to 
the "martial races" theory of a by-gone empire has coalesced 
with its hostility to Blacks in a current Ministry of 
Defence plan to integrate, into existing recruit-starved 
British units, hundreds of redundant Gurkha soldiers whose 
own units disbanded as a direct result of the return of Hong 
Kong to China. 
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